Skeptical Science

The world without solar and wind?

Tue, 6 Oct 2026 15:35:19 EST

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink

Twenty years ago, wind, solar and other non-hydro renewables were close to a rounding error. In 2005 they supplied a mere 2.0% of the world’s electricity generation. By 2015 that had risen to 6.8%, and by 2025 it was up to 19.8%. According to the IEA Electricity 2026 outlook, non-hydro renewables will supply around 21.8% of global electricity in 2026, edging past natural gas (21.6%) to become the second-largest source of power after coal.1

That is a remarkable pace of growth from an industry that barely existed two decades ago. But not everyone is impressed; many commenters on social media have responded to these figures by pointing out that despite the growth of renewables, fossil fuel generation continues to grow as well. They aren’t wrong; global coal generation set a record in 2024. Gas generation reached a new high in 2025.

Their point is that clean energy isn’t replacing fossil fuels at all. It’s simply being piled on top of them to feed an ever-growing appetite for electricity, making this an “energy addition” rather than an energy transition. Global fossil electricity generation around 50% higher today than it was in 2005. Coal generation rose by 3,300 TWh and gas by 3,200 TWh. The world burns more coal for power now than it did when wind and solar started taking off.

This argument has been made in the past both by skeptics of growth and by energy systems modelers. The historian Jean-Baptiste Fressoz argues in More and More and More (2024) that “far from the industrial era passing through a series of transformations, each new phase has in practice remained almost wholly entangled with the previous one.” Coal mining created a huge new demand for timber for pit props, while the oil age ran on steel made with coal. Vaclav Smil has made the same point about today’s clean energy boom more bluntly: ”We use more fossil fuels today than at any time in history… Renewables are not replacing fossil fuels; are joining them.”

The question of counterfactuals

The problem with the “addition” argument is that it compares the world today with the world in 2005, rather than with the world as it would have been without clean energy. Electricity demand has not grown because wind turbines and solar panels were built. It has grown because of what the IEA describes as “rising consumption from industry, electric vehicles, air conditioning and data centers”. Demand growth is located overwhelmingly in emerging and developing economies, which accounted for about 80% of global demand growth in 2025 and an average of 95% over the past decade.

Global electricity demand rose by 75% (13,600 TWh) between 2005 and 2025. That demand had to be met by something. Wind and solar supplied 5,400 TWh of new demand, hydro 1,500 TWh, bioenergy and other renewables 530 TWh, nuclear 85 TWh, and fossil fuels the remaining 6,100 TWh. But over the past decade the balance has shifted sharply toward clean energy. Since 2015, wind and solar supplied 57% of demand growth, compared with 29% for fossil fuels. And in 2025, according to Ember’s Global Electricity Review 2026, “wind and solar grew by 841 TWh, meeting 99% of global electricity demand growth”.

A 2024 study by Brantley Liddle found that “intermittent renewables (solar and wind) have unitary displacement effect.” In other words, each unit of wind and solar power displaced about one unit of coal and oil generation. Fossil generation has kept rising in many years because demand has grown faster than clean energy could be added. That is very different from clean energy failing to displace anything.

And electricity demand will continue to rapidly grow, particularly if we succeed in reducing global emissions by electrifying sectors of the economy that currently burn fossil fuels. Most scenarios where we reach net zero emissions involve a doubling or tripling of electricity generation.

So if we want to assess the real world emissions impact of wind and solar buildout over the past 20 years, the right question to ask is not “did fossil use go down?” but rather “how much higher would it have been?”

A world without wind and solar

To answer this, I built a counterfactual for the global power sector in which wind and solar (and geothermal, which is less than 2% of the total) stopped growing in 2005. In every separate country, their generation is held at 2005 levels, while electricity demand, nuclear, hydro and bioenergy follow their real-world paths.2 The missing clean generation has to come from somewhere, and in this counterfactual it comes from fossil fuels.

The key choice is which fossil fuels are used to fill in the gap. A wind farm in China or India displaces coal, while one in Texas or the UK mostly displaces gas. So rather than assuming a single global fossil mix, the analysis fills each country’s gap with that country’s own coal, gas and oil mix in each year, using data for about 200 countries from Ember. This keeps real-world coal-to-gas switching like what occurred during the US shale gas boom in place, rather than crediting it to renewables.3

Without wind and solar growth since 2005, global power-sector CO2 emissions in 2025 would have been 28% higher, at 16.9 billion tonnes rather than 13.2 billion. This adds up to 3.7 billion tonnes avoided in 2025, which is about three-quarters of the total CO2 US emissions that year (or roughly 1.5x EU emissions).

Between 2006 and 2025, wind and solar avoided about 23 billion tonnes of CO2. The biggest assumption I’ve made is what fossil fuel fills in the gap: if every missing kilowatt-hour had come from gas, avoided emissions would be 15 billion tonnes, while if it was all coal it would have been 30 billion.

This lines up almost exactly with Ember’s own estimate. Using a simpler method (and a 2000 baseline rather than 2005 baseline), Ember’s Global Electricity Review 2026 found that “had wind and solar not grown since 2000, fossil generation would have been 30% higher in 2025, and emissions 28% higher.”

While its true that global electricity emissions have yet to clearly peak, it may well be imminent; emissions went down in 2025 and may be on track to decline in 2026 as well, though rapid increases in demand from vehicle electrification and data centers have made this a bit more challenging.4 But there are many countries in which electricity emissions have already peaked and declined substantially, and where clean energy has played a key role in those declines.

Already replacing fossil fuels in some countries

Globally, clean energy has not yet led to fossil fuel use peaking in the electricity sector. In 2025, fossil generation was essentially flat (down ~0.3%). But that global total hides a lot of country-level variability. In many wealthier economies, where demand has grown more slowly, clean energy has driven real emissions reductions (even when accounting for the outsourcing of some industrial production).

Between 2005 and 2025, power-sector CO2 emissions fell by 75% in the UK, 55% in the European Union and 37% in the United States.

The reasons why differ from place to place:

In the EU, wind and solar account for about 85% of the decline (512 of 601 million tonnes), even though falling nuclear output pushed emissions up by about 100 million tonnes.
In the UK, the decline had three main drivers: wind and solar (56 million tonnes), lower domestic generation (58 million tonnes, partly because the UK now imports more power), and the near-elimination of coal, which went from 45% of UK fossil generation to effectively zero (36 million tonnes).
In the US, switching from coal to cheaper natural gas cut emissions by 682 million tonnes, slightly more than wind and solar (606 million tonnes), while a 12% rise in electricity use added 352 million tonnes. Coal’s share of US fossil generation fell from 69% to 29%.

Without wind and solar growth, EU power emissions would have fallen by only about 16% since 2005 rather than 55%, US emissions by about 17% rather than 37%, and UK emissions by about 53% rather than 75%. In these regions clean energy has not just met new demand, its actually pushed fossil generation down.

What about temperatures?

Avoided emissions translate into avoided warming, but the story here has an important twist. Coal plants don’t just emit CO2. They also emit sulfur dioxide, which forms aerosols that reflect sunlight and cool the planet. A world with more coal would also have had more of this aerosol pollution and the cooling it causes, though exactly how much depends on the use of scrubbers, the sulfur content of the coal, and a number of other factors.

To capture the complex dynamics here, I ran the counterfactual emissions (CO2, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, black and organic carbon, and methane leaked from coal mines and gas supply chains) through the FaIR climate model, using a 841 parameter ensemble constrained to match the climate sensitivity and carbon cycle feedback values assessed in the IPCC AR6 as well as observed warming.

The CO2 avoided by solar and wind growth between 2005 and 2025 has prevented about 0.01C of warming. Adding the methane that would have leaked from the extra coal mining and gas production, the gross effect is larger still. But the extra sulfur that would have been emitted by fossil fuels in that counterfactual world would have masked most of that for now. Taking everything together, the net avoided warming in 2025 is only about 0.002C (−0.008 to +0.009C).

However, this comparison is a bit apples and oranges. Aerosols wash out of the atmosphere within days to weeks, while CO2 persists for centuries (and the warming from CO2 for millennia). Once the extra aerosols clear, the avoided warming from wind and solar deployment to date settles at about 0.01C by 2035. Cooling from sulfur pollution depends on how much is being emitted in a given year, while the warming from CO2 depends on how much has built up over time. So while a new coal plant (in our counterfactual world) would lead to an immediate spike of cooling sulphate aerosols, that effect would be overtaken by warming from CO2 – which will persist long after the coal plant is closed and the cooling from sulfur emissions is gone. Trading a small, temporary cooling from air pollution for permanent warming is a bad bargain, and it comes with catastrophic public health costs of breathing that pollution.

These warming numbers are modest, but they reflect only 20 years of deployment. Much of it is also very recent: 60% of all the emissions wind and solar avoided came in the last five years. The world has emitted roughly 2,600 billion tonnes of CO2 since 1850, so 23 billion tonnes is just under 1% of that total.

More importantly, the 0.01C is only the effect to-date of what has been built so far, assuming the counterfactual world’s extra emissions stopped at the end of 2025. In reality, the wind and solar fleet will keep running and keep growing. At today’s rate, each additional year of operation avoids roughly 3.7 billion tonnes of CO2, and that rate is rising quickly as deployment accelerates.

Addition and displacement at the same time

Clean energy has been an addition to the global power system, but not in the sense the critique implies. It has been added alongside rapidly growing demand that would have existed anyway, and it has displaced fossil generation that would otherwise have been built and burned. Both things are true at once, which is why fossil use can rise while clean energy is still cutting emissions.

Without the wind and solar built since 2005, the world’s power plants would be emitting 28% more CO2 today. Over the long term, the world would be warmer. The warming avoided so far is small (and partly hidden by the side effects of cleaner air), but it grows with every year that clean energy continue producing power. Many countries have already seen their power sector emissions decline, the world as a whole appears to now be on the cusp of absolute declines in electricity sector emissions.

Methods, code and data for this analysis are available over at my GitHub.

1 The 2026 breakdown here is: 10.3% of global generation from solar, 9.1% from wind, 2.2% from bioenergy, and 0.3% from geothermal. Note that the analysis later in the piece looking at what would have happened without clean energy growth excludes bioenergy from its analysis, given the complexity of emissions accounting there.

2 There is a mechanism by which clean energy could in principle add to demand: if cheap wind and solar lower electricity prices, people and firms may use more power. That rebound effect is real, but it would need to be enormous to account for demand growth on the scale seen, and lower cost power can also enable emissions reductions through increased electrification (heat pumps, EVs, etc.). Accounting for a rebound would at most modestly reduce the avoided emissions we estimate.

3 Additional methodological details: Europe is treated as a single interconnected grid, so that Scandinavian wind displaces German and Polish coal and gas rather than fossil plants Sweden doesn’t have. Plants can’t run above realistic capacity factors; where existing plants would be maxed out, the model builds new ones in the fuel each country has been adding. Emissions are calculated from combustion emission factors that vary by country and year, drawn from CEDS, the US EIA and Chinese official statistics, and are net of the emissions from manufacturing the wind turbines and solar panels themselves.

4 Not all electricity demand increases are a bad thing from an emissions standpoint. Vehicle electrification is driving more demand growth than data centers globally, and that demand is coming at the direct expense of oil consumption (and associated emissions).

America is hurtling toward a power grid crisis

Mon, 5 Oct 2026 15:05:27 EST

This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections

A crisis is brewing for the U.S. electricity grid – one that could make your electric bill skyrocket and thwart efforts to address climate change.

To understand the problem, think of transmission lines – the poles and wires that transport electricity from power plants to homes and businesses – as an interstate highway system for electrons. Like too many cars on the road, too many electrons traveling across power lines can cause traffic jams.

These sorts of jams haven’t been a problem until just recently, as power-hungry data centers proliferate and demand from electric vehicles, heat pumps, and air conditioning grows.

As a result, Americans’ electricity rates, which already spiked by more than one-third over the past five years, are poised to keep rising.

Read: Home electricity bills are skyrocketing. For data centers, not so much.

What’s more, when rising demand meets inadequate grid capacity, that slows efforts to address climate pollution. When new clean power sources are stymied by too much traffic on power lines, existing fossil fuel power plants are forced to remain in service and burn gas and coal more often. And when data centers are unable to connect to the grid, they often build dirty on-site natural gas power generation instead.

Adding more transmission lines to the grid would ease congestion, but on average, permitting and building a new transmission line in the U.S. takes a decade. Some big multistate transmission lines have taken over three decades to complete. And the Trump administration recently axed Congress’ attempts to accelerate the process.

A bipartisan group of senators just released a bill that would reform permitting for transmission lines and other large projects, speeding up the process for constructing new lines. But time is running short in this session of Congress, and the stakes of inaction are high.

"Failing to pass permitting reforms would have real consequences for all of us,” said Zach Zimmerman, director of research and policy for Grid Strategies, a power sector consulting firm, in an email. “Every year that major transmission projects are delayed means higher system costs and less ability to move power where it is needed during extreme weather. Without reform, we will continue to pay more for the grid.”

The U.S. has struggled to modernize its grid

The demand for electrons on the U.S. power grid remained relatively flat for decades, increasing by a mere 5% between 2005 and 2023.

Now that’s changed: Analysts at the consulting firm ICF forecast that U.S. residential electricity rates could rise another 15% to 40% over the next five years and double by 2050, with power grid traffic jams being a root problem.

U.S. electricity demand from 2000 to 2025 (blue) in terawatt-hours (TWh) and the range of forecasts (green) by various groups. (Image credit: created by Dana Nuccitelli with data from Ember, Princeton REPEAT, American Clean Power, Bank of America Institute, Enverus Intelligence Research, and McKinsey & Company)

In 2024, the Department of Energy concluded that the U.S. would need between a doubling and quadrupling of its transmission capacity by 2050 in order to affordably meet growing power demand and maintain grid reliability.

To create that capacity would require a build-out of roughly 5,000 miles per year of high-capacity regional transmission, plus additional miles of interregional transmission, according to Grid Strategies. But it took the U.S. nine years, from 2017 through 2025, to build the last 5,000 miles of transmission lines, Grid Strategies estimated.

The only recent year that came close to the 5,000-mile target was 2013, when Texas built close to 3,000 miles of transmission lines. That was the result of a 2005 Texas state law that encouraged building transmission lines in areas with high potential for wind power, known as “competitive renewable energy zones.”

U.S. transmission build-out has since stagnated, averaging just 600 new miles per year since 2017.

Read: How blue California and red Texas became green powerhouses

Miles of new high-voltage transmission lines built in the U.S. per year between 2010 and 2025, compared to the Grid Strategies estimated need of 5,000 new miles per year. (Image credit: Created by Dana Nuccitelli with data from Grid Strategies and Americans for a Clean Energy Grid)

For comparison, China has been building over 1,000 miles of ultrahigh voltage power lines per year. Ultrahigh voltage transmission lines are like the high-speed rail of transmission. They can carry more electrons more efficiently than America’s high-voltage transmission lines.

Congress has failed to speed up transmission line permitting

Like Texas, Congress passed a law in 2005 in an effort to spur more transmission lines, but with far less success.

One challenge transmission projects face is obtaining permits in every state and local jurisdiction along their proposed path. That can be an onerous and time-consuming process with many potential veto points. In contrast, Congress in the 1938 Natural Gas Act gave the entity now known as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission the authority to act as a one-stop shop for interstate natural gas pipeline permits.

Lawmakers tried to establish a similar process for interstate transmission lines in the 2005 Energy Policy Act. That law instructed the Department of Energy to establish “National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors.” These are areas where it would be in the nation's interest to build electrical transmission lines relatively quickly, for example, to relieve traffic jams on the grid. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission would then have the authority to permit transmission lines along these corridors in consultation with states.

But for over 15 years, the Department of Energy was unable to designate any such corridors due to a series of court decisions in favor of states, landowners, and environmental groups, ruling that the bill’s language was insufficiently clear. Congress subsequently tried to clarify its intent in the 2021 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act.

And that effort seemed to succeed. In December 2024, the Department of Energy finally advanced three proposed National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors in the areas identified as having the greatest need for additional transmission capacity.

The Department of Energy’s “rough approximation for illustrative purposes” of its three retained proposed National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors in December 2024. (Image credit: U.S. Department of Energy)

But in August 2026, Trump’s Energy Secretary Chris Wright announced that he was canceling these three proposed corridors. Despite acknowledging the importance of building new transmission lines, Wright characterized these proposals as part of “a climate-alarmist agenda” intended by the Biden administration “to advance their Green New Scam agenda and accelerate decarbonization.”

What’s next?

Zimmerman of Grid Strategies identified several measures that could speed up domestic transmission permitting and development.

For example, Congress could allow important transmission projects to move directly to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for permitting, rather than waiting for the Department of Energy to first define national interest corridors. That would also depoliticize the process, because the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission operates more independently from the White House than the Department of Energy.

Zimmerman also pointed to a 2024 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission rule called Order 1920. That rule, among other things, requires utilities and regional grid operators to consider the next 20 years of power demand forecasts in their transmission planning rather than simply considering short-term needs.

There’s also “a need for Congress to improve permitting for large-scale transmission and address interregional transmission. And establishing a transmission investment tax credit would be helpful,” Zimmerman said by email.

In order to avoid prolonged fights over who pays for how much of a proposed transmission line, Congress could also establish a formula for fairly allocating its costs among the beneficiaries and define the types of benefits that should be included in that cost allocation.

Congress narrowly failed to pass the Energy Permitting Reform Act in 2024, which would have implemented many of Zimmerman’s recommendations. An analysis by energy systems experts at the nonpartisan think tank RMI estimated that the transmission permitting reform provisions in that bill could have allowed enough clean energy to connect to the U.S. grid to reduce the country’s climate pollution by billions of tons.

This week, a group of senators introduced the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act, which also includes many of Zimmerman’s recommendations. A preliminary analysis of some of the transmission provisions in the bill from the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions estimated that they would cut climate pollution by billions of tons in the next 15 years while reducing Americans’ electricity bills by $19 billion and lessening the risks of widespread power outages.

“This analysis shows that practical reforms to transmission planning and interconnection processes can unlock more clean energy, reduce our reliance on natural gas, lower costs for consumers, and help build a cleaner, more reliable electric grid,” said Nat Keohane, president of the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions. “These benefits are within reach if we move quickly to modernize the systems that power our nation.”

This article first appeared on Yale Climate Connections and is republished here under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #40

Sun, 4 Oct 2026 10:29:28 EST

A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, September 27, 2026 thru Sat, October 3, 2026.

Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Policy and Politics (7 items)

Midterm Battleground State Poll: Political Priorities & Opinions on the Clean Energy Transition The data relating to “climate hushing” is particularly revealing, showing that — by large margins — battleground state voters (a) want politicians to spend more time talking about climate change (not less), and (b) are more likely to vote for candidates who make transitioning away from fossil fuels a top priority if elected. Environmental Voter Project, EVP staff, Sep 22, 2026.
Gavin Newsom condemns Democrats` `climate hushing`, predicts Trump`s downfall and expects AOC to run in 2028 Energy modernization means more affordable energy and politicians should not be afraid to say it. The Guardian, Mark Hertsgaard, Sep 24, 2026.
Fed up with Brazil’s politicians not listening, a climate scientist runs for office Luciana Gatti, who studies carbon uptake in the Amazon, aims to join Brazil’s lower house in this weekend’s elections Science, Daniel Grossman, Sep 28, 2026.
Alito`s Recusal From Climate Case: Too Little, Too Late? The justice’s participation in the Boulder case already may have been pivotal, and his continued stock holdings—including in fossil fuels—keep an ethics cloud over the Supreme Court. Inside Climate News, Marianne Lavelle, Sep 29, 2026.
AI Was Supposed to Cut Emissions. Instead, Fossil Fuel Companies Are Using It to Find More Oil and Gas. A new study found AI-driven fossil fuel productivity could increase emissions. Here are examples of companies already using AI to boost production. Desmog, Sarah Hofmann, Sep 30, 2026.
A Climate Change Rebrand More politicians have stopped talking about the climate, but love of money and risky geopolitics leave the 'green transition' still moving forward. NYT, Katrin Bennhold, Oct 01, 2026.
Texas can`t hide from climate change by stopping students from learning about it Climate change will shape the future of Texas. Students should be allowed to learn about it. The Climate Brink, Andrew Dessler, Oct 02, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (7 items)

`Concerning` low sea ice persists as Antarctic hits third-lowest winter peak Antarctic sea ice has recorded its third-smallest winter peak extent since satellite records began 48 years ago, new data reveals. Carbon Brief, Ayesha Tandon, Sep 25, 2026.
Who is responsible for limiting global warming to 1.5°? Climate mitigation as systems integration: researcher models and quantifies Interlocking systemic changes spanning government, industry and households necessary for adhering to a 1.5°C warming limit. Phys.org, Irene Ketting, Sep 27, 2026.
Godzilla El Niño is about to hit the Arctic. How bad will it be? Part 1 of a 2-part collaboration between Dave Borlace ("Just have a Think") and Ella Gilbert (Dr Gilbz) about possible connections between the Super El Nino and Artic sea ice in the northern and Antarctica in the southern hemisphere. "Just have a Think" on Youtube, Dave Borlace, Sep 27, 2026.
“Godzilla” El Niño = crashing Antarctic sea ice? Part 2 of a 2-part collaboration between Dave Borlace ("Just have a Think") and Ella Gilbert (Dr Gilbz) about possible connections between the Super El Nino and Artic sea ice in the northern and Antarctica in the southern hemisphere. Dr Gilbz on Youtube, Ella Gilbert, Sep 27, 2026.
The impacts of this year`s record-shattering El Niño El Niño will drive severe drought from Indonesia to the Southern Africa and northern South America, with wetter winters from the US Gulf Coast to Southern South America. The Climate Brink, Zeke Hausfather, Sep 28, 2026.
Planetary Health Check 2026 The 2026 Planetary Health Check identifies 7 of 9 planetary boundaries as exceeded and includes a special focus on carbon sinks. Planetary Health Check, Carlos Nobre et al. , Sep 29, 2026.
Skeptical Science New Research for Week #40 2026 Skeptical Science's weekly survey of academic, government and NGO climate research. Skeptical Science, Doug Bostrom & Marc Kodack, Oct 01, 2026.

Climate Change Impacts (7 items)

Explainer: How sea level rise poses an `existential threat` to humans, heritage and nature Here, Carbon Brief unpacks some of the key ways that sea level rise threatens both societies and ecosystems. Carbon Brief, Giuliana Viglione, Sep 22, 2026.
Sea level rise is reshaping a California beach town and threatening a key rail line “The constant pressure is sea level rise,” said Sean Vitousek, research oceanographer with the U.S. Geological Survey. “It is going to keep rising, and rising, and the beaches will retreat landward.” AP News, Amy Taxin, Sep 27, 2026.
Antarctica`s ice loss is locked in, and extra snowfall won`t save it - that`s bad news for low-lying coastal areas elsewhere The Conversation, Yucheng Lin, Robert Kopp, Sep 30, 2026.
Past emissions will continue warming the planet for decades New research shows that past emissions from oil, gas, coal, and cement will continue to affect the environment and increase the odds of extreme weather for decades. Futurity, U. Washington, Sep 30, 2026.
Swiss glaciers suffer another year of record ice loss Switzerland's glaciers lost more than 5% of their ice in 2026, marking another year of rapid decline. NPR, Imogen Foulkes, Sep 30, 2026.
Gas from thawing Arctic permafrost is changing world's climate future Two recent studies project that by the end of this century, methane in permafrost liberated by warming due to burning of fossil fuels will add a quarter degree Celsius of warmth to Earth's atmosphere. AP News, Seth Borenstein, Oct 02, 2026.
Europe`s Extreme Summer Triggered Cascading Climate Shocks A summer of record heat, severe drought and compounding impacts tested Europe's infrastructure and resilience. Inside Climate News, Bob Berwyn, Oct 02, 2026.

Climate Law and Justice (4 items)

Scrutinizing the Achievement of Climate Targets, Part I: The Widening Reach of Implementation Litigation Columbia University's Sabin Center for Climate Change Law does a deep dive into the role of judiciaries and courts in forcing governments to actually do as they say they will to deal with climate change mitigations. Climate Law Blog, Joe Udell and Filippo Fantozzi, Sep 28, 2026.
Inside the anti-climate campaign against researchers A POLITICO investigation reveals more than 100 open records requests demanding documents from climate scientists nationwide. Politico, Chelsea Harvey, Lesley Clark and Corbin Hiar, Sep 29, 2026.
States want to make Big Oil pay for climate harm. Now, courts are weighing in. New York’s "climate superfund” law has suffered two losses in court, while a U.S. Supreme Court case next week could determine the fate of similar efforts nationwide. Grist, Joseph Winters, Sep 30, 2026.
The surprising allies backing Boulder`s climate case before the Supreme Court Ranchers, conservative legal scholars, and former Republican EPA chiefs are siding against oil companies. Here's why. Grist, Kate Yoder, Oct 01, 2026.

International Climate Conferences and Agreements (1 item)

`We want action`: Fijian climate activist sends message ahead of UN talks in Pacific Lavenia Naivalu has seen the impact of the climate crisis first-hand and is determined to amplify Pacific voices at this year’s pre-Cop summit in Fiji The Guardian, Sera Sefeti, Oct 02, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Solutions (1 item)

Australia`s climate chief promises harder line on misinformation Senior public servant says bureaucrats will speak up about misinformation that risks policy progress. Politico, Miriam Webber, Oct 01, 2026.

Miscellaneous (1 item)

2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #39 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, September 20, 2026 thru Sat, September 26, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, Sep 27, 2026.

If you happen upon high quality climate-science and/or climate-myth busting articles from reliable sources while surfing the web, please feel free to submit them via this Google form so that we may share them widely. Thanks!

Skeptical Science New Research for Week #40 2026

Thu, 1 Oct 2026 14:24:30 EST

Open access notables

Centuries of global heating from Carbon Majors: Dependence on future emissions pathways, Frierson & Henrie, PLOS Climate

We perform simulations that attribute the amount of global warming due to corporations, governments and other entities into the future. We utilize the Finite Amplitude Impulse Response (FaIR) model run until 2500, and the Carbon Majors dataset, a database with the emissions history associated with the top 178 oil, gas, coal, and cement producers. We perform counterfactual experiments to calculate the warming attributable to the emissions associated with these entities, using several different future emissions scenarios. The future atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) anomaly attributable to a company’s past emissions is smaller with less ensemble spread in a lower emissions future than it is in a high emissions future. This is due to smaller carbon cycle feedbacks with lower emissions. However, the temperature change from past emissions is larger in a lower emissions future, even with the smaller change in CO2. This is due primarily to the logarithmic sensitivity of CO2 radiative forcing to concentration. Methane concentration post-2080 experiences a negative anomaly, due to a decrease in methane lifetime from elevated temperature, which is a small negative feedback. For any future emissions scenario, the historical emissions from oil, gas, coal, and cement producers affect many aspects of the climate system, including CO2 in the atmosphere and other parts of the carbon cycle, methane, ozone, and stratospheric water vapor. The total radiative forcing induced by these elements stays positive throughout all simulations, which in turn causes positive temperature perturbations. Thus in addition to the damages that have already occurred, we expect the Carbon Majors to be responsible for calculable climate damages for many centuries into the future.

Global Emissions Since the Paris Agreement Have Intensified Europe's Recent Heatwaves, Trok et al., Geophysical Research Letters

Understanding the consequences of continued greenhouse-gas emissions requires determining whether recent emissions can be robustly linked to changes in extreme weather events. However, current approaches have a limited ability to quantify changes in extreme weather caused by small subsets of anthropogenic emissions, particularly for individual events. To address these limitations, we train a generative machine-learning model to predict spatially-explicit changes in daily surface temperature at different levels of cumulative emissions, conditional on the event's observed meteorological conditions. Using this approach, we find strong evidence (>95% probability) that the combined effects of anthropogenic emissions released since the 2015 UN Paris Agreement have increased the intensity of Europe's summer temperature extremes since 2021. Additionally, our results suggest >99% probability that regional-mean temperature during Europe's high-impact June 2025 heatwave would have been lower (median estimate of 0.34°C) if the same large-scale meteorological conditions had occurred under 2015 levels of cumulative emissions.

Permafrost-Thaw Driven Acid-Rock Drainage Threatens Arctic Aquatic Ecosystems, Skierszkan, AGU Advances

A new study in this issue of AGU Advances (Evinger et al., 2026) documents abrupt onset of acid-rock drainage from thawing permafrost in Alaska's Brooks Range. Similar findings emerged from a publication in Science earlier this year (Skierszkan et al., 2026a, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aea2898). This Viewpoint provides a broader regional context of the phenomenon, highlighting widespread acid-rock drainage within northwestern North America's permafrost zone. Acid-rock drainage is accelerating release of metals and acidity at toxic concentrations in thousands of seepages in regions undergoing permafrost thaw. As such, it may be of the most consequential recently recognized environmental hazards caused by cryosphere loss. This widespread outcome of global warming presents a major risk to water resources and aquatic ecosystems.

Abrupt Onset and Persistent Downstream Effects of Acid Rock Drainage on Rivers Across Northwest Arctic Alaska, Evinger et al., AGU Advances

Warming in the Arctic is accelerating permafrost thaw, leading to changes in the water quality of streams and rivers that provide important ecosystem services to rural communities. In Arctic Alaska, a growing concern is the increasing number of rivers affected by natural acid rock drainage, a process that occurs when certain minerals are exposed to air and water, releasing acid, sulfate, and a mixture of major and trace metals. Here, we examined the effects of acid rock drainage on river chemistry across six watersheds in Alaska's Brooks Range. Acid rock drainage inputs were extremely acidic, with concentrations of nickel, zinc, and cadmium similar to those observed in mine-impacted rivers outside the region. Acidic, metal-rich inputs to rivers raised metal levels downstream by up to 70 times, with the potential for long range transport (>100 km). We used long-term water quality records to constrain the timing of onset to 2019–2020, which coincided with warm, snowy conditions of the preceding winters. Collectively, our findings document the recent and abrupt onset of acid rock drainage that releases toxic metals to Arctic rivers, with implications for wildlife and humans.

Understanding the Gateway: Unpacking the Mechanisms, Boundaries, and Outcomes of Climate Consensus Messaging, Göbel et al., Journal of Environmental Psycholog

Communicating the scientific consensus on climate change acts as a gateway to increasing climate beliefs, a process described by the Gateway Belief Model (GBM). Although the effectiveness of this approach is well-documented, critical gaps in the literature persist. Few studies have scrutinized the risks of low-consensus messages and their correctability, the potential for consensus messaging to have an impact beyond self-reported measures, or the cognitive mechanisms driving belief updates. This study addresses these three critical areas in a German sample (N = 941). First, we demonstrate the powerful adverse effect of a low-consensus message on the perceived scientific consensus (PSC) and show that this effect can be corrected through subsequent accurate messaging. Second, we introduce learning as a novel cognitive outcome, finding that high-consensus messaging can act as a gateway to knowledge acquisition. Third, we explore initial confidence as a key psychological moderator, revealing that it influences belief updating under certain conditions.

From this week's government/NGO section:

Planetary Health Check 2026, Caesar et al., Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research

The Planetary Health Check (PHC) provides an annual assessment of the state of the Planet. It is structured around the Planetary Boundaries: the nine critical processes that regulate stability, resilience, and the conditions that support life on Earth. For each boundary, one or two indicators, known as control variables, are used to assess its status. These show whether conditions remain within the Safe Operating Space – the range in which the risk of destabilizing the Planet remains low. Beyond a boundary lies the Zone of Increasing Risk, followed by the High-Risk Zone, where the risk of large-scale and potentially irreversible changes becomes high. The 2026 Planetary Health Check finds that seven of the nine Planetary Boundaries are transgressed, and trends for all seven continue to point in the wrong direction, indicating further deterioration in the conditions that support long-term planetary stability.

The Billion Dollar Deal: How the Fossil Fuel Industry Bought the Trump Administration, Cashed In, and Left Americans to Pay the Price, Senate Democrats Anti-Corruption Initiative, Senate Environment & Public Works Committee

The authors trace the massive fossil fuel and polluting industry donations to President Trump and Republican campaigns during the 2024 election cycle and demonstrates how the industries unlocked power over executive branch agencies in the form of personnel and policy decisions. Senate Democratic investigators found over the course of 19 investigations into Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory rollbacks, 13 investigations into nine other agencies, and another 13 investigations into 88 separate polluters, backed by original analyses of campaign finance filings, corporate earnings, and investor communications. The near-total refusal of the Trump Administration—and the fossil fuel administration that runs it—to cooperate with legitimate Congressional oversight complicated the investigations, but truth has a way of finding the light, and some corruption casts a shadow too unmistakable to conceal.

134 articles in 64 journals by 882 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

AMOC Discrepancies across Reanalyses and Models Limit Dynamical Understanding, Raganato et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0618.1

Contrasting aerosol–cloud feedbacks across a warming Arctic, Chua et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41561-026-02114-x

Exploring the Genesis and Climatic Drivers of Marine Heatwaves in the Indonesian Maritime Continent: Insights from South Java and Karimata Strait, Iskandar et al., Dynamics of Atmospheres and Oceans 10.1016/j.dynatmoce.2026.101709

Iceberg Freshwater Transport Alleviates Future Weakening of Antarctic Bottom Water Formation, Shi & Li, Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.20710821

Reassessing the Role of the Antarctic Slope Current in Poleward Ocean Heat Transport, Aguiar et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc023934

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A climate change signal in the tropical Pacific emerges from decadal variability, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52731-6 20 cites.

Observations of climate change, effects

A country-level storyline attribution of global warming on heat-related extremes in South America, León-FonFay et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100961

Climatic and Hydrological Changes Drive Contemporary Fire Regime Transitions in the World's Largest Wetland, Barros-Rosa et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71089

Decreasing Translation Speed of Rapid Expansion Tropical Cyclones Over the Western North Pacific, Li & Tang, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl125625

Earlier and faster heatwave onset on land under a warming climate, Xu et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02762-2

Long-term temperature, oxygen and water clarity trends in Swiss lakes, Bärenbold et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-18-6527-2026

Nighttime warming dominates the thermal evolution of lakes across China, Chen et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-78114-7

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
South America is becoming warmer, drier, and more flammable, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01654-7 75 cites.

Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

A 30-year synthetic climatological normal dataset for Ghana generated using the CDSim framework, Osei et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1798088

Capability of Planet Dove for monitoring the world's coastlines, Cavanaugh et al., Remote Sensing of Environment Open Access 10.1016/j.rse.2026.115630

GloSVeT: a global 0.05° monthly mean surface soil and vegetation component temperature dataset (2003–2023), Liu et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-6885-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Accuracy of daily extreme air temperatures under natural variations in thermometer screen ventilation, Atmospheric Science Letters, 10.1002/asl.1256 7 cites.

Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

Assessing Taiwan's Future Climate: High Resolution Projections and Regional Impacts From Statistical Downscaling of CMIP6 Data, Chen et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access 10.1002/joc.70431

Centuries of global heating from Carbon Majors: Dependence on future emissions pathways, Frierson & Henrie, PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0001036

Changing Antecedent Land-Surface Conditions Can Amplify Future Heat Extremes Across New Zealand, Debsharma et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124647

Climate change is projected to widen global inequalities in ocean-derived wellbeing, Zhang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04070-1

Global Emissions Since the Paris Agreement Have Intensified Europe's Recent Heatwaves, Trok et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl125079

Mediterranean cyclones from pre-industrial to future climate: changes in extreme wind, precipitation and compound precipitation–wind events, Doensen et al., Weather and Climate Dynamics Open Access pdf 10.5194/wcd-7-1899-2026

One History, Many Futures: Exploring Climate-Driven Changes in Estuarine Water Temperature and Salinity (Sado Estuary Case Study), Biguino et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007408

Projected Future Changes of Australian Boundary Currents—Insights From Dynamical Downscaling Simulations, Jin et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jc024251

Reduced Asian monsoon influence on Mediterranean summers in a warmer climate, Yu et al., Nature Geoscience 10.1038/s41561-026-02091-1

Volcanic Aerosol Forcing Suppresses Tropical African Rainfall: Mechanisms and Modulation by a Warmer Climate, Yu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046721

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Arctic Amplification of marine heatwaves under global warming, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52760-1 25 cites.

Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

Atmospheric nudging in weather and climate modeling: Bias reduction, mechanism isolation, and attribution, Orbe et al., Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 10.1002/qj.70300

CMIP6 data usage: lessons learned from more than 200 million downloads, Lavoie et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-8977-2026

Fifteen years of regional climate downscaling in CORDEX-Australasia, Evans et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0001066

Impact of Model Resolution on Antarctic Bottom Water Representation in Coupled Climate Models, Shu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2025jc023640

Simulation of Coastal El Niño Events in CMIP6 Models and Its Relationship to Mean-State and ENSO Biases, Tello & Karamperidou, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025gl120974

Systematic Overestimation of Global Peak Runoff Synchronization in CMIP6 Models, Yang et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl122766

The NASA-GISS ModelE2.1-CC2 ESM: development and evaluation, Romanou et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-9131-2026

The North American CORDEX-CMIP6 WRF evaluation run: comparing historical simulations from 25 km to convection-permitting scales, Stuivenvolt-Allen et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-8995-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
AI-empowered next-generation multiscale climate modelling for mitigation and adaptation, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01527-w 88 cites.

Cryosphere & climate change

A comprehensive rock glacier inventory for the Peruvian Andes (PRoGI): dataset, characterization and topoclimatic attributes, Medina et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-345-2026

Dynamic thinning and grounding line retreat in Porpoise Bay, Wilkes Land, East Antarctica, Weatherley et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-20-5509-2026

Impact of climate forcing time step in an ice-sheet firn model, Aker et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-20-5475-2026

Listening to Tsunami Waves Induced by Glacier Calving, G?owacki et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl125399

Permafrost Detachment Slides: A Distinct High-Magnitude Permafrost Mass Wasting Process, Young et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124103

Permafrost-Thaw Driven Acid-Rock Drainage Threatens Arctic Aquatic Ecosystems, Skierszkan, AGU Advances Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026av002822

Sea level & climate change

North Atlantic sea level budget revisited, Song et al., Ocean science Open Access pdf 10.5194/os-22-2903-2026

Warming and Sea-Level Rise Transform Intertidal Sediment Thermal Dynamics, Liu et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026ef008924

Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Coupled increases in pelagic fish productivity and export productivity during the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, Zhou et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-77863-9

Dead Sea Warming and the Origin of Salt Giants, Guillerm et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124167

Palaeocene climate warming as a catalyst for wildfire intensification, Theurer et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-72676-8

Reconstructing Climate From Coral Skeletal Banding: Statistical Effects of Replicating Cores and Observers, Hedger et al., Paleoceanography and Paleoclimatology Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026pa005546

Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Abrupt Onset and Persistent Downstream Effects of Acid Rock Drainage on Rivers Across Northwest Arctic Alaska, Evinger et al., AGU Advances Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026av002407

Abrupt pH changes overestimate the responses of Chaetoceros muelleri to ocean acidification, Zhao et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-77753-0

Changes in Potential Suitable Habitats, Species Turnover, and Conservation Gaps of Wild Plants in the Tarim Basin, China, Chen et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.74393

Climate Change Impacts on the Distribution Patterns and Habitat Suitability of the Oriental Stork (Ciconia boyciana) in China: Implications for the “30 × 30” Conservation Targets, Chen et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.1002/ece3.74424

Climate mitigation contributes more to population persistence than evolutionary adaptation in a long-lived seabird, Jenouvrier et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2620362123

Climate-Driven Hydraulic Traits Shift in Natural and Planted Forests: Patterns, Drivers, and Future Acclimation, Bai et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025ef006678

Climate-Driven Shifts in Flowering Phenology of Wild Tropical Plants Uncovered by Century-Long Herbarium and Photographic Records, Xue et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71130

Complete Chloroplast Genomes of Five Ulmus pumila Cultivars: Comparative Analysis, Evolutionary Dynamics, and Germplasm Authentication Implications, Wang et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.74352

Economic incentives for conifers may limit broadleaf expansion in climate-adaptive European forests, Djahangard et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04087-6

Natural disturbances from bark beetle outbreaks and windthrow increasingly affect Europe's most mature and carbon-rich forests, Besnard et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-5983-2026

Ocean dynamics amplify remote warming effects of reforestation, Banville et al., Earth System Dynamics Open Access 10.5194/esd-17-1315-2026

Ocean warming and acidification reveal transcriptional plasticity in the gastropod Hexaplex trunculus, Sarropoulou et al., Marine Environmental Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.marenvres.2026.108426

Permafrost-Thaw Driven Acid-Rock Drainage Threatens Arctic Aquatic Ecosystems, Skierszkan, AGU Advances Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026av002822

Projecting Impacts of Marine Heatwaves and Their Effects on Long-Term Changes in Marine Ecosystems Over the 21st Century, Luzinais et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.71123

The Future of Native Bees in Australia Under Environmental and Anthropogenic Change, Howard & Prendergast, Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.74363

Unprecedented Warming and Increased Herbivory Drive Collapse of Japan's Kelp Forests, Harvey et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71106

We Are Dying to Eat You: Cannibalism and Disease Transmission Under Global Climate Change, Rougeau & Elderd, Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.74403

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate change and deer in boreal and temperate regions: From physiology to population dynamics and species distributions, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17505 26 cites.

GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

A 7-Year Eddy Covariance Dataset of the Energy, Water Vapour and Carbon Dioxide Fluxes Observed in a Siberian Dwarf Pine Ecosystem, Iwata et al., Geoscience Data Journal Open Access pdf 10.1002/gdj3.70101

A Global Database of Soil Methane uptake (SMUD), Jiang et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-18-6783-2026

An assessment of a CO₂ transport model simulations using surface, aircraft and satellite data (2015–2021), Das et al., Atmospheric Environment 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2025.121754

Assessment of CO₂ storage potential in global marine sediments based on machine learning methods, Zhang et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2025.105210

C-PEAT's Global Peatland Carbon Database (v.2025), Loisel et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-18-6485-2026

Examining challenges and uncertainties associated with using water table management to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from grassland peat soils, Pierce et al., Environmental Science & Policy Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104495

Global carbon dioxide flux into the surface ocean intensified by rain-induced dilution, Witte et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41561-026-02112-z

Global dispersal of macroalgae-derived recalcitrant DOC may substantially contribute to deep-ocean carbon storage, Feng et al., Science Advances Open Access 10.1126/sciadv.aeg3815

Methane emissions from penguin colonies reshape the natural greenhouse gas budget, Román et al., npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41612-026-01556-9

Methane oxidation in African lakes increases with phytoplankton and outweighs photosynthesis-driven oxic methane production, Borges et al., Nature Communications Open Access 10.1038/s41467-026-78255-9

Minimal impact of recent decline in C₄ vegetation abundance on atmospheric carbon isotopic composition, Lavergne et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-025-03102-6

Natural methane emissions feedbacks in MAGICC v. 7.6, Sloughter et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-9063-2026

Optimized wetland rewetting strategies can control methane, carbon dioxide, and oxygen responses to water table fluctuations, Zhao et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-025-03163-7

Pelagic sea cucumbers in the Galapagos: Midwater grazers that short-circuit deep-sea carbon flux, Robison, Ecology Open Access pdf 10.1002/ecy.70536

Responses of Soil Organic Matter and Minerals to Winter and Growing Season Climate Change, Goebel et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71110

Simulation and analysis of CO₂ concentration in China from 2009 to 2021 based on the WRF-Chem model, Liu et al., Atmospheric Research 10.1016/j.atmosres.2025.108732

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Inland water greenhouse gas emissions offset the terrestrial carbon sink in the northern cryosphere, Science Advances, 10.1126/sciadv.adp0024 40 cites.

CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

Assessing Earth system responses in mitigation scenarios with activity-driven simulation of carbon dioxide removal, Schwinger et al., Earth System Dynamics Open Access pdf 10.5194/esd-17-1341-2026

Fast and selective CO₂ capture from outdoor air by covalent organic frameworks, Zhou et al., Nature Sustainability 10.1038/s41893-025-01735-1

Land use sequestration potential and uncertainties in India’s net-zero pathway, Rajbanshi et al., Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.21853095

Pathways for biochar carbon removal: A national foresight study, Campion et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104988

The Triassic Mercia Mudstone Group: Sealing the UK's net zero future, Mcevoy et al., Earth-Science Reviews Open Access 10.1016/j.earscirev.2026.105678

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Carbon sequestration potential of tree planting in China, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52785-6 101 cites.

Decarbonization

Regional dynamics of agrivoltaics adoption: Stakeholder perceptions and barriers in Maryland, USA, Morash & Pavao-Zuckerman, Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2025.115066

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Solar transpiration–powered lithium extraction and storage, Science, 10.1126/science.adm7034 244 cites.

Geoengineering climate

Biogeochemical and Carbonate Chemistry Response to Natural and Anthropogenic Mineral-Based Ocean Alkalinity Enhancement, Mehta et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2026jg009697

Constraints on Ocean Alkalinity Enhancement: Limited Olivine Dissolution and Secondary Precipitation During Periclase Addition to Seawater, Mehta et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jg009977

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Next steps for assessing ocean iron fertilization for marine carbon dioxide removal, Frontiers in Climate, 10.3389/fclim.2024.1430957 17 cites.

Black carbon
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Microplastic and Associated Black Particles From Road-Tire Wear: Implications for Radiative Effects Across the Cryosphere and in the Atmosphere, Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres, 10.1029/2024jd041116 26 cites.

Aerosols

Climate impact of contrail cirrus from hydrogen combustion aircraft, Pettersson et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-13485-2026

Volcanic Aerosol Forcing Suppresses Tropical African Rainfall: Mechanisms and Modulation by a Warmer Climate, Yu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046721

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A machine learning paradigm for necessary observations to reduce uncertainties in aerosol climate forcing, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52747-y 27 cites.

Climate change communications & cognition

Information on public opinion has lasting effects on second-order climate beliefs, but minimal and ephemeral effects on first-order beliefs, Barnfield et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.102901

Strategic Frame Differentiation in Environmental Communication: Evidence from China Daily's Bilingual Climate Change Reporting, Yang et al., Environmental Communication 10.1080/17524032.2026.2674274

The Importance of Accounting for Stakeholder Values, Power Relationships and Language in Constructing Relevant and Trustworthy Climate Information, Maraun et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2024ef005618

Understanding the Gateway: Unpacking the Mechanisms, Boundaries, and Outcomes of Climate Consensus Messaging, Göbel et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.102913

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Understanding ecological grief as a response to climate change-induced loss in Ghana, Climate and Development, 10.1080/17565529.2024.2407342 17 cites.

Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

Agricultural liming is a carbon sink in the Mississippi River Basin, Suhrhoff et al., Nature Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41586-026-11040-2

Association between climate variability adaptation practices and household food security in three agro-ecological zones of northwestern Ethiopia, Nega et al., Discover Sustainability Open Access 10.1007/s43621-026-04827-w

Comparative analysis of methane flux measurement methods under continuous flooding and alternate wetting and drying in Arkansas rice fields, Ranniku et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111488

Evaluating farmers' adaptation strategies amid rising heat and climatic extremes in San Diego County, California, Bross et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100880

Manure to insect farming for feed mitigates nitrogen and greenhouse gas emissions, Cheng et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2604870123

Modeling the agricultural suitability of key crops under climate change scenarios in british columbia using spatial machine learning, Vakhshoori et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111492

Multi-Decadal Analysis on the Impact of Climate Change, Genetic Gain, Cultivar Type, and Harvest Timing on Main and Ratoon Rice Yield and Quality, Wilson et al., Global Change Biology Open Access 10.1111/gcb.70679

Regional dynamics of agrivoltaics adoption: Stakeholder perceptions and barriers in Maryland, USA, Morash & Pavao-Zuckerman, Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2025.115066

The carbon footprint of the farming of edible brown alga Sargassum naozhouense, Sun et al., Marine Environmental Research 10.1016/j.marenvres.2025.107738

The impact of climate risk on forestry ecological total factor productivity: evidence from double machine learning, Wang et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access pdf 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1930608

[Personal View] Promoting climate-resilient agriculture and food security through school feeding, Singh et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2025.101414

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Inventory of methane and nitrous oxide emissions from freshwater aquaculture in China, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01699-8 32 cites.

Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Anthropogenic warming is projected to divert atmospheric rivers toward densely populated Asia, Liang et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04075-w

Characterizing meso-level organizations engaged in climate change adaptation work in Africa: A configurational analysis, Ma et al., Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104503

Climate change integrated intensity-duration-frequency analysis for the coastal cities of Kochi and Kozhikode, India, Drissia & Radhakrishnan, Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103163

Decreasing Translation Speed of Rapid Expansion Tropical Cyclones Over the Western North Pacific, Li & Tang, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl125625

Emerging Hydroclimatic Risks in Pakistan: Regional Projections of Precipitation Characteristics Under CMIP6 Scenarios, Khan, International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70577

Evaluation and Projection of Northwest China's Extreme Precipitation Using Statistically Downscaled CMIP6 Models, Zhang et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70237

Observed Decreases in Seasonal Drought across the Northeastern United States, Wargo et al., Journal of Hydrometeorology 10.1175/jhm-d-25-0103.1

Reversed variation of September and October rainfall over West China and its enhanced linkage to Arctic Sea ice in the Pacific sector since the early 1990s, Wang et al., Atmospheric Research Open Access 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109364

Tree-ring δ¹⁸O reveals a consistent decrease in April precipitation in southeastern China since the 1950s and its linkage to global climate phenomena, Wang et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2025.105249

Volcanic Aerosol Forcing Suppresses Tropical African Rainfall: Mechanisms and Modulation by a Warmer Climate, Yu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046721

Water Storage Capacity Dynamics in Drained Boreal Peatlands: Responses to Rewetting and Climate Change, Salimi et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl124233

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Dynamic assessment of the impact of compound dry-hot conditions on global terrestrial water storage, Remote Sensing of Environment, 10.1016/j.rse.2024.114428 20 cites.

Climate change economics

Climate- and nature-related transition risks in Brazil: capital stranding and financial vulnerability, Scala et al., Figshare Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.33980207.v1

Measuring the compound flood risk from economic growth, sea-level rise and land subsidence on insurance affordability in China's coastal cities, Lin et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100877

New labour and agricultural damages improve climate cost estimates, Moore et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02749-z

The impact of financing cost differences on global energy and industry decarbonization, Waidelich et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41558-026-02756-0

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:

Reducing the cost of capital to finance the energy transition in developing countries, Nature Energy, 10.1038/s41560-024-01606-7 116 cites.

Climate change mitigation public policy research

A critical political economy of climate obstruction: forests, fossils, and foundations of developmentalism in Indonesia, Fünfgeld, Climate and Development Open Access 10.1080/17565529.2025.2609768

Carbon pricing and clean energy markets: Policy effectiveness in an era of trade wars, Jiang, Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115624

Institutional betrayal in climate action: Youth experiences and future pathways, Nosek et al., Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104497

Policy, trade, and opinion dynamics in the transition to electric vehicles in Canada, Khajehdehi et al., Environmental Research Infrastructure and Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1088/2634-4505/aea89b

Resistance as climate change mitigation: Contested emissions from Japan's anti-coal movement, Thiri et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104976

Time–frequency and distributional heterogeneity in the drivers of consumption-based carbon emissions across the E7 emerging economies, Fakhrullah et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1933128

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Green hydrogen transitions deepen socioecological risks and extractivist patterns: evidence from 28 prospective exporting countries in the Global South, Energy Research & Social Science, 10.1016/j.erss.2024.103731 70 cites.

Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

From awareness to action: Climate change knowledge, perceived impacts, and adaptation responses in coastal Keta, Ghana, Agyemang & Nunekpeku, Environmental Science & Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104502

From Policy to Participation: How Trust and Communication Shape Climate Resilience in Longyearbyen, Svalbard, Badu et al., Environmental Communication Open Access 10.1080/17524032.2026.2734419

Heat, water, and hillsides: An integrated diagnosis of compounded climate risks for coastal adaptation in Brazil, Torres et al., Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103164

Resolving the fire governance paradox in an increasingly fire-prone world, Devenish et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04090-x

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Urban water infrastructure: A critical review on climate change impacts and adaptation strategies, Urban Climate, 10.1016/j.uclim.2024.102132 98 cites.

Climate change impacts on human health

An open-access workflow combining climate model projections with epidemiological frameworks to assess air quality mortality, Wells et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1847091

Our lands, our minds: research and action agenda on Indigenous mental health in a changing climate, Hill et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1724441

[Articles] Projecting and valuing climate change impacts on anxiety and depression in the contiguous USA: a damage function approach, Belova et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2025.101426

[Comment] Framing climate change, migration, and health as a syndemic, Schwerdtle et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2026.101443

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Temperature-Driven Dengue Transmission in a Changing Climate: Patterns, Trends, and Future Projections, GeoHealth, 10.1029/2024gh001059 19 cites.

Climate change & geopolitics
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
“We rather not connect trade to politics, let alone geopolitics” – The changing role of Russia as a landscape pressure for zero-carbon energy transitions, Energy Research & Social Science, 10.1016/j.erss.2024.103775 12 cites.

Climate change impacts on human culture

Impact of climate change on ski tourism and its adaptation research: Progress and prospects, YANG et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.accre.2026.09.013

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Hajj pilgrims suffer from climate extremes, Science, 10.1126/science.adr2696 3 cites.

Other

Artificial Intelligence and Climate Risk Shocks, Chen et al., Risk Analysis Open Access pdf 10.1111/risa.70371

Women, cuckoos, and new generations among darkening peaks: temporalities of climate crisis in the Himalayas and beyond, Diemberger, Apollo (University of Cambridge) Open Access pmh:oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/408385

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The Evolution of the Hunga Hydration in a Moistening Stratosphere, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl110841 18 cites.

Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

Addressing Epistemic Risk in Actionable Earth System Science, Emard et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society Open Access pdf 10.1175/bams-d-24-0218.1

Carbon removal projects need to get justice right, Fritz et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41558-026-02739-1

COP29 at the climate crossroads: achievements, gaps, and implications for a warming world, Khan et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2025.1685999

[Personal View] Leave no one behind: a call to include people with disabilities in climate change and health research, Kim et al., The Lancet Planetary Health Open Access 10.1016/j.lanplh.2026.101440

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Diversity in IPCC author’s composition does not equate to inclusion, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02150-8 9 cites.

Book reviews

Climate unrest comes to a fictionalized France, Dames, UNC Libraries Open Access 10.17615/z3vg-n281

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

Global Recommendations on Nationality and Statelessness in the Context of Climate Change, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Peter McMullin Centre on Statelessness

The authors focus on practical measures that States and other stakeholders can take now to identify and protect stateless persons, and to reduce and prevent statelessness in climate-vulnerable contexts. The recommendations are intended to support practical action to prevent new cases of statelessness, reduce existing statelessness, and protect those whose rights are at risk in the context of climate change. They can be advanced through international, regional, national and local measures, including by integrating safeguards into nationality laws, and by informing efforts to strengthen civil registration and identity systems, human mobility frameworks, disaster risk reduction, emergency preparedness and response, and climate adaptation planning.

Software Developers on Climate Change, AI, and Sustainable Software: A survey of GitHub users, Summer 2026, Vorreuter et al., Yale Program on Climate Change Communication

This report is based on findings from a survey of GitHub users conducted between June 30 – August 9, 2026. 1,039 GitHub users were interviewed (18+) in the 50 U.S. states and Washington, D.C. All questions were administered online in English using the Qualtrics platform. Portions of this survey use validated items from Climate Change in the American Mind (CCAM), a nationally representative U.S. survey. These shared items make it possible to compare GitHub users’ responses to estimates from the U.S. general population, with the sampling caveats described in the Survey Method appendix. The purpose of the survey is to establish a baseline measure of software developers’ climate change beliefs and risk perceptions, their views on AI’s environmental impact, their perceptions of software efficiency as a lever for sustainability, and their expectations for employers, cloud providers, governments, and GitHub in addressing environmental effect. More than eight in ten respondents (86%) say global warming is happening, while 7% say it is not happening, and 6% say they do not know. A majority of respondents (53%) say global warming is caused mostly by human activities, and an additional 31% say it is caused by a combination of human activities and natural changes. About 1 in 10 (9%) say it is caused mostly by natural changes in the environment.

Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2026, Abraham et al., Climate Policy Initiative

Continued growth in turbulent times is led by private finance in domestic markets. Energy security is becoming more affordable per climate dollar. However, the rate of finance growth must increase dramatically to meet needs. Retreating international public flows create opportunity for domestic and catalytic solutions in Emerging Market and Developing Economies. Increased adaptation spending can sustain development gains.

Warming temperatures fueled evaporation, which, combined with low levels of rainfall, led to the agricultural drought this summer (Ireland), Bergin et al., ICARUS Climate Research Centre, Maynooth University, Met Éireann, and Teagasc

A new rapid attribution study shows that increased temperatures and evaporation levels directly linked to climate change will make for drier farming and land conditions. Human-caused warming has already increased the likelihood of extreme July Potential Evapotranspiration (PET) by approximately 8-fold and the intensity by 7% in Ireland. As global temperatures increase, the authors expect the likelihood and intensity of future July PET events to further increase, with a nearly 6% increase in PET on present levels expected at 3°C of warming globally. Really dry Julys in terms of low precipitation levels, like those experienced this summer, are becoming rarer. However, when these exceptionally dry Julys do occur, they are expected to bring even less rainfall. The evidence indicates that it was the PET which exacerbated the effects of the low rainfall conditions and therefore exacerbated the drought conditions experienced across Ireland in July 2026. In general, drying in July is being driven by rising temperatures, which leads to more evaporation, rather than changes in precipitation. Maximum and minimum summer temperatures are following the expected trend and it is becoming not only more likely to have warm summers, as experienced this year, but future summers are also set to become warmer, not just during the day but also at night.

451,000 at Risk, Greenstone et al., Climate Impact Lab

Scientists project that global land temperatures will be 1.2°C/2.1° F above normal in the coming months due in large part to the current “Super El Niño” that began in June and is expected to last through Northern Hemisphere spring. These anomalously warm conditions will resemble the higher temperatures that climate change is projected to deliver 20 years in the future and will lead to 44% more extremely hot days than expected in a normal year. El Niño is effectively pushing the world into the future – exposing people to temperatures that will not be the norm for another two decades – before people have time to adapt and protect ourselves. As a result, a projected 451,000 lives will be lost due to heat the first nine months (June-February) of El Niño, compared to a normal year. This is about 65 times larger than the 6,800 people believed to be dead or missing from the recent Nepal flash flood. In just the next 6 months, this includes 239,000 ± 11,000 deaths across the globe. With current forecasts suggesting El Niño will remain in place through spring 2027, all these numbers may grow even higher, particularly as effects such as higher-than-average temperatures and heat-related deaths will linger into June and July.

Germany’s Roadmap for Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels, German Government

The roadmap lays out the policy framework and the key strategies Germany will be pursuing in the various sectors in order to achieve its goal of climate neutrality and thus transition away from the use of fossil fuels no later than 2045. The scientific reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicate that ambitious climate action is urgently needed to mitigate the risks posed by climate change and secure prosperity for future generations. In spite of the progress being made, unceasing efforts are still needed. It is not only in Germany that climate policy faces massive challenges in view of the constantly shifting geopolitical and geoeconomic parameters. International cooperation on climate action and transitioning away from fossil-fuel-generated energy is absolutely critical in this regard.

Supply disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz stress test Southeast Asia's gas buildout, Warda Ajaz, GEM

Southeast Asia’s gas buildout shifts at the edges, but more than 100 GW of power remains in development. The author identified more than 100 GW of gas power capacity in development in May 2024, compared with roughly 106 GW still planned. Over that period, individual projects have moved into and out of development, but the overall scale of planned gas power capacity has remained above 100 GW. The region has planned more liquefied natural gas (LNG) import capacity even as the risks of reliance on LNG have become harder to ignore. LNG import capacity in development has risen from about 47 million tons per annum (mtpa) in 2024 to roughly 70 mtpa today, even as the Hormuz disruption tightened supply and drove up LNG prices in Asian markets. The continued expansion of LNG import infrastructure risks deepening exposure to the same supply disruptions and price volatility the crisis has brought to the fore. Domestic gas may cushion the shock in some countries, but it will not remove the region’s growing exposure to imported LNG. The author identifies at least 20 fields that could add around 62 bcm/y of production capacity by 2035, but new supply takes years to develop and may not even supply domestic power markets. The short-term pursuit of domestic gas offers no quick or assured fallback for countries exposed to tightening global LNG markets.

Americans’ views of data centers have turned more negative, Brian Kennedy, Pew Research Center

Americans have grown more negative toward the possible environmental and economic effects of data centers since the beginning of the year. And a majority say they’d be uncomfortable if a new data center started operating in their area. More than half of Americans (54%) now say data centers are mostly bad for the environment, up from 39% in January. Half say they are mostly bad for home energy costs, up from 38%. And 49% say they are mostly bad for people’s quality of life nearby, up from 30%. The new survey was conducted from July 20 to Aug. 9 among 10,548 U.S. adults. Just 4% of Americans think data centers have a mostly good effect in each of these areas.

Soybean: A Producers Guide to Drought Preparation and Recovery in the Southeastern United States, Plumblee et al., US. Department of Agriculture, Southeast Climate Hub

Drought is a natural part of the Southeastern United States climate and a threat to agricultural productivity and profitability. Whether slow developing or rapid onset, droughts can have negative effects on agricultural crops and livestock, depending on timing, severity, and length. Droughts are expected to become increasingly common in the Southeast due to increasing temperatures, longer dry periods between rain events, and growing water demand across the region.

Planetary Health Check 2026, Caesar et al., Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research

The Planetary Health Check (PHC) provides an annual assessment of the state of the Planet. It is structured around the Planetary Boundaries: the nine critical processes that regulate stability, resilience, and the conditions that support life on Earth. For each boundary, one or two indicators, known as control variables, are used to assess its status. These show whether conditions remain within the Safe Operating Space – the range in which the risk of destabilizing the Planet remains low. Beyond a boundary lies the Zone of Increasing Risk, followed by the High-Risk Zone, where the risk of large-scale and potentially irreversible changes becomes high. The 2026 Planetary Health Check finds that seven of the nine Planetary Boundaries are transgressed, and trends for all seven continue to point in the wrong direction, indicating further deterioration in the conditions that support long-term planetary stability.

U.S. Green Bank 50 Impact Report. Growing the Clean Economy: How U.S. Green Banks Mobilize Capital, Reduce Energy Costs, and Benefit American Communities, Green Bank 50

The U.S. Green Bank 50’s inaugural Impact Report is based on an analysis of a robust survey with responses from 48 Green Banks financing clean energy projects across the country, supplemented by more than 200 case studies, independent market research, and dozens of conversations with Green Bank executive leadership teams. The authors analyze the economic, energy, and environmental effects Green Banks have delivered to date; describes emerging strategic partnerships that pair aligned capital from new allies, such as Community Development Financial Institutions, or CDFIs, with the origination capacity of the Green Banks; discusses strategies to open secondary markets and promote the securitization of quality Green Bank loans; and provides recommendations for how Green Banks can bring community-focused clean energy lending to scale.

The authors trace the massive fossil fuel and polluting industry donations to President Trump and Republican campaigns during the 2024 election cycle and demonstrates how the industries unlocked power over executive branch agencies in the form of personnel and policy decisions. Senate Democratic investigators found over the course of 19 investigations into Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulatory rollbacks, 13 investigations into nine other agencies, and another 13 investigations into 88 separate polluters, backed by original analyses of campaign finance filings, corporate earnings, and investor communications. The near-total refusal of the Trump Administration—and the fossil fuel administration that runs it—to cooperate with legitimate Congressional oversight complicated the investigations, but truth has a way of finding the light, and some corruption casts a shadow too unmistakable to conceal.

U.S. Hydropower Market Report (2026 edition), Uría-Martínez et al., Oak Ridge National Laboratory

The authors describe the steady growth for one of America’s most affordable and reliable sources of domestic energy. They analyze the latest data from public and commercial sources, as well as findings from other Department of Energy research and development projects, to provide a comprehensive overview of the American hydropower and pumped storage hydropower (PSH) fleet and industry trends. The authors show that from 2010 to 2025, the U.S. hydropower fleet grew to include 2,258 hydropower plants and a total generating capacity of 80.55 gigawatts (GW), adding 2.1 GW to the national energy mix—enough to power 1.6 million American homes. This amounts to 5.6% of total electricity across the country. In addition, the 41-plant PSH fleet grew to a total generating capacity of 22.23 GW and storage capacity of 553 GWh or 82.1% of all utility-scale energy storage capacity, adding 1.7 GW through facility upgrades.

Developing Water Reuse Regulations: A State-Level Guide, Gerringer et al., The WateReuse Association

Each state has different drivers, regulatory landscapes, and rulemaking processes that affect how and why utilities and industry pursue water reuse. The guide provides entry points at the state level for readers to understand their local context and suggestions for how to navigate and engage in the rulemaking process in a way that protects public health and the environment.

State-Level Climate Security: Ohio, Madelyn MacMurray and Caroline Mallory, Council on Strategic Risks

Ohio faces escalating exposure to extreme precipitation, flooding, heat, and drought. In the first six months of 2026, the state accrued between $2 and $5 billion in natural disaster costs, ten times higher than the $250-$500 million in damages usually amassed by June. Aging infrastructure, legacy industrial pollution, and rapidly expanding energy demand from data centers compound these hazards, straining the systems that protect Ohioans from a changing climate.

Security, Integration and Industrial Policy: China’s 15th Energy Five-Year Plan, Michal Meidan and Anders Hove, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP; 2026–2030) arrives at a pivotal moment for the country’s energy system. It is the final full planning cycle before China’s 2030 carbon-peaking deadline, but it comes also in the context of a difficult external environment, weaker domestic demand in parts of the traditional economy, and a growing imperative to secure the technologies, materials and infrastructure required for China’s industrial development. The resulting energy agenda seeks to reconcile three objectives: energy security, industrial and technological leadership, and China’s climate commitments.

Carbon without borders: Building Europe’s CO2 market, Alevtyna Prykhodko, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

As Europe moves from carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) ambition towards large-scale deployment, the challenge is no longer simply how much infrastructure to build, but how to create a functioning carbon management market. The author examines how the coordination of CO? demand, transport and storage can shape CCS development, and why expanding individual parts of the value chain in isolation may not be enough to unlock deployment. Drawing on scenario, corridor and financial analysis alongside stakeholder interviews, the author explores how infrastructure choices can influence both the scale and geography of Europe’s emerging CCS market. The author highlights the role of industrial clusters and cross-border corridors, the potential of emerging storage regions in Central and Eastern Europe, and the policy choices that could determine which regions participate in, and benefit from, Europe’s future CO? network.

Will There Be an African Energy Revolution? That Depends on Who Funds What, Charles Kenny, Center for Global Development

The reach of electricity in Africa is rapidly extending, not least thanks to an explosion in imports of solar panels. This is good news for the quality of life of people in the region and is the primary route to sustainably extend electricity access, but it imposes some challenges on the utility sector. Most of the panels are being used domestically and at small scale. This worsens what were already considerable financial challenges for utility scale private provision. And it suggests a vital role for publicly funded electricity infrastructure to ensure high-quality, financially sustainable power provision, especially to industry

A Framework on Implementing a Compliance Solution Under the EU Methane Emissions Regulation, Rabbani et al., The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

The European Commission (EC) has introduced the concept of Compliance Solutions as a mechanism for complying with the Monitoring, Reporting and Veri?cation (MRV) requirements of the European Union Methane Emissions Regulation (EU MER) for imports of LNG/gas/oil from Producers in exporting countries. The goal of this paper is to provide stakeholders a framework to design and evaluate Compliance Solutions that are consistent with the EU MER and the EC Recommendations on Compliance Solutions. The authors introduce key concepts, framework principles, and design requirements to implement Certification and Trace and Claim Compliance Solutions for Producers, intermediaries, and Importers in complex supply chains aligned with the EC’s Recommendations and internationally recognized standards on verification schemes and chain of custody programs where additional prescription is warranted. As a case study, the authors assess the potential for the U.N. Environment Program’s International Methane Emissions Observatory/Oil and Gas Methane Partnership (IMEO/OGMP) to establish an independent entity that could serve as a Compliance Solution Provider against the framework presented.

A Research Strategy for Ocean-based Carbon Dioxide Removal and Sequestration 2026, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

The report is part of an ongoing effort to evaluate marine carbon dioxide removal (CDR) approaches and identify research priorities needed to inform future decision making. The authors examine marine CDR approaches using a common framework that considers scientific readiness, carbon removal performance, scalability, environmental and social impacts, governance readiness, and justice considerations.

Accelerating Climate Progress with AI: From Science to Action: Proceedings of a Workshop (2026), National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine

A workshop was held on January 13-14, 2026 to discuss the innovative ways AI can enhance climate science and foster resilience, with a focus on decision making and adaptation measures. The workshop brought together experts from government, nonprofits, the private sector, and academia to explore cross-sectoral engagement, identify critical applications where AI can help support climate decision making at speed and scale, and consider how AI's broader societal impacts affect approaches to addressing climate change. The publication presents a summary of the presentations and discussions from the workshop.

Beyond the blue line: Tackling climate, peace, and security challenges in Abyei, Andrew Yaw Tchie and Katongo Seyuba, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

Abyei, a disputed area between Sudan and South Sudan, faces interconnected climate, peace and security challenges that affect local communities and the operating environment of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). Drawing on the experiences of UNISFA, the authors examine existing responses to climate, peace and security challenges and opportunities to strengthen them. They recommend greater integration of climate, peace and security considerations into mission planning, training, early warning and preparedness, alongside support for community-level adaptation and social cohesion.

Considerations for Federal Leasing of Onshore Energy: Oil and Gas and Geothermal Power, McPherron et al., Congressional Research Service

Both oil and gas (O&G) and geothermal power are long-standing energy sectors for the United States. The two sectors have many similar characteristics, including use of subsurface resources, ability to provide baseload electricity production, development timelines, drilling technologies and processes, and types of environmental impacts. The technologies also have significant differences. O&G is a more mature sector, with more investment potential and more potential for competitive leasing, but it depends on finite, carbon-intensive resources. Geothermal power has growth potential due to developing technologies like enhanced geothermal systems and the potential to deliver lower-carbon electricity. Geothermal power also has challenges to greater deployment, including high capital costs, difficult operating conditions, lower profit margins on electricity compared to fossil fuels, and other market challenges. These similarities and differences influence how current onshore federal leasing and permitting laws and regulations impact each sector and can inform what changes might be relevant for the future management and development of federal lands and resources.

U.S. Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program: Overview and Considerations for Congress, Kathryn Kynett, Congressional Research Service

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP) in 2009 in response to a congressional directive mandating economy-wide reporting of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. EPA described the program's purpose as gathering comprehensive emissions data to inform the development of future climate change policies. The GHGRP requires reporting from three broad groups of covered entities. Direct-emitting facilities in covered source categories report the GHG emissions released directly from their on-site processes and fuel combustion. Suppliers of fuels and industrial gases report the potential emissions associated with their products if combusted, released, or oxidized. Facilities that inject carbon dioxide (CO2) underground must report the quantities of CO2 injected or sequestered underground. Reporting is generally subject to emissions thresholds for both direct-emitting facilities and suppliers, primarily a threshold of 25,000 metric tons of CO2 equivalent (MTCO2e) per year, although certain source categories are required to report regardless of their emissions levels. There is no threshold for CO2 injection facilities, which must report all quantities of CO2 sequestered or injected underground. Beginning in 2025, EPA initiated a series of actions to reconsider the scope and requirements of the GHGRP. In its 2025 proposed rule, EPA asserts that Section 114 does not authorize continued economy-wide data collection, that the data are not needed to carry out the CAA, and that eliminating most reporting requirements would relieve reporting entities of compliance costs. EPA estimates the proposal would produce significant cost savings for reporting entities. Stakeholder positions on EPA's proposal reflect a range of views.

U.S. Satellite Capabilities for Tracking the Wildfire Life Cycle, Keating-Bitonti et al., Congressional Research Service

Satellite capabilities support virtually every stage of the wildfire life cycle: characterizing the prefire environment (e.g., seasonal climate predictions, vegetation); detecting and monitoring wildfires and smoke; and assessing postfire hazards (e.g., debris flows, flash floods) and ecosystem recovery. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) notes that certain satellites provide "information about the location, duration, size, temperature, and power output of those fires that would otherwise be unavailable" through ground-based sensors, aerial drones, or aircraft. These approaches may provide complementary data to satellites, particularly when satellite data are limited in spatial and/or temporal (i.e., the time between observations of the same area) resolution and given the money and time to develop and deploy new satellites.

Midterm Battleground State Poll: Political Priorities & Opinions on the Clean Energy Transition, Beacon Research, Environmental Voter Project

The authors present key findings from a survey of 5,014 likely midterm voters across eight US Senate battleground states. The survey was conducted via online panel from August 28 – September 11, 2026. With large, balanced samples in each of the eight states surveyed — Alaska (460), Iowa (506), Maine (512), Michigan (708), Georgia (713), North Carolina (707), Ohio (507), and Texas (901) — these are functionally eight state-specific polls that can also be viewed as one larger, multi-state survey. The data relating to “climate hushing” is particularly revealing, showing that — by large margins — battleground state voters (a) want politicians to spend more time talking about climate change (not less), and (b) are more likely to vote for candidates who make transitioning away from fossil fuels a top priority if elected.

How Durable are Used Electric Vehicles?, New AutoMotive, British Vehicle Rental and Leasing Association

High-mileage electric cars are less likely to fail an Ministry of Transport (MOT) than equivalent petrol cars. Analysis of 47.4 million MOT tests found relatively little difference between electric and petrol cars at lower mileages once age and mileage are taken into account. From around 60,000 miles, however, the picture begins to change. Electric Vehicle (EV) MOT failure rates level off at approximately 16%, while those for petrol and diesel cars continue to climb. Among vehicles aged three to eight years with 90,000–120,000 miles on the clock, 16.5% of EVs failed their MOT compared with 22.1% of petrol cars. The authors also found no evidence that the additional weight of EVs results in more suspension problems, although EVs recorded more tire defects. Battery health is not assessed as part of an MOT and is therefore outside the scope of the study.

The Hidden Health Costs of AI Data Centers: More Power, More Pollution, Fewer Federal Protections, Environmental Protection Network

As AI data centers drive enormous new demand for electricity the authors find that federal policy is moving in the wrong direction for health, weakening pollution safeguards, accelerating approvals, reducing public information and participation, and diminishing the science and enforcement capacity needed to understand and control pollution. The authors document at least 30 federal actions since January 2025 that, taken together, increase pollution-related health risks as data centers expand. Those risks extend well beyond the data-center fence line, including pollution from on-site generators and turbines and from power plants supplying enormous new electricity loads many miles away.

Beyond indicators. Unpacking the greening agriculture agenda in the Near East and North Africa region, Tutundjian et al., Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

The authors present a Near East and North Africa (NENA)-specific analysis within the broader global framework for greening agriculture, examining progress, persistent gaps and the particular conditions shaping agricultural transformation across the region. They combine Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and environmental indicators with an assessment of policy, governance and institutional frameworks to provide a more comprehensive picture of greening agriculture in Near East and North Africa (NENA). The analysis highlights structural challenges related to water scarcity, soil and land degradation, biodiversity, climate change and inefficient resource use, while demonstrating how global and headline indicators may not fully capture country- and region-specific realities. The authors examine the extent to which enabling policy and institutional frameworks are supporting the transition towards more sustainable and resilient agrifood systems.

New Data for Africa’s Changing Climate: Mapping Risks, Readiness and Policy Action, The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Global Green Growth Institute, and the World Bank

The African continent is highly vulnerable to climate-related risks. At the same time, Africa contributes only 4% of global energy-related greenhouse gas emissions. Policymakers need foundational data on key climate indicators to point the way towards a low-carbon, climate-resilient path. Yet these data remain limited for most African countries. The authors aim to fill the gap in foundational data. First, they show how African countries and cities are exposed to major climate-related hazards, such as extreme heat, and assesses countries’ adaptation readiness. Second, they describe the climate mitigation policy landscape in African countries along with key policy trends. In doing so, they break new ground by building on novel datasets that use robust methods developed by the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the OECD Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC) and the World Bank, covering 28 African countries that jointly account for around 73% of African GHG emissions.

Recharged: Repowering America's Solar Fleet with Storage for a New Era of Demand, Price et al., Crux and Foundry-Logic

America's first generation of solar plants is aging out at the exact moment the grid can least afford to lose the capacity. What owners do with aging solar plants — retire them or reinvest to rebuild them — is an increasingly significant question for the solar market and the nation’s electricity system. The authors attempt to define an emerging market opportunity. They size the technical potential of U.S. solar repowering — the capacity it could unlock and the investment it would represent — using a bottom-up model of the installed fleet by installation year and segment. They also set out the variables including interconnection and permitting, capital sources, and tax credits and equipment rules, that owners and market participants will need to work through as they approach the opportunity.

Second-hand EVs retain their value better than industry claims, Transportation and Environment

Electric cars are retaining their value better than the leasing industry claims. This has major implications for potential buyers and the pricing of leasing deals and puts pressure on leasing companies, carmakers and governments to accelerate the EV shift. The discrepancy stems from how the value loss is calculated. The industry commonly relies on used-car transaction estimates for leasing and financing deals. In the four largest EU markets – Germany, France, Italy, and Spain – 2025 data on used transactions shows a 12.9 percentage point depreciation gap between combustion and electric cars. However, The authors' analysis reveals five key variables are omitted from these calculations. Adjusting for them reduces the gap by 80% to just 2.6 percentage points.

Renewing renewables: The next chapter in the energy transition, Lassen et al., Wood Mackenzie

As the first great wave of turbines and modules reach the end of their design life, owners are having to decide whether to abandon their sites, invest in extending their lifespans or renew them. The authors forecast that more than 2.5 terawatts of wind and solar projects will face this decision in the 2040s. As the transition to a new era of renewal occurs, repowering old sites with new equipment will become as important a driver of installations and output growth as opening new ones. The authors quantify the coming wave of decommissioning and repowering and show why, for many markets, this overlooked issue will be one of the most important factors shaping future growth.

Utilize Coalition white paper: A practical framework for measuring grid utilization, Noah Goldmann and Molly Knoll, Utilize Coalition

As states begin putting grid use into law and regulation, the authors offer a framework to measure how infrastructure is used over time, interpret that information in context, and use it to achieve better outcomes for customers. The authors provide a practical framework for utilities, regulators, policymakers, and stakeholders working to understand and apply grid use. Used alongside existing planning metrics and processes, use can help decision-makers distinguish where existing infrastructure can do more, where targeted solutions can address constraints, and where new investment is needed.

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The impacts of this year’s record-shattering El Niño

Wed, 30 Sep 2026 15:50:29 EST

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink

The 2026-27 El Niño is on track to be the strongest event in the instrumental record. The latest (September 2026) runs of the 14 seasonal forecast models that I track over at the Climate Dashboard put the event’s peak at around 4.1C in the Niño 3.4 region (with the middle 80% of ensemble members between 3.4C and 4.6C), well above the prior record of 2.75C during the 2015-16 El Niño.1

I’ve previously written about how unprecedenteted this event will be. The question I get asked most often now is a more practical one: what does it actually mean for the weather where I live?

I recently published a piece in Nature on the impacts of El Niño and what countries should do to prepare. But I can only fit so much in a short journal article, and there is vast scientific literature on regional El Niño impacts that has accumulated over the past few decades.

This post walks presents a map of higher-confidence El Niño impacts, with an in-depth discussion of each different region. Some of the canonical El Niño impacts show up in nearly every strong event on record, while others turn out to be closer to a coin flip when looking at the record of past events.

Expected regional impacts of the 2026-27 El Niño. Shading shows confidence from the teleconnection literature and the observed record of strong events. Shapes show where at least 80% of 13 seasonal forecast models agree on the sign of the rainfall or temperature anomaly (NMME and Copernicus C3S, September 2026 initialization). Regional impacts beyond the models’ forecast range (e.g. summer 2027) are drawn by hand. Each label shows how many of the eight strong El Niños since 1957 went the expected way and how many of this year’s models agree.

If you want to dig into a particular region, I’ve put togehter an interactive version of this map over at the Climate Dashboard. Clicking on a region brings up how it fared in each of the eight past strong El Niños, what each of this year’s forecast models shows, and a short summary of the relevant research. You can also replay any past strong event across the whole map, step through the forecast season by season, or click anywhere to see the raw model forecast for that spot.

Likelihoods but not guarantees

El Niño events shift the odds of different climate outcomes, but not every El Niño has the exact same impacts (Mason and Goddard 2001). As NOAA’s Climate Prediction Center puts it in their current ENSO discussion: “With an event of this magnitude, the chances of experiencing impacts consistent with El Niño are larger, but they are not guaranteed.”

To get at how much the odds shift, I’ve leaned on three separate lines of evidence for each region. The first is the published literature on El Niño teleconnections (the physical pathways by which a warm tropical Pacific changes rainfall and temperature elsewhere). I’ve assessed these with IPCC-style confidence levels like high, medium-high, and medium confidence. You can find links to the individual studies I’ve relied on below, with more details shown over at the Climate Dashboard when clicking on a particular region.

The second is the current generation of dynamical seasonal forecasts: 13 independent modeling systems (six from NOAA’s North American Multi-Model Ensemble and seven from the European Copernicus Climate Change Service), which let us see where the models agree and disagree with the teleconnection literature during this particular event.

The third is the past performance during strong El Niño events. For every region on the map I went back to the eight strong events since 1957 (1957-58, 1965-66, 1972-73, 1982-83, 1997-98, 2009-10, 2015-16 and 2023-24) and checked how often that region was drier or wetter than a typical ENSO-neutral year.2 The figure below shows the results. Each cell is one past event, colored by how dry or wet it was relative to neutral years, with a check mark wherever it landed on the expected side.3

Each cell shows rainfall (or temperature) in one of the eight strong El Niños since 1957 (Nov–Jan Oceanic Niño Index ≥ 1.5 °C), for the season shown on the impacts map, relative to ENSO-neutral years after removing long-term trends. Checks mark events on the expected side of the neutral-year median. Data from GPCC v2025, Berkeley Earth, GHCN-Daily stations (Hawaii and Western Pacific islands) and GPCP (Central Pacific islands, 1979 onward only). Model agreement is from the September 2026 forecasts.

A few things jump out here. Across the 26 regions on the map, 86% of region-events went the expected way (176 of 205). The two biggest east Pacific events, 1982-83 and 1997-98, gave the expected impacts in every single region. The two earliest events delivered in only 68% of regions, which likely reflects both sparser rain gauge networks in the 1950s and 60s and genuine differences between events.

That being said, the teleconnection literature draws in part from these same events, particularly 1982-83 and 1997-98, so these hit rates partly restate the evidence the literature was built on. It’s also worth noting that no past event looks like the one forecast for this winter. All eight of these are “strong” events, and 2026-27 is forecast to be well beyond any of them. In the regions with the most reliable signals that probably means larger impacts. But it also means we are extrapolating well outside the training data here.

Asia, Australia and the Pacific

The western tropical Pacific is where El Niño’s fingerprint is clearest, because it is where the atmosphere’s rising branch of the Walker circulation normally sits. When that rising air shifts east toward the central Pacific, the islands and archipelagos that normally sit under it dry out.

Close-up of the impacts map for Asia, Australia and the Pacific. Each card shows how many of the eight strong El Niños since 1957 went the expected way and how many of this year’s forecast models agree.

Indonesia and the Maritime Continent are the single most reliable El Niño impact on the planet. September through December was drier than the median neutral year in all eight past strong events, and in six of them it was drier than any neutral year in the record. Past strong events resulted in around 73% of normal rainfall, and all 13 models agree on drought this autumn. The main risk for the region is fire. Burning on drained peatlands responds very nonlinearly to drought, and the fires during the 1997 El Niño released an estimated 3 to 9 billion tonnes of CO2, equivalent to 13% to 40% of global fossil fuel emissions that year. The haze from the 2015 fires has been linked to around 100,300 excess deaths across Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

The Philippines has an equally consistent record, dry from December through April in all eight strong events (with a median of 58% of normal rainfall). This is driven by an anomalous high pressure system that sets up over the western North Pacific during El Niño winters (Lyon and Camargo 2009). Every one of the 13 models shows it this year.

The western Pacific islands, from Palau and Guam through Micronesia, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji, were drier than normal (i.e. than in a typical neutral year) in all eight events. These islands also see sea level drop as the warm water sloshes east, which can expose and kill shallow reef flats (Widlansky et al. 2015).

On the other hand, the central Pacific islands of Kiribati and Tuvalu get deluged. Satellite-era data show September to May rainfall there wetter than in any neutral year in each of the five strong events since 1982, with a median of around double normal.

Southern China tends to be wetter from winter through spring, fed by moisture flowing around the same western Pacific high pressure system. The observed record is weaker than for the Philippines, with 5 of 8 strong events wetter than normal, though the big events were very wet (1982-83 brought around 200% of normal rainfall and 2015-16 164%). The models are in strong agreement (12 of 13) on heavier than normal rainfall this year.

The Yangtze basin is generally expected to experience heavy summer rain in the year after a strong El Niño, when the Indian Ocean warms up and acts as a “capacitor” that sustains the western Pacific high pressure system into summer. That signal was real in 1998, the year of catastrophic Yangtze floods. In June and July, when the East Asian monsoon rain band normally sits over the basin, it was wetter than normal during 6 of 8 past strong events, including all six since 1972. However, next summer is beyond the range of any current seasonal forecast, so no model-based odds are available.

The southern Mekong basin (Cambodia, southern Laos and southern Vietnam) was drier than normal in March to May of the year after the El Niño peak in 7 of 8 strong events, with a median of around 71% of normal rainfall. The teleconnections literature suggests that the ENSO drought signal in mainland Southeast Asia is “most consistent and expressed over the largest areal extents during March-May of the year when the ENSO events decay.” The models show a bit less agreement this year (only 4 of 6 models that extend through May show drying) and the literature notes the relationship varies between events, so it shows up on the map as only medium confidence.

In India, the the textbook example of El Niño is a weaker than normal Indian monsoon. North and central India were drier than normal in all eight years during which strong El Niño events developed, and the 2026 monsoon was running around 12% below normal by mid-August. But that season is already behind us; the monsoon in the year after a strong El Niño was drier than normal in only 1 of 8 cases (1966), with the other seven running between 102% and 115% of normal. Part of this is that strong El Niños often flip into La Niña by the following summer, and part of it is that eastern Pacific events like this one appear less effective at suppressing Indian rainfall in the first place (Kumar et al. 2006). Either way, the data do not support calling for a weak 2027 monsoon.4

Sri Lanka’s northeast monsoon (October to December) was wetter than normal in all eight strong events, with a median of 126% of normal (Zubair and Ropelewski 2006). However, Sri Lanka was also on the wet side in 8 of 12 La Niña years, so the island’s autumn rain is less tied to El Niño specifically than the count might suggests. Southern India shows a similar observed record (7 of 8), but it is not on the map because this year’s models disagree about it (only 5 of 13 show a wet signal).

Southeast Australia (Victoria and Tasmania) was drier than normal between September and November in 7 of 8 strong events, with a median of 81% of normal and a severe 44% in 2015. The El Niño dry signal is concentrated in spring, when it is reinforced by the positive Indian Ocean Dipole that often accompanies El Niño (Cai et al. 2009), and it has a habit of reversing in summer. In 2023-24, national rainfall ran 20% below average in spring before summer came in 19% above average. And for eastern Australia more broadly, this year’s models show little signal at all (only 10 of 13 lean dry, which is not significant). It’s worth noting that the 2019-20 Black Summer fires, often associated with El Niño in the public mind, happened during a record positive Indian Ocean Dipole with only borderline El Niño conditions.

Africa

El Niño’s effects on Africa run through the Indian Ocean. This year a positive Indian Ocean Dipole (warm water off East Africa, cool water off Sumatra) has been developing alongside it. That combination points in opposite directions for the two halves of the continent.

Close-up of the impacts map for Africa. Each card shows how many of the eight strong El Niños since 1957 went the expected way and how many of this year’s forecast models agree.

Southern Africa probably the most potentially disasterious impact on the map, because summer rain there feeds the maize crop that tens of millions of people depend on. December to February was drier than normal in 6 of 8 strong events, consistent with Pomposi et al. (2018), who estimate an around 80% chance of below-normal rain in a strong El Niño. The two clear misses were early in the record (1957-58 and 1965-66). The largest recent failure was 1997-98, when the expected regional drought failed to materialize. That has been attributed to regional circulation features (the Angola Low and Botswana High) that vary independently of ENSO, and it isn’t something we can rule out this year. But the most comparable recent case suggests we will see a bigger impact this year: in 2023-24, with an Indian Ocean Dipole almost as strong as 1997’s, southern Africa had the driest season of all eight events (69% of normal), prompting a $5.5 billion regional humanitarian appeal for more than 61 million people. All 13 models show drought this coming summer.

The Horn of Africa (southern Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia) was wetter than normal between October and December in all eight strong events, with 1997 at 241% of normal and 2023 at 175%. Here the Indian Ocean Dipole matters more than El Niño itself. In model studies the influence of the dipole on the short rains is “overwhelming as compared to that of ENSO,” and World Weather Attribution’s analysis of the catastrophic 2023 floods found “no significant role of ENSO but a significant influence of the IOD.” Because strong eastern Pacific El Niños tend to come with positive dipole events, the hit rate here is really a record of the two acting together. That is also what it looks like will occur this year, as all 13 models show a wet season.

The Sahel is not on the map. Its El Niño signal mostly falls on the summer rainy season of the developing year (which for this event was 2026), and even then it was drier than normal in only 3 of 8 strong events. The literature agrees this is one of the weakest teleconnections, with El Niño explaining only a small share of Sahel rainfall variability (Pomposi et al. 2020).

South America

Close-up of the impacts map for South America. Each card shows how many of the eight strong El Niños since 1957 went the expected way and how many of this year’s forecast models agree.

The Amazon was drier than normal between October and May in 7 of 8 strong events, and in each of the last five (from 1982-83 onward) it was drier than any ENSO-neutral year in the record. All 13 models agree for this season. But the Amazon is also strongly impacted by longer-term climate changes. A World Weather Attribution study found that “the severity of the [2023-24] drought… is largely driven by climate change,” with El Niño and warming contributing about equally to the rainfall deficit but the drying trend almost entirely due to warming. Fire risk also depends heavily on land management practices, as the large majority of Amazon fires are set by people.

Northern South America (Colombia, Venezuela and the Guianas) was drier than normal in December to February in all eight strong events, with a median of 71% of normal (Poveda et al. 2011). All 13 models agree this year. Northeast Brazil’s March to May rainy season was drier than normal in 6 of 8 events (Hastenrath 2011). That signal depends on tropical Atlantic temperatures as well as the Pacific, which is why it shown as only medium-high confidence. It also has a dashed outline on the map, because after the last El Niño the 2024 rainy season came in right at normal (100%).

The coast of northern Peru and Ecuador is where El Niño got its name, and where its impacts can be most violent. Normally a desert, the coast floods when the ocean just offshore warms enough to support deep convection. Only 1982-83 and 1997-98 brought truly extreme rains, with the coastal grid cells averaging more than double normal rainfall from December to April. Other strong events ranged from somewhat below to somewhat above normal, and in 2023-24 the expected coastal rains largely failed after Peru had set aside around $1.2 billion for flood preparation. What distinguished 1982-83 and 1997-98 was very warm water right along the coast. This year looks more like those two events than the others; in mid-September the far eastern Pacific (the Niño 1+2 region) was running 4.6C above normal, compared to 3.5C in 1997, 2.1C in 2015 and 2.6C in 2023 at the same point. I’ve rated this high confidence provided that coastal warmth persists as predicted by current models.

Southeastern South America (Uruguay, northeastern Argentina, southern Brazil and Paraguay) was wetter than normal between September and February in 7 of 8 strong events (Grimm and Tedeschi 2009), while the 2023-24 season was close to normal. The devastating Rio Grande do Sul floods of May 2024 came much later – in the autumn after the El Niño’s peak – though one attribution study found the El Niño approximately doubled their likelihood (albeit with a very wide uncertainty range).

The Altiplano, the high plateau shared by southern Peru, western Bolivia and northern Chile, gets most of its rain from December to March, and El Niño tends to suppress it. A warmer tropical atmosphere strengthens the upper-level westerly winds over the Andes, which cuts off the easterly flow that normally carries Amazon moisture up onto the plateau (Garreaud and Aceituno 2001). All 13 models show a dry summer this year, one of the strongest model signals anywhere on the map. The observed record is weaker as only 5 of 8 past strong events were drier than normal. The link is closest over the drier western part of the plateau (Vuille et al. 2000) and weaker toward Lake Titicaca in the north, so I’ve rated the region medium confidence.

In Chile, Montecinos and Aceituno (2003) find that during El Niño “there is a tendency for the occurrence of above-average precipitation between 30° and 35°S in winter [June–July–August (JJA)] and from 35° to 38°S in late spring [October–November (ON)].” October and November were wetter than normal in 7 of 8 strong events (with a median of 170% of normal) and in all six moderate El Niños, and all 13 models agree this year.

Further south, the same literature finds relatively dry summers between about 38°S and 41°S during El Niño, and the observed record agrees (7 of 8 strong events drier than normal from January to March), but this year’s models are split (only 8 of 13 show a drier January and February), so I’ve left it off the map. The Atacama Desert does get rare heavy rains in El Niño years, but historically these have come in the winter of the developing year (Vargas et al. 2000), which for this event has already passed.

North and Central America

Close-up of the impacts map for North America, Central America and Hawaii. Each card shows how many of the eight strong El Niños since 1957 went the expected way and how many of this year’s forecast models agree.

The US Gulf Coast and Southeast was wetter than normal between December and February in all eight strong events, with 1982-83 at 151% and 1997-98 at 168% of normal (Ropelewski and Halpert 1986). The strengthened subtropical jet stream also brings wetter winters to Cuba and the Bahamas, which were wetter than normal in all eight strong events, with a median of 163% of normal (Giannini et al. 2000). This year all 13 models agree on wetter than normal conditions in both regions.

Southern California, the US Southwest and northern Mexico were wetter than normal between December and March in 7 of 8 strong events, with 1982-83 and 1997-98 both around double normal. The exception was 2015-16 when coastal southern California ended up at only 60% to 68% of normal despite 9 of 10 seasonal models predicting a wet winter that year. Rerun for 1982-83 and 1997-98, those same models called for wet winters (9 of 9 and 10 of 11), which is what happened. El Niño explains at most around a third of West Coast winter rainfall variability even in strong years, so a lot comes down to where individual storms go.

Northern California is a bit more ambigious. It was wetter than normal between December and March in 6 of 8 strong events, including 2015-16 (120% of normal) when Southern California missed, and 1982-83 and 1997-98 were both well above normal (173% and 156%). All 13 models lean wet this year. The misses were 1965-66 (75%) and 2009-10 (90%). However, the signal is not very specific to El Niño. Northern California was also on the wet side in 7 of 12 La Niña winters, only 2 of 6 moderate El Niños were wet, and the El Niño relationship across all winters since 1950 is weak. Past work has generally found the El Niño rainfall signal is concentrated in Southern California, and I’ve added it to the map as only medium confidence for this year.

Further north, El Niño winters tend to be drier in interior British Columbia and the inland Northwest, with lower snowpack (Shabbar et al. 1997). This was observed in 7 of 8 past events, though the typical dry anomaly is small (~95% of normal), so I’ve assigned it only medium confidence.

Central Canada tends to have mild winters during El Niño, with the strongest warmth just west of Hudson Bay (Shabbar and Khandekar 1996). All eight strong El Niño winters were warmer than the typical neutral winter once long-term warming is removed, and the four since 1997 were strikingly warm (2023-24 was Canada’s warmest winter on record). But La Niña winters were also on the warm side in 7 of 12 cases, and it is sensitive to how the warming trend is removed so I’ve assigned it medium confidence.

Hawaii is usually dry during El Niño winters, particularly in eastern Pacific events like this one (Lu et al. 2020). A composite of long-running Hawaiian rain gauges shows November to March was drier than normal in every strong event since 1972 (six of six, with a median of 69% of normal), though 1957-58 and 1965-66 were both wet. All 13 models show a dry winter this year.

Central America and the southern Caribbean (Costa Rica, Panama and the Caribbean coast of Colombia) tend to be drier during El Niño winters. During the 2023 El Niño, drought restricted traffic through the Panama Canal. But December to February is the dry season across much of this region anyway, and in the places where it normally rains during those months drier conditions only occurred in 5 of 8 past events. The more robust Central American signal is midsummer drought during the developing year (e.g. July and August 2026), which has already passed.

While some of the literature on teleconnections suggests that El Niño drives drier conditions in the Ohio Valley, this year’s models lean wet there (only 3 of 13 show drying), and the observed record is a coin flip as it was only drier in 4 of 8 past strong events.

Europe

Europe is conspicuously absent from the map, which has surprised some people given the summer heat and drought across the continent this year. For most of Europe we simply don’t know what El Niño will do this winter.

Multi-model seasonal forecasts for Europe (top) and the winter North Atlantic Oscillation in each strong El Niño winter since 1950 (bottom).

The textbook late-winter pattern (cold northern Europe, wet south) mostly shows up when a sudden stratospheric warming occurs, which can’t be forecast months in advance (Ineson and Scaife 2009). The link may also have weakened since the 1970s. Past strong El Niño winters split 4 to 4 on the North Atlantic Oscillation, 5 of 8 showed a wet UK and central Europe in autumn, and 5 of 8 had a cold Scandinavian late winter. The models (12 of 13) lean wet for the UK and central Europe from October to December this year, but the shifts are small.

The global picture

Because global temperature lags the tropical Pacific by a few months, 2027 is almost certain to be the warmest year on record. My latest forecast, which combines six global temperature datasets with the 14-model ENSO forecast, gives it a 95% to 96% chance, up from around 85% in April. El Niño-driven drought and fire in the tropics also weaken the land carbon sink, which is why the growth rate of CO2 at Mauna Loa hit a record 3.33 ppm in 2024. A similar spike in 2027 is likely. The fourth global coral bleaching event was driven by the 2023-24 El Niño on top of longer-term warming and affected 84% of the world’s reef area. A stronger event arriving before those reefs have recovered raises the risk of widespread mortality next year.

The most reliable El Niño impacts are clustered around the tropical Pacific and in the Americas. Drought in Indonesia, the Philippines, the western Pacific islands and northern South America, and wet winters from the Gulf Coast to Cuba, have shown up in essentially every strong event since the 1950s, and this year’s models agree. Southern Africa, the Amazon and the Horn of Africa are nearly as consistent. Those are the places where preparation (water storage, food reserves, fire management, flood defenses) is urgently needed now before the rains or droughts arrive.

The impact I’d flag most for policymakers is on food. Of the major climate modes of variability, “only El Niño can force globally synchronous crop failures,” because it simultaneously affects breadbaskets on multiple continents. The map shows drought risk for maize in southern Africa, rice in the Philippines and Southeast Asia and a range of crops in northern South America during the first half of 2027.

Its also worth remembering that this event is forecast to be well beyond anything in the observed record, and the two most similar past events (1982-83 and 1997-98) showed the expected impacts in every region on the map.

I’ll update the map when the October forecasts come in, and I’ve put the code and data to reproduce this analysis on my GitHub here.

1 These numbers are from the September initializations of the 14 models tracked on our Climate Dashboard, with each model weighted equally, and use the same convention as NOAA’s Oceanic Niño Index (each month relative to a centered 30-year climatology). The regional impact forecasts in this post use a slightly different set of 13 models that publish rainfall and temperature fields (NMME and Copernicus C3S). For each region, the model check averages every model over the region’s whole season up to February 2027, the last month all 13 cover; seasons that fall mostly after that use the six NMME models, which run through May.

2 Strong events are those with a November–January Oceanic Niño Index (ONI) of at least 1.5C. For each region I compared its average rainfall (or temperature) in the season on the map to ENSO-neutral years, after removing a long-term trend fitted to the neutral years only. An event counts toward the tally if it lands on the expected side of the median neutral year. Percentages of normal are relative to the 1991–2020 average. The main precipitation data are GPCC’s new Precipitation Analysis Monthly Version 2025. The full methods, including all sensitivity tests, are in the GitHub repository.

3 One note on how to read the numbers here: the counts (like 7 of 8) compare each event with a typical ENSO-neutral year, while the percentages (like 70% of normal) are relative to the 1991–2020 average. These usually tell the same story, but not always, because a few very wet or very dry years can pull the average away from a typical year.

4 This is consistent with the long-standing observation that the ENSO-monsoon relationship has weakened since the 1980s. The strongest El Niño on record at the time, 1997, produced a near-normal monsoon even in the developing year (around 102% of normal in our data for north and central India).

The Worst Case Is Still on the Table

Tue, 29 Sep 2026 15:02:27 EST

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink by Andrew Dessler

The Trump administration is continuing it’s war on climate science. This time, instead of attacking climate science in general, as they tried (and failed) to do with the DOE Climate Working Group, they are going after the U.S. National Climate Assessment (NCA).

There was some chatter that the administration would try to write an entire new version of the NCA that would deny well-established climate science, but my guess is that they have abandoned this. The NCA is a “Highly Influential Scientific Assessment” and therefore must follow specific rules. These include rules about how to select authors, peer review, etc. Following those rules would make it impossible to produce the biased, climate-denying report that they require. And if they don’t follow the rules, they’d lose the inevitable court challenges.

So they instead, they are proposing to amend the Fifth National Climate Assessment (NCA5) by (basically) removing references to the highest emissions scenarios, RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5, which produces the most warming:

This is justified on two grounds: 1) RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 is not an expected emissions scenario and 2) it is not policy relevant. Point 1 is irrelevant since the NCA5 does not refer to it as business as usual, baseline, etc. And Point 2 is just wrong. My comment below expands on these points.

The USGCRP is presently soliciting comments. You can tell USGCRP understands their arguments are weak since they go out of their way to make it as hard as they can for people to comment on it: They’re limiting the comment window to 15 days and comment length to 3,500 words.

Below is my comment on this. If you see any errors, please leave a comment below or email me.

Public Comment on the Proposed Amendment to the Fifth National Climate Assessment

Summary

I write to oppose the proposed amendment. It should be rejected in its entirety.

The amendment rests on two false premises: 1) that NCA5 presents RCP8.5 and SSP5-8.5 results as expected, baseline, or business-as-usual futures, and 2) that RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 scenario runs are not useful for policy deliberations. As described here, neither of these premises is true.

First, NCA5 accurately describes RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 as very high emissions scenarios throughout the report. Second, because of uncertainty in many climate parameters (e.g., climate sensitivity), the temperatures produced under RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 are a reasonable upper bound on what the future climate might be. These scenarios are therefore worth examining not as expected outcomes but as plausible worst cases. Eliminating RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 therefore commits one of the cardinal sins of risk assessment: assuming the worst-case will not occur.

In addition, NCA5 frequently uses these scenarios in global-warming-level analysis, which evaluates impacts at different levels of warming but makes no claim about how likely any level of warming is.

Overall, removing RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 analyses would strip sound science from the assessment and make it harder for U.S. policymakers to evaluate the risks of climate change.

1. NCA5 does not present results with RCP8.5 or SSP5-8.5 as business-as-usual

The term “RCP8.5” and “SSP5-8.5” appear 113 times in NCA5 — 74 mentions of “RCP8.5” and 39 of “SSP5-8.5”. I have inventoried all of them. They appear in 98 passages. Eighty-four of those describe the pathway as a very high scenario and six as a high scenario; the remaining eight carry no descriptor in the sentence itself. NCA5 never refers to RCP8.5 or SSP5-8.5 as business-as-usual or anything similar. Thus, NCA5 already labels the scenario correctly.

2. RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 emissions may be implausible, but temperatures are not

Much of the RCP8.5 discourse misses a key point: in trying to understand future climate changes, our focus is not primarily on emissions. Rather, it is on temperature, which is what drives most climate impacts. So the key question is: are the temperatures predicted by today’s climate models driven by RCP8.5 implausible?

To quantify this, I ran the FaIR climate emulator (v2.2.4, Leach et al., 2021) between 1750 and 2100 under SSP2-4.5 and SSP5-8.5 emissions from RCMIP v5.1.0. Climate-response uncertainty was represented by the 841-member calibrated and constrained parameter ensemble of fair-calibrate v1.4.1. This analysis shows that the warmest of the SSP2-4.5 runs reach the median SSP5-8.5 run (Figure 1).

Fig. 1. Global surface air temperature (GSAT) for two different scenarios, SSP2-4.5 and SSP5-8.5. The spread within each scenario represents parameter uncertainty in the model. It shows that 0.5% of SSP2-4.5 runs predict warming above the median SSP5-8.5 run.

Let me be precise about what this result means. The spread within each scenario in Figure 1 is not noise. Each of the 841 parameter defines a plausible set of uncertain parameters that determine how the climate system responds to emissions: how sensitive it is to carbon dioxide, how quickly the ocean takes up heat, how strongly aerosols cool, how the carbon cycle responds, etc. Because the ensemble was constrained against observations, every one of these descriptions is consistent with the warming observed to date.

The real climate system, of course, has one true set of these properties. This analysis shows that we cannot rule out that the real climate system driven by a SSP2-4.5 emissions delivers warming at the end of the century equal to what a typical model produces under SSP5-8.5 (around 4°C).

The median temperatures in the RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 ensemble are therefore plausible, even if the emissions that produced them are not. As discussed in the next section, this is important for risk assessment.

One might reasonably wonder why we need SSP5-8.5 to estimate the upper limit of SSP2-4.5 runs. Why can’t we just use SSP2-4.5 runs to evaluate the upper limit? You certainly could specifically analyze high-sensitivity models driven by SSP2-4.5 to determine the worst-case scenario, but the available literature doing that is sparse compared to the literature describing RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 results and doing that would require a wholesale revision of the NCA5 that is not being considered here.

Keeping the RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 runs as a plausible upper limit is particularly important given that recent research has emphasized the possibility that models are underestimating future warming. Gyuleva et al. (2026), for example, use the Earth’s energy imbalance to suggest that models with higher transient climate response more accurately fit the planetary energy balance observations of the last few decades. Armour et al. (2024) show further that the strongest evidence against high-sensitivity models, their poor reproduction of the warming since the 1970s, does not actually rule those models out.

In addition, the SSP2-4.5 scenario contains enormous amounts of carbon removal (Anderson & Peters, 2016). In 2100, for example, total carbon capture & sequestration (CCS) in that scenario is 32 GtCO2^[1]. Our willingness and ability to implement CCS at this level (about 75% of today’s total CO2 emissions) is entirely hypothetical (Daigle & Ravikumar, 2026). It is therefore possible that we will not do so, meaning that SSP2-4.5 will be understating emissions. This would push SSP2-4.5 temperatures even further into the range of temperatures simulated by RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5.

Thus, the median global temperature predicted by today’s models driven by RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 is a plausible upper limit of warming this century. To the best of my knowledge, there is no analysis that opposes this conclusion and I do not believe the case can be made on current evidence. The proposed amendment does not attempt it.

3. Risk assessment should not confine itself to the most likely outcome

Reaching RCP8.5-level temperatures with SSP2-4.5 emissions, while plausible, is not likely. But that does not mean we should ignore it. In fact, conventional risk management tells us that, when consequences are severe, low-probability extreme outcomes can determine the response.

Levees are built to withstand the hundred-year flood, not the average year. Nuclear power plants’ safety systems are designed against worst-case scenarios, not average operations. Insurance companies maintain solvency by accounting for the worst-case claims scenario, not typical scenarios. In the national defense arena, Vice President Cheney famously said that, if there is a one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al-Qaeda build a nuclear weapon, “we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response.”^[2]

It is in this role that RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 is valuable: as a plausible upper bound of the temperature distribution given SSP2-4.5 emissions. This contradicts the claim in the amendment that RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 is not policy relevant. In fact, adopting this amendment would mean that our risk assessment would ignore tail risk. This would go against best practices of risk assessment. I also note that the amendment presents this as a correction of a scientific error, when in reality it’s a value judgement about what role upper limit risks should play in deciding how to respond to climate change.

4. Global warming levels

The amendment also ignores other ways the NCA5 uses RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5. In many places, NCA5 does not use RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 as a possible emissions trajectory but to predict impacts at various global warming levels (GWLs). In other words, the analysis estimates the climate impacts when the planet is 2°C, 3°C, or 4°C warmer than preindustrial.

For example, Figures 2.9, 2.10, and 2.13 map U.S. temperature, precipitation, and sea surface temperature at 1.5°, 2°, 3°, and 4°C of global warming; Figures 2.11 and 2.12 map extreme heat and extreme precipitation at 2°C; Figures 1.14 and 1.15 in the Overview and Figure 30.3 for the Pacific Islands do the same. The report’s findings are read off these figures: e.g., at 2°C of global warming, U.S. average temperature very likely rises 4.4°–5.6°F (p. 2-21), tropical cyclone winds are 5% faster (p. 2-26), and Midwest extreme precipitation intensifies by 10%–15% (p. 24-19).

None of these are predictions that these temperatures will occur. Rather, they answer a different question: what happens when the climate reaches that temperature.

The amendment’s plausibility argument does not address this alternate use and it performs none of the analysis needed to separate warming-level results from genuinely emissions-dependent ones. It simply declares RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 off-limits, which could be used to strike the GWL analysis from the NCA5. It offers no justification for discarding RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 scenarios in GWL analyses, which is of value even if reaching the top of the temperatures range is unlikely.

Recommendation

Reject the proposed amendment in its entirety.

The amendment fails to correct any errors in the NCA5 and is inconsistent with the underlying science. First, NCA5 accurately describes results with RCP8.5. Second, the amendment declares RCP8.5/SSP5-8.5 off-limits to federal decision-making but doesn’t address the fact that the median temperatures predicted from these scenarios is plausible. Third, it presents an institutional judgment about risk tolerance (that we should ignore worst-case scenarios) as though it were a scientific correction. Fourth, it proposes to jettison research about impacts at global warming levels. Thus, adopting the amendment would leave the country less prepared for future climate impacts, including lower probability but high severity outcomes.

Anderson, K., & Peters, G. (2016). The trouble with negative emissions. Science, 354(6309), 182-183, doi:10.1126/science.aah4567

Armour, K. C., Proistosescu, C., Dong, Y., Hahn, L. C., Blanchard-Wrigglesworth, E., Pauling, A. G., Jnglin Wills, R. C., Andrews, T., Stuecker, M. F., Po-Chedley, S., Mitevski, I., Forster, P. M., & Gregory, J. M. (2024). Sea-surface temperature pattern effects have slowed global warming and biased warming-based constraints on climate sensitivity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 121(12), e2312093121, doi:10.1073/pnas.2312093121

Daigle, H., & Ravikumar, A. (2026). Can we sequester carbon fast enough? Growing disconnect between models and reality. Environmental Research: Energy, 3(3), 031001, doi:10.1088/2753-3751/ae987b

Gyuleva, G., Fischer, E., Knutti, R., & Sippel, S. (2026). Recent Temperature and Energy Imbalance Trends Point to Higher Estimates of Future Warming. Earth’s Future, 14(8), e2026EF008356, doi:10.1029/2026EF008356

Leach, N. J., Jenkins, S., Nicholls, Z., Smith, C. J., Lynch, J., Cain, M., Walsh, T., Wu, B., Tsutsui, J., & Allen, M. R. (2021). FaIRv2.0.0: a generalized impulse response model for climate uncertainty and future scenario exploration. Geosci. Model Dev., 14(5), 3007-3036, doi:10.5194/gmd-14-3007-2021

Scientists link fossil fuel producers to the West’s worsening water shortages

Mon, 28 Sep 2026 14:49:18 EST

This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Barbara Grady

As the Western United States grapples with severe drought, leading cities to scramble for water and farmers to abandon some crops, a new scientific study has found that 122 major oil, gas, coal, and cement companies and state-owned operations are partially responsible.

The study found that climate change from all climate-warming greenhouse gas emissions over the last 70 years has resulted in a 36% decline in annual average mountain snowpacks, the major source of surface water in Western states – and that about 40% of that decline is linked to the climate pollution caused by just 122 companies.

The annual loss attributable to those 122 companies is equivalent to the amount of water held by Lake Mead, the nation’s largest reservoir, at full capacity.

The authors of the peer-reviewed paper, “Carbon emissions exacerbating the Western US water crisis,” also found that global warming from greenhouse gas emissions has led to a 13% decline in average annual streamflows from mountains to the lower-lying areas that depend on them, and to a 4.3% increase in the need for agricultural irrigation. The study attributed about half the streamflow declines and roughly half the increased need for irrigation to the warming caused by the 122 companies. In other words, those companies’ products resulted in a 6% fall in streamflows in the region, according to the study.

Nine scientists from the University of California at Merced and the Union of Concerned Scientists contributed to the study, published August 25 in the Nature magazine affiliate Communications Earth & Environment.

The West relies on snowpack

Summers are dry in the Western U.S.

Precipitation occurs in winter, with much of it stored as snowpack in the mountains. The West’s multibillion-dollar agriculture industry and the reservoirs supplying cities and towns in 11 states depend on melted snow carried by rivers, streams, and water conveyance systems in late spring and summer. If the snowpack is scant or if snow melts early, water shortages can occur in summer when water demand is highest.

The West’s historic megadrought has persisted for two decades. With less surface water available, farmers have had to pump more groundwater for irrigation, depleting aquifers so much that the ground is sinking in many agricultural areas. Some farmers in the Southwest have had to abandon crops or fallow fields for lack of sufficient water. Corpus Christi, Las Vegas, Los Angeles and Phoenix are just some of the cities facing severe water shortages.

Tying drought to specific companies

Emily Williams, lead study author and a postdoctoral research scientist at the University of California at Merced, said in an interview that the study allowed scientists to disentangle how much worse water scarcity became over the decade 2014 to 2024 because of climate-change-induced atmospheric warming, as well as how much worse it became specifically because of the warming emissions generated by 122 companies and their products.

“It lets us get beyond how much more intense climate change is becoming to look at specific impacts like snowpack decline as well as specific sources” of emissions, she said. Her team found impacts on water resources “not just from climate change but because of emissions traceable to specific sources.”

The 122 companies cited in the study are the world’s biggest producers of climate-warming greenhouse gas emissions cumulatively up to 2024; they are all coal, oil, gas, and cement producers. That list, known in climate science as the carbon majors and compiled by other scientists, is based on publicly reported coal, oil, gas, and cement production data along with scientific formulas for calculating emissions per unit of product produced. Since 2024, the list has grown to include 178 entities.

Chevron, ExxonMobil, BP, and Shell are the fourth-, fifth-, eighth-, and ninth-biggest cumulative emitters of greenhouse gases in the world, according to the most recent version of the list. The world’s three highest emitters are state-owned coal, oil, and gas companies from the former Soviet Union, China, and Saudi Arabia (Saudi Aramco). U.S. coal producers Core Natural Resources and Peabody Energy are also in the top 25 carbon majors.

The study authors based their calculations on emissions since 1950, rather than earlier, because that was the decade when major oil and gas companies began to suspect that use of their products would cause changes to the Earth’s climate. Engineers at ExxonMobil who studied the issue determined that burning large amounts of fossil fuels would affect planetary climate systems. After its engineers shared their conclusions with management in the 1970s, ExxonMobil at first expanded that research to learn more and then – a decade later – pivoted to hiding the scientific findings and denying the existence of climate change, as reported in the Pulitzer Prize finalist series “The Road Not Taken” by Inside Climate News. Other major oil companies did the same.

The study authors wrote that “roughly 70% of global industrial carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions since 1854 are traceable to 122 fossil fuel producers and cement manufacturers (“Carbon Majors”), and ~97% of these emissions occurred after 1950.”

U.S. oil companies remain silent

When asked on August 27 for a comment on the water crisis study, Chevron – the largest U.S. emitter since 1950 – sent an automatic thank-you note but did not respond to the question by publication.

Chevron’s second quarter earnings report, released August 12, highlighted record-breaking oil production. The report said the company “achieved new U.S. upstream production record of nearly 2.1 million barrels of oil equivalent per day and record U.S. refinery throughput of over 1 million barrels per day” as well as “competitive growth” in operations “around the globe.” Chevron also has embarked on developing oil resources in Venezuela, which has large deposits of heavy crude – a variety of oil that’s highly polluting to process.

A media relations receptionist for ExxonMobil, the second-largest U.S. emitter, politely pledged to convey the reporter’s question to the media relations team, but the company did not respond.

“By comparing these scenarios and using pattern scaling, we calculated how much of the observed changes in snowpack, streamflow, and irrigation demand are attributable to climate change and specifically to emissions from the Carbon Majors,” the authors wrote.

Governments seek damages from polluters

The study is part of a growing body of what’s called attribution science. As scientific consensus has solidified around climate change resulting from atmospheric warming caused by the burning of fossil fuels, emissions of methane, and destruction of forests, scientists are looking more deeply at the impacts of that warming, how to minimize future warming, and the specific sources of the emissions.

Similar studies have attributed the size of areas burned in intense wildfires, specific measures of sea level rise, and the increased likelihood and intensity of extreme heat events to emissions from the carbon majors.

Read: Scientists agree: Climate change is real and caused by people

“We have a choice of how much worse climate change is going to get, and that is a function of how much emissions we allow,” Williams said. She said some changes to the planet’s climate system are already irreversible, but we do have a choice to avoid others and the worsening of some that are already baked in.

Many states and cities around the world are taking the biggest climate polluters to court in hopes of getting financial resources to help them address damages from extreme hurricanes, wildfires and floods whose intensification can be linked to climate change.

Two states – New York and Vermont – have passed climate superfund laws requiring that the biggest historical emitters help pay for climate damages incurred in their states. Many other states, including California, are considering such legislation. New York’s law was recently struck down in court, but the state also plans to appeal the decision. Meanwhile, several states are suing major fossil fuel companies over the damage they allege was wrought by their emissions.

“As climate impacts become increasingly severe, communities will be asking for more action” to help recover from damage and adapt to climate changes, said Carly Phillips, another author of the water study and senior research scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists.

Communities, states and small countries are bearing an unfair share of the costs of the impacts of emissions, Phillips contended, compared with the companies that ignored the looming crisis for decades and even lobbied Congress against taking action sooner.

“Given the outsized contribution of certain entities to the problem – 122 companies is a very small number – there should be some accountability,” she said.

2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #39

Sun, 27 Sep 2026 10:07:11 EST

A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, September 20, 2026 thru Sat, September 26, 2026.

Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Policy and Politics (8 items)

Interview with Senator Sheldon Whitehouse: ''Call Out the Corruption Propelling the US Climate Retreat'' The Rhode Island senator, who could lead the Judiciary Committee if Democrats win in November, urges stronger messaging and a focus on Supreme Court reform. Inside Climate News, Marianne Lavelle, Sep 20, 2026.
Whitehouse: Call Out the Corruption Propelling the US Climate Retreat The Rhode Island senator, who could lead the Judiciary Committee if Democrats win in November, urges stronger messaging and a focus on Supreme Court reform. Inside Climate News, Marianne Lavelle, Sep 20, 2026.
Let`s Talk Climate Annual NY Times climate conference opens in difficult times for sensible climate policy. NYT > Climate and Environment, Katrin Bennhold, Sep 20, 2026.
We Need to Stop Talking Like Climate Change Is Partisan 'People who raise awareness about climate change know that how you communicate your message matters, and there’s much to learn from them.'' TIME, Katharine Hayhoe and Dana R. Fisher, Sep 21, 2026.
How Saudi oil scientists ended up working on the world`s most important climate reports Guardian investigation reveals fossil fuel links of IPCC authors, with experts declaring the body’s conflict of interest policy ‘not fit for purpose’ The Guardian, Damian Carrington, Eoghan Gilmartin, Silvia Lazzaris, Rita Cruz, Simon Guichard and David Haas, Sep 21, 2026.
Effort begins to fill the void left by terminated US climate report First paper added to community collection is a roadmap for research. Ars Technica, Scott K. Johnson, Sep 22, 2026.
The climate scientist Kate Marvel sheds light on why she left NASA this year. One of the most prominent climate scientists to resign from the federal government during the second Trump administration described the “chaotic” conditions inside NASA that led to her departure. NYT, Raymond Zhong, Sep 23, 2026.
Trump cut their climate jobs. This secretive network found them new ones. Climate Reserve is quietly building a lifeline for America's lost climate workforce, one job at a time. Grist, Kate Yoder, Sep 24, 2026.

Climate Change Impacts (4 items)

Losing your way of life to climate change matters — and we need a way to measure it Climate losses extend beyond property and income. Policymakers need ways to assess what people value, experience and ultimately stand to lose. Nature, Manasi Kumar, Sep 21, 2026.
The worst El Niño in recorded history is brewing — here’s how governments must prepare From southern Africa to the Amazon, the risks are mounting and the window for action is rapidly closing. Nature, Zeke Hausfather, Sep 22, 2026.
Scientists link fossil fuel producers to the West`s worsening water shortages A new study blames 122 companies for contributing to severe drought in the region. Yale Climate Connections, Barbara Grady, Sep 22, 2026.
An Existential Threat to the Oil Industry Can fossil energy giants be held responsible for extreme weather? The Atlantic, Ross Andersen, Sep 23, 2026.

Climate Education and Communication (3 items)

Why I turned down funding for my Miami story Behind-the-scenes ethical choices by an accomplished climate communicator. HEATED, Emily Atkin, Sep 21, 2026.
How to stay smart in the age of AI: the science of critical thinking There is growing concern that AI can blunt memory and reasoning. But science shows ways to keep the brain sharp. Nature, Helen Pearson, Sep 23, 2026.
Twenty years after An Inconvenient Truth, Al Gore still believes in the climate fight: `We are going to win this` Former US vice-president still has optimism for climate advocacy two decades after groundbreaking documentary The Guardian, Oliver Milman, Sep 23, 2026.

Miscellaneous (3 items)

2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #38 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, September 13, 2026 thru Sat, September 19, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, Sep 19, 2026.
Energy Transition is No Longer About Climate Change 'Global Energy analyst Jeff Currie tells Bloomberg the Energy Transition is “TurboCharged” – but it’s not about climate, and maybe never was. By far the biggest growth in energy consumption is going to come from the developing world in Asia and Africa, and those countries are no longer willing to be held hostage to fossil fuels.'' This is Not Cool, greenman3610, Sep 19, 2026.
Jensen Huang talks about AI and climate change like a supervillain With AI, he says, ‘in order to save you, they’ve got to hurt you first.‘ The Verge, Justine Calma, Sep 24, 2026.

Climate Law and Justice (2 items)

Suncor Helped Lead Climate Denial Group Spreading ‘Uncertainties’ With a U.S. Supreme Court decision looming on whether the company can be held liable for climate deception, internal documents show a campaign to question science. Desmog, Geoff Dembicki, Sep 21, 2026.
Judge Dismisses Unusual Climate Suit Claiming Oil Giants Broke Antitrust Law The lawsuit, filed by Michigan, claimed oil companies colluded to obstruct solar power and to misrepresent climate risks, making energy costlier. NYT, Karen Zraick, Sep 22, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (2 items)

For Climate-Vulnerable Countries, Debt Costs 25 Times More Than Climate Action As climate disasters intensify, mounting debt is leaving vulnerable countries with less money to prepare, recover and invest in climate action. Inside Climate News, Alissa de Chassey, Sep 19, 2026.
`Way Too Hot`: Britain`s Hospitals Were Not Built for 96-Degree Summers Patients and workers in one of the country’s largest hospitals sweltered in a heat wave last month. Experts say the whole country must urgently adapt. New York Time, Megan Specia and Andrew Testa, Sep 21, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (2 items)

Skeptical Science New Research for Week #39 2026 Skeptical Science's latest weekly survey of research on anthropogenic climate change, climate change impacts, and how we're dealing with it all. Skeptical Science, Doug Bostrom & Marc Kodack, Sep 23, 2026.
`Robust little` vessel begins treacherous 22,000km journey around Antarctica in the name of climate science World news The Guardian, Petra Stock, Sep 25, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (2 items)

Trump renames AI in off-the-rails rant against ‘hoax’ concerns Trump Truth Social post likens AI skeptics to global warming and climate change warnings from environmentalists. The Independent, John Bowden, Sep 21, 2026.
AI`s Meet-Cute With Climate Denial Just in time for Climate Week NYC, President Trump calls concerns over global warming and artificial intelligence a “hoax.” Inside Climate News, By Dan Gearino, Sep 24, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Solutions (2 items)

Fact brief - Does wind power require backup from fossil fuels? Skeptical Science's latest climate solutions denial debunking, created in cooperation with Gigafact and Columbia Univesity's Sabin Center for Climate Change Law. Skeptical Science, Sue Bin Park, Sep 22, 2026.
Coalition vows to 'take a chainsaw' to climate laws, offshore wind The Coalition would cancel offshore wind zones, scrap climate laws for heavy industry and car makers, and attempt to lift the ban on nuclear if it wins power. ABC News, Jake Evans, Sep 23, 2026.

Skeptical Science New Research for Week #39 2026

Thu, 24 Sep 2026 12:55:50 EST

Open access notables

The Increasing Incidence of Boreal and Western U.S. Forest Wildfires and Its Causes: An Overview, Wallace et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society

This overview of the voluminous wildfire literature addresses the following questions: “How seriously is the current spate of wildfires impacting the boreal forests and the forests of the western United States? Is the current rate of burning of these forests unprecedented? Has it been systematically increasing over the past few decades and, if so, is it in response to human-induced global warming?” The article contains diagrams and tables based on a suite of fire-related datasets: satellite measurements of burned area, fire-related carbon emissions, aerosol optical depth, dating back to around the year 2000, and longer ground-based records of area burned by fires in the western United States. The graphics and tables reveal the remarkable extent of the forested area burned. The average area burned per year has increased by roughly a factor of three since the year 2000. The area burned by severe fires with areas > 100 km2 has been increasing more rapidly than the area burned by smaller fires. Wildfire smoke has also increased appreciably over much of North America. Forested burned area and fire-related carbon emissions are highly sensitive to measures of aridity on time scales ranging from days to decades. Aridity has increased, mainly in response to the warming trend, which is comparable in magnitude to that in climate model simulations of the response to rising greenhouse gas concentrations. The evidence presented herein supports the widely held belief that the recent increase in wildfires is mainly due to human-induced global warming.

Net Groundwater Recharge in California Occurs Primarily During Above-Average Snowpack Years, Reager et al., Geophysical Research Letters

In a new application of GRACE and GRACE-FO satellite observations, we estimate basin-scale net groundwater recharge rates for the combined Sacramento, San Joaquin, and Tulare basins encompassing California's Central Valley aquifer. Net recharge is calculated as the temporal derivative of groundwater storage anomalies and compared with precipitation and snow water equivalent over a fixed study area. Net positive recharge is rare, occurring in only six water years since 2004, and is consistently associated with years of above-average Sierra Nevada snowpack. Across the observational record, net positive recharge is observed only in years when snow water equivalent exceeds approximately 21 km3 (17 MAF; ∼121% of the 20-year mean value), with the largest recharge event coinciding with the exceptionally wet winter of water year 2023. These results suggest that above-average snowpack conditions, rather than rainfall alone, are an important enabling condition for basin-scale groundwater recharge under a warming climate.

Concurrent Eurasian Heatwaves Will Intensify Beyond the Mean Warming, Xu et al., Geophysical Research Letters

Heatwaves occurring at the same time over Europe and North China are among the most common simultaneous climate extremes in the Northern Hemisphere. These events are linked by a large-scale atmospheric circulation pattern, the British–Baikal Corridor pattern, which produces high-pressure systems over both regions simultaneously. Using a large ensemble of climate model simulations, we find that these concurrent heatwaves will become much more severe in the future. Importantly, they intensify faster than average temperature increases due to global warming. Even after accounting for background warming, temperatures during these events exceed the regional mean warming by about 0.3°C on average and by more than 0.5°C locally. Surprisingly, the reasons for this additional intensification differ between the two regions. Over North China, the atmospheric circulation pattern strengthens, bringing clearer skies and greater solar heating. Over Europe, however, the circulation pattern weakens, but heatwaves still intensify because drier soils provide less evaporative cooling. These findings challenge the common assumption that the same weather pattern amplifies heat equally wherever it occurs. They also suggest that future heat risks may be underestimated if assessments rely only on average warming, particularly when heatwaves strike multiple regions simultaneously.

Defending the status quo: The role of system justification in public opposition to ambitious climate policy and energy system change, Lloyd et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology

In recent years, environmental psychologists have argued that our field must conduct more solutions-focussed and system-level research if we want to contribute to ambitious and effective climate action. In this paper, we propose that system justification offers a promising pathway towards achieving both of these goals, and investigate its influence on three societally-impactful outcomes: support for climate policy, support for a just energy transition, and endorsement of climate delay discourses. We also test whether experimentally inducing hope could offer a solution to these proposed deleterious effects. We conduct this research in small-to-medium sized communities in Western Canada, many of which are dependent upon fossil-fuels for their continued existence, and thus strongly oppose decarbonization. Using an online survey of these communities (N = 3,400) we find that system justification consistently predicts lower support for climate policies, greater endorsement of climate delay discourses, and lower support for a just energy transition. Additionally, moderation analyses reveal that this relationship is stronger for those with greater proximity to the fossil-fuel industry, and that our hope manipulation had no effect. We explore the policy implications of these findings, arguing that policymakers should (1) aim to narratively detach the status quo from the economic system, and (2) design just transitions policies which act to maintain fossil-fuel communities’ current way of life, rather than trying to improve it. These findings extend system justification theory to three new societally-impactful outcomes; demonstrate its utility for policymaking; and highlight its potential to contribute to transformation-oriented research in environmental psychology.

From this week's government/NGO section:

Findings from a 2026 Survey of Adults Age 18 and Older, Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago and the AP-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research

The authors found that 53% of Americans are extremely or very concerned about the environmental effects of AI, up from 41% who said the same in 2025. Younger adults ages 18-29 have become particularly concerned, increasing from 38% last year to 60% today and moving from levels similar to other age groups to the highest level of concern. Forty-seven percent of Americans think AI will do more to hurt rather than help the environment, up from 33% who said the same in 2025. The authors also explored attitudes toward climate change, energy policy, and electric vehicles (EVs). Most Americans agree that climate change is happening and is caused by human activity, a trend that has remained stable in recent years. There is a large partisan divide in these attitudes, however, with Democrats more likely than Republicans to believe climate change is occurring (92% vs. 55%) and is caused mostly by human activity (68% vs. 34%). About 2 in 3 believe that oil and gas companies, the federal government, and large businesses and corporations have a lot of responsibility to address climate change, while just 4 in 10 say the same about developing countries and individual people.

In Hottest Summer on Record, 2 in 3 Americans Say Climate Change Is Increasing Heat-Related Illnesses, Annenberg Public Policy Center, University of Pennsylvania

Nearly two-thirds of the American public say climate change is increasing the risk of respiratory diseases and heat- and insect-related illnesses. The author's survey, which was conducted Aug. 4-17, 2026, among 1,904 empaneled U.S. adults, found that 76% report that extreme outdoor heat affected their daily activities at least sometimes in the past year and 38% say poor air quality resulting from wildfire smoke did so. Extreme heat is affecting the everyday lives of most Americans. Nearly two-thirds of Americans (65%) say that climate change is increasing the risk of heat-related illnesses, respiratory diseases, and insect-borne diseases. This is unchanged from August 2025 (65%) and July 2024 (67%) but is significantly higher than 58% in November 2023. Americans generally recognize that heat waves are on the rise. Nearly two-thirds (62%) say U.S. heat waves are becoming more frequent and intense than in the past, statistically unchanged from 61% in August 2025, 65% in July 2024, and 58% in November 2023. Of the four extreme weather events measured in the survey, more Americans report that their daily activities were impacted at least sometimes by extreme outdoor heat (76%) and poor air quality resulting from wildfire smoke (38%). As one would expect, fewer say they were impacted at least sometimes by flooding (20%) and tornadoes/hurricanes (11%), since these events are less frequent.

87 articles in 46 journals by 618 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

Amplified Cloud-Phase Responses Over Global Mountain Regions Under Climate Warming, Zhang et al., AGU Advances Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026av002380

Anthropogenic Warming Weakens Mild Offshore Winds in Southern California but Not the Extreme Fire-Weather Winds, Madakumbura et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026ef008422

Emerging Divergence Between Dry- and Humid-Heat in China Under Weakening Temperature-Humidity Coupling, Zhu et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046959

Future Reduction of North Pacific Subtropical Mode Water: Its Impacts on Physical and Biogeochemical Conditions in the North Pacific Subtropical Gyre, Sugimoto, Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2026jc024776

On the Timescales of Atmospheric Adjustments to Contrail Cirrus Formation, Quarroz et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl125935

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A holistic platform for accelerating sorbent-based carbon capture, Nature, 10.1038/s41586-024-07683-8 95 cites.

Observations of climate change, effects

Earthquake-triggered cascading hazards under Arctic amplification, Melo et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2617210123

Long-term weakening of extreme cold stress in eastern China, Li et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100960

Observational Evidence for Accelerated Warming and Salinification Propagating Into the Deep Mediterranean, Terzi? & Vilibi?, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124518

Spatiotemporal variations in snowline altitude across the High Mountain Asia from 1990 to 2024 Based on Landsat Data, Wang et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.09.007

The Increasing Incidence of Boreal and Western U.S. Forest Wildfires and Its Causes: An Overview, Wallace et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 10.1175/bams-d-25-0193.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Sketching the spatial disparities in heatwave trends by changing atmospheric teleconnections in the Northern Hemisphere, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52254-0 42 cites.

Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

A deep learning framework for gridding daily climate variables from a sparse station network, Dumitrescu, Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-8895-2026

Attribution estimates for similar extremes are robust across event definitions, Otto et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04053-2

Improving global and regional ocean heat content by consistently combining GRACE gravity, satellite altimetry and Argo profile observations in a joint inversion framework, Uebbing et al., Earth system science data Open Access 10.5194/essd-18-6945-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Are Our Climate Data Fit for Your Purpose?, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 10.1175/bams-d-23-0295.1 10 cites.

Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

Concurrent Eurasian Heatwaves Will Intensify Beyond the Mean Warming, Xu et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123850

Future Redistribution of North Atlantic Tropical Cyclone Risk in Two Contrasting CMIP6 Scenarios, Lele et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl123424

Projected Changes in Reference Evapotranspiration Across Indian Climate Regimes Using Bias-Corrected CMIP6 Simulations, Nayak et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70603

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Abrupt increase in Arctic-Subarctic wildfires caused by future permafrost thaw, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-51471-x 42 cites.

Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

A new Earth Observation–based WRF configuration for urban regional climate simulations over Paris, Kyriakidis et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-8709-2026

Downscaling of Temperatures Over the Eastern Mediterranean for the 21st Century, Gelman et al., International Journal of Climatology Open Access pdf 10.1002/joc.70519

New Constraint on Future Ocean Heat Uptake Revealed by Considering Model Spread of Radiative Forcing, Wu & Gregory, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123530

The Cloud Feedback Model Intercomparison Project (CFMIP) contribution to CMIP7, Ceppi et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access pdf 10.5194/gmd-19-8693-2026

Using Rapid Temperature Falls to Estimate Future Strong Cold Front Frequency in CMIP6 Climate Projections, Corrales et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124031

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A Comprehensive Evaluation of Mean and Extreme Climate for the Conformal Cubic Atmospheric Model (CCAM), Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology, 10.1175/jamc-d-24-0004.1 16 cites.

Cryosphere & climate change

Accelerated mass loss of glaciers across Alaska since the Little Ice Age, Carrivick et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-70307-w

Cross-Basin Synergistic Effects Stall Summer Sea Ice Decline in the Chukchi Sea, Dong et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd047482

Enhanced Erosion Across a Transition From Continuous to Discontinuous Permafrost in Alaska, Özpolat et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007889

Feedbacks and timescales in the modelled transient response of debris-covered glaciers, Hardmeier et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-5365-2026

Modelling climate-induced instability of ice-rich permafrost slopes, Aga et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-20-5225-2026

Net Groundwater Recharge in California Occurs Primarily During Above-Average Snowpack Years, Reager et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl122396

Parameterizing tidal-water intrusions in long-term Antarctic ice-sheet projections, Juárez-Martínez et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-5345-2026

Seasonal Response of the Arctic Sea Ice to Meltwater Runoff from the Greenland Ice Sheet, Liang et al., Journal of Physical Oceanography 10.1175/jpo-d-26-0025.1

Temporal evolution of the Petermann Ice Shelf estuary constrained by satellite remote sensing observations, Savignano et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-5247-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Lake ice quality in a warming world, Nature Reviews Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43017-024-00590-6 33 cites.

Sea level & climate change

Anatomy of Interannual to Decadal Sea Level Changes in the GECCO3 Ocean Synthesis, Stammer et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access 10.1029/2026jc024340

Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A 485-million-year history of Earth’s surface temperature, Science, 10.1126/science.adk3705 242 cites.

Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Climate change affects the distribution of cacti species of the genus Melocactus in the Brazilian Caatinga, Cavalcante et al., Tropical Ecology Open Access 10.1007/s42965-026-00444-w

Detection of emergent multiple predator effects in a warming world, Davidson et al., Biology Letters Open Access 10.1098/rsbl.2026.0257

Escalating Ecological Droughts Driven by Compound Soil and Atmospheric Dryness, Song et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71102

Global Projections of Coral Reef Sediment Dissolution in the 21st Century, Yan et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl125720

GROWTH RESPONSES OF CHIHUAHUA PINE (PINUS LEIOPHYLLA) OVER 128 YEARS OF WARMING AND PRECIPITATION REGIME SHIFTS, Todd et al., Dendrochronologia Open Access 10.1016/j.dendro.2026.126614

Identifying future climate refugia in central European mountain forests, Berre et al., Journal of Ecology Open Access 10.1111/1365-2745.70439

Increasingly synchronous water limitation portends resilience declines for whitebark pine, Friedman & Germain, Dendrochronologia 10.1016/j.dendro.2026.126615

Reforestation Under Climate Change—A Cross-Regional Deadwood Retention Experiment to Develop Multifunctional Forests on Disturbed Norway Spruce Areas, Putzenlechner et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access pdf 10.1002/ece3.74357

Spatial Variability in Phytoplankton Response to Projected Increases in Iron and Temperature in the Ross Sea, Cristi et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Oceans Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jc024364

Summer Heat Stress Downregulates Photochemistry in Coast Redwoods, Klinek et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access 10.1029/2026jg010052

Synthesis of scale-dependent plant biodiversity change in climate warming experiments, Korell et al., Ecology Open Access 10.1002/ecy.70486

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Nonanthropocentric climate ethics, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change, 10.1002/wcc.131 72 cites.

GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

Abundance of Fe/Al Oxides Governs Soil Organic Carbon Stability in Wetlands Under Drying Conditions, Yao et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71109

Climate and penguin-mediated carbon burial hotspots in coastal lakes of East Antarctica, Zhao et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105730

Forest Carbon Exchange Dynamics and Integrated Carbon Budget of a Subtropical Island Ecosystem, Han et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2026jg010032

Heterogeneity in Permafrost Organic Matter Molecular Composition With Depth and Ramifications Upon Thaw in the Western Siberian Lowlands, Anderson et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences 10.1029/2026jg010169

Modeling forest soil organic carbon dynamics under seasonal freeze–thaw cycles: implications for carbon sequestration in cold-region forest ecosystems, Gao et al., Frontiers in Forests and Global Change Open Access pdf 10.3389/ffgc.2026.1939588

Natural wetland methane emissions simulated by ICON-XPP, Wilkenskjeld et al., Biogeosciences Open Access 10.5194/bg-23-6583-2026

Net carbon losses in Central African forests revealed by high-resolution biomass change maps, Wan et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-77531-y

Nonlinear thermal responses of soil respiration temperature sensitivity under climate change, Yang et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105727

Seven-year continuous measurement of CO₂ and CH₄ at Atlas Mohammed V atmospheric research station in Northwest Africa, Ouchen et al., Atmospheric Environment Open Access 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2026.122365

Structural Diversity Amplifies the Effects of Functional Diversity on Forest Carbon Storage Across Stand Development, Wang et al., Global Ecology and Biogeography Open Access pdf 10.1111/geb.70309

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Emerging multiscale insights on microbial carbon use efficiency in the land carbon cycle, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52160-5 119 cites.

CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

Carbon sequestration potential of tree planting under future climate scenarios in the Guangdong–Hong Kong–Macao Greater Bay Area, China, Zhao et al., Urban Climate 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103128

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Feasible deployment of carbon capture and storage and the requirements of climate targets, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02104-0 170 cites.

Decarbonization

Flash energy droughts in solar and wind resources under climate change, Lin et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02753-3

Hydrogen Storage Technologies: Materials Innovation and System-Level Challenges for a Carbon-Neutral Future, Pranto et al., Advanced Energy and Sustainability Research Open Access 10.1002/aesr.70256

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Diverse decarbonization pathways under near cost-optimal futures, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52433-z 43 cites.

Geoengineering climate

Mapping justice claims for solar geoengineering, Jinnah et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0001054

Uneven Responses of Regional Terrestrial Ecosystem Carbon Turnover Time to Stratospheric Aerosol Injection, Park et al., Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.21390921

Black carbon
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The politics of knowledge in black carbon mitigation: Policy entrepreneurship of Finnish actors and the Climate and Clean Air Coalition, Environmental Science & Policy, 10.1016/j.envsci.2024.103881 3 cites.

Aerosols
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Global aerosol retrieval over land from Landsat imagery integrating Transformer and Google Earth Engine, Remote Sensing of Environment, 10.1016/j.rse.2024.114404 45 cites.

Climate change communications & cognition

Affective divisions and climate policy polarization, Bäck et al., Environmental Politics Open Access pdf 10.1080/09644016.2026.2731596

Future Before My Eyes: How Psychological Distance and Immersive Presentations Relate to Climate Emotions, Schroeder et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103213

Simple logic warnings improve climate argument evaluation across beliefs and partisanship, Bagó & Purcell, Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02754-2

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Durably reducing conspiracy beliefs through dialogues with AI, Science, 10.1126/science.adq1814 305 cites.

Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

Genetically engineered crops increase climate resilience of US fields, [authors did not process], Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02750-6

Historical dynamics of agricultural carbon emissions in the North China plain over the past 300 years, Ye et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1831579

Long-Term Sustainability of Direct Straw Return Challenged by Soil Carbon Saturation and Emission Trade-Offs, Liu et al., Global Change Biology 10.1111/gcb.71120

Stage-Specific Associations Between Extreme Climate Events and Crop Failures Across China, Huang et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008789

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Nexus among climate change, food systems, and human health: An interdisciplinary research framework in the Global South, Environmental Science & Policy, 10.1016/j.envsci.2024.103885 23 cites.

Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Future changes and drivers of socioeconomic exposure to extreme precipitation in the Huai River Basin, Jiang et al., Natural Hazards 10.1007/s11069-026-08417-x

Governance barriers to climate change adaptation in regional catchment management, Kennedy et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104491

Net Groundwater Recharge in California Occurs Primarily During Above-Average Snowpack Years, Reager et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl122396

The 2025–2026 Iberian Atmospheric Rivers Exhibited Moisture Transport Resembling the Early SSP5-8.5 Climate Response, Fernández-Alvarez et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl123799

Variability and response to climate change of precipitation recycling ratio in the water source conservation area of the upper Yellow River, Yang et al., Atmospheric Research 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109333

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Spatiotemporal patterns in persistent precipitation extremes of the Chinese mainland (1961–2022) and association with the dynamic factors, Atmospheric Research, 10.1016/j.atmosres.2024.107600 14 cites.

Climate change economics
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The ocean carbon sink enhances countries’ inclusive wealth and reduces the cost of national climate policies, Communications Earth & Environment, 10.1038/s43247-024-01674-3 9 cites.

Climate change mitigation public policy research

Affective divisions and climate policy polarization, Bäck et al., Environmental Politics Open Access pdf 10.1080/09644016.2026.2731596

Australian Elected Representatives Underestimate Public Support for Climate Action, Wilkinson & Klebl, Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103217

Climate action disclosure among companies: Implications for achieving global efforts to limit average global temperature rise to below 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, Shimwela et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000951

Defending the status quo: The role of system justification in public opposition to ambitious climate policy and energy system change, Lloyd et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology Open Access 10.1016/j.jenvp.2026.103214

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Progress from Chicken Genetics to the Chicken Genome, Poultry Science, 10.1093/ps/85.12.2050 55 cites.

Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

Adapting the emergency management Enterprise to manage the climate emergency: a critical review, Preston et al., Climate Risk Management Open Access 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100885

Cross-sectoral perspectives on strategies to address climate adaptation and health in cyclone-prone Sofala province, Mozambique, Marrufo et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1912968

Governance barriers to climate change adaptation in regional catchment management, Kennedy et al., Environmental Science & Policy 10.1016/j.envsci.2026.104491

Mapping the urban heat island and climate risk in Padua (Italy): Trends in extremes and perspectives for climate justice in adaptation planning, Ceppi et al., Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103143

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Elevated urban energy risks due to climate-driven biophysical feedbacks, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02108-w 37 cites.

Climate change impacts on human health

Beyond resolution: An integrated framework for selecting climate data for urban heat-risk assessment, Shin et al., Urban Climate Open Access 10.1016/j.uclim.2026.103150

Climate Informed Dengue Prediction and Future Risk Under a Changing Monsoon Climate in Kerala, India, Yacob & Koll, Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) Open Access 10.5281/zenodo.20096919

Heatstroke in Japan: current status, future risks, and prevention measures under a changing climate, Oka, Climate Risk Management Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.crm.2026.100887

Long-term weakening of extreme cold stress in eastern China, Li et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100960

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Rising cause-specific mortality risk and burden of compound heatwaves amid climate change, Nature Climate Change, 10.1038/s41558-024-02137-5 100 cites.

Climate change & geopolitics

Mapping and quantifying engagement levels of governments in IPCC approval meetings by topic from text, Bayer et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0001057

Other

Climate urgency enables political alignment for Latin American power integration, Ramírez et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-77772-x

Dialogue framework for climate justice: bridging social and environmental justice, Thiele, Environmental Sociology 10.1080/23251042.2026.2732173

Extreme North American heatwaves in 1941 and 2021 drove widespread but contrasting impacts, Anderson & Chartrand, Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04055-0

Internal Variability Dominates the Spatial Heterogeneity of Recent Trends in Eurasian Winter Cold Extremes, Liu et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124591

Kinetic study of global-scale O₃ pollution under 2060s climate and emission scenarios, Hata et al., Atmospheric Environment Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2026.122367

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climatic controls of fire activity in the red pine forests of eastern North America, Agricultural and Forest Meteorology, 10.1016/j.agrformet.2024.110219 7 cites.

Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives

A global safety net for climate-risk intelligence is urgently needed, Bashir & Adil, Nature 10.1038/d41586-026-02995-3

Adaptation as a catalyst for social change, Adams et al., PLOS Climate Open Access 10.1371/journal.pclm.0001052

Protecting tropical forests is more cost-effective for biodiversity and climate than restoration, Miranda et al., Science 10.1126/science.adx9928

Research Priorities for Robust Climate Assessments in the United States, Kenney et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2025ef007336

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
A just world on a safe planet: a Lancet Planetary Health–Earth Commission report on Earth-system boundaries, translations, and transformations, The Lancet Planetary Health, 10.1016/s2542-5196(24)00042-1 173 cites.

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

Making California’s Electricity Cheaper: An Affordability Agenda for the Golden State, Boyle et al., Grid Lab and Energy Innovation

More than 80% of Californians rank lowering bills as a top or important priority for state leaders, and the state’s elected officials have a duty to address these intertwined problems for their constituents. In response, the authors participated in a workshop of more than 20 California electricity experts to diagnose what is causing rising costs and develop actionable policy solutions that address the scale of the challenge. The authors were informed by but not limited by that workshop; they define a policy roadmap to stabilize and ultimately reduce electricity rates for California’s incoming governor, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), the legislature, utilities, and other stakeholders, that will allow California to sustain its clean energy leadership.

Understanding the linkage between transmission deliverability and resource adequacy, Stenclik et al., GridLab and Telos Energy

The authors wanted to bridge the gap between interconnection studies and resource adequacy assessments, two processes that are deeply interrelated, but have historically been treated as separate analytical exercises. Most of the recent attention on generator interconnection has focused on interconnection costs, queue timelines, and transmission cost allocation, while the resource adequacy implications have remained largely unexamined. Despite the central role of deliverability assumptions in resource adequacy assessments, there has been limited research into whether they accurately reflect how resources perform during periods of elevated resource adequacy risk outside of narrowly defined peak-load windows. Inaccurately assumed generator deliverability can have a large affect on resource adequacy outcomes.

Assessing Electricity Resource Adequacy in Pennsylvania and PJM, Knight et al., Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

The authors developed load projections and evaluated resource adequacy under a set of likely possible futures for PJM's grid and its' Pennsylvania service area. The authors used capacity expansion and resource adequacy scenario modeling to (a) develop projections of future resources through the long term (2040) in light of different load projections and (b) assess system reliability performance through the near term (2030) to better understand the kinds of stresses Pennsylvania’s electric system and the wider PJM grid face. Three scenarios were used. In both the Reference scenario and the High Load And Low Supply scenario, the authors found that from 2027 through 2030, the PJM planning criterion for resource adequacy (loss of load expectation or “LOLE” of 0.1) is not met by PJM. Meanwhile, in the No New Data Centers scenario, LOLE is below this 0.1 threshold.

State of Mind: Mapping Values and Climate Perceptions, Maharashtra Edition, Ek Kutumb Solutions

If technical infrastructure enables the delivery of climate solutions, relational infrastructure enables their acceptance, adoption, and endurance. It comprises the social foundations that shape whether people engage with transitions: the values they hold, the degree of agency they feel, the priorities they seek to protect, the institutions they trust, and the ways in which they make sense of change. To address this missing layer, Ek Kutumb is building the first and largest state-by-state, values-based segmentation of citizens in India. The research seeks to surface the deeply held values and perceptions of climate change, along with experiences of agency, priorities, and trust factors that shape how people respond to climate-related issues and interventions. The first state examined is Maharashtra. Four themes emerge from the Maharashtra findings including the primacy of everyday economic pressures, a deep but locally rooted relationship with nature, broad acceptance of climate change expressed in the language of lived experience rather than scientific terminology, and a trust vacuum in which no institution has yet earned the mandate to lead on climate. The authors segment the population into seven value-based groups, each defined by a distinct configuration of core values. For each segment, they examined their relationship to family and community, as well as their understanding of the environment, climate, and institutions.

State of Global Water Resources 2025, World Meteorological Organization

The authors provide a comprehensive quantitative overview of global water resources, with a focus on hydrological variability and trends. The report's information supports countries, decision makers and stakeholders in understanding the current state of water resources, identifying areas with significant anomalies and supporting effective water management strategies. The authors found that 2025 was one of driest years for river discharge in 35 years. The past seven years have seen abnormal river flows. Water storage on Earth’s land surface has decreased in past 10 years. Widespread glacier loss occurred across all regions for the fourth consecutive year. Asia and Africa are the regions most affected by water-related disasters. Water data availability has improved, but gaps remain in hard hit areas.

State-Led Planning, Development, and Procurement, Spokas et al., Clean Air Task Force

The authors identify how establishing state-led planning and procurement can help state governments in deregulated electricity markets meet their power sector decarbonization goals and lays out the components needed to put that planning in action.

Findings from a 2026 Survey of Adults Age 18 and Older, Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago and the AP-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research

The authors found that 53% of Americans are extremely or very concerned about the environmental effects of AI, up from 41% who said the same in 2025. Younger adults ages 18-29 have become particularly concerned, increasing from 38% last year to 60% today and moving from levels similar to other age groups to the highest level of concern. Forty-seven percent of Americans think AI will do more to hurt rather than help the environment, up from 33% who said the same in 2025. The authors also explored attitudes toward climate change, energy policy, and electric vehicles (EVs). Most Americans agree that climate change is happening and is caused by human activity, a trend that has remained stable in recent years. There is a large partisan divide in these attitudes, however, with Democrats more likely than Republicans to believe climate change is occurring (92% vs. 55%) and is caused mostly by human activity (68% vs. 34%). About 2 in 3 believe that oil and gas companies, the federal government, and large businesses and corporations have a lot of responsibility to address climate change, while just 4 in 10 say the same about developing countries and individual people.

In Hottest Summer on Record, 2 in 3 Americans Say Climate Change Is Increasing Heat-Related Illnesses, Annenberg Public Policy Center, University of Pennsylvania

Nearly two-thirds of the American public say climate change is increasing the risk of respiratory diseases and heat- and insect-related illnesses. The author's survey, which was conducted Aug. 4-17, 2026, among 1,904 empaneled U.S. adults, found that 76% report that extreme outdoor heat affected their daily activities at least sometimes in the past year and 38% say poor air quality resulting from wildfire smoke did so. Extreme heat is affecting the everyday lives of most Americans. Nearly two-thirds of Americans (65%) say that climate change is increasing the risk of heat-related illnesses, respiratory diseases, and insect-borne diseases. This is unchanged from August 2025 (65%) and July 2024 (67%) but is significantly higher than 58% in November 2023. Americans generally recognize that heat waves are on the rise. Nearly two-thirds (62%) say U.S. heat waves are becoming more frequent and intense than in the past, statistically unchanged from 61% in August 2025, 65% in July 2024, and 58% in November 2023. Of the four extreme weather events measured in the survey, more Americans report that their daily activities were impacted at least sometimes by extreme outdoor heat (76%) and poor air quality resulting from wildfire smoke (38%). As one would expect, fewer say they were impacted at least sometimes by flooding (20%) and tornadoes/hurricanes (11%), since these events are less frequent.

Energy Crossroads: Why managing fossil fuel decline is key to Australia’s green export future, Malbrain et al., WWF-Australia

The authors warn that the Australia's bid to be both a renewable energy superpower and a major fossil fuel exporter is putting its economic future at risk. This dual energy strategy is sending mixed signals to investors and trading partners just as countries across the Indo-Pacific accelerate clean energy investments. Australia could lose up to $70 billion in fossil fuel export value by 2035 as global demand shifts. Yet, findings show Australian governments still provide an estimated $20.1 billion a year in support to fossil fuels, compared with just $4.6 billion for renewable energy.

Understanding Oregon’s Data Center Industry, Wirkkala et al., Center for Nonprofit and Philanthropic Insight at ECOnorthwest and the University of Virginia

The authors establishes a common foundation for understanding Oregon’s data center industry. They examine the location, scale, and characteristics of existing and planned facilities; electricity and water implications; workforce and economic contributions; property taxes and incentive programs; land use and host-community characteristics; and Oregon’s position relative to selected peer markets. The analysis draws on facility-level data, confidential employment records, economic modeling, county property tax records, geospatial analysis, public utility and water-resource information, and other state, federal, and industry sources. The authors also identify areas where data are insufficient to understand impacts, and further research or reporting is needed. Electricity demand is one of the industry’s most significant infrastructure considerations. Water use depends heavily on facility technology and local conditions. Data centers have a distinct economic profile; relatively few operational jobs, but substantial economic activity. Land-use effects are small statewide, but can be more significant locally.

From Opportunity To Infrastructure: Scaling Rooftop Solar In Commercial Real Estate (UK), Cush and Wakefield, Real Estate:UK, Forsters, and Push Power

The authors found that the UK’s untapped commercial rooftops could become a major new source of solar energy generation with enough output to match that of 20 Hinkley Point C nuclear power stations. This, if used correctly, could massively increase UK renewable energy production, fast-track the UK’s path to net zero, improve national energy security, reduce the need for solar deployment on agricultural land, and drastically reduce energy costs for occupiers amid ongoing energy price uncertainty. The authors used data and responses from 70 real estate organizations with combined assets under management of over £500bn. The authors found that less than 10% of suitable commercial building roof space has been used for solar generation to date, providing just 3-5GW of solar capacity. While solar technology is widely championed in principle, its deployment remains significantly below its technical potential, particularly across the industrial and logistics real estate sector.

The Dirty Truth. They promised you clean energy, but there's a Dirty Truth behind your rising utility bills, Ver Beek et al., Sierra Club

The authors studied the 50 parent companies that own the most fossil fuel generation, comprised of 76 operating companies, which collectively own half of all remaining coal and gas generation in the U.S. They analyzed their plans to retire coal by 2030, not build new gas plants through 2035, and build clean energy to replace fossil generation and serve new load by 2035. The utilities studied scored 7/100, earning an F, worsening their overall score by 11 points since 2021.

Stored Potential. The impacts of utility-scale battery energy storage systems on communities and the grid, Draklellis et al., RMI

The authors examine large-scale battery energy storage system (BESS) projects across the United States, drawing on available data to assess their reliability contributions, economic impacts, community benefits, and improving safety performance. Batteries help keep the lights on during grid stress. Battery storage can lower electricity costs during high-demand periods. BESS projects can provide meaningful local economic benefits.

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Fact brief - Does wind power require backup from fossil fuels?

Tue, 22 Sep 2026 10:44:50 EST

Skeptical Science is partnering with Gigafact to produce fact briefs — bite-sized fact checks of trending claims. You can submit claims you think need checking via the tipline.

Does wind power require backup from fossil fuels?

Most power grids still combine fossil fuels with renewables, but some already run entirely on renewable energy and offer models others could follow.

The majority of 100% renewable grids rely primarily on hydropower, though certain nations have significantly incorporated wind in their portfolios. Costa Rica and Uruguay have achieved 99-100% renewable power with around 17% and 35% coming from wind, respectively.

Several U.S. municipalities meet electricity demands using diverse portfolios of renewables, including wind. Burlington, Vermont’s 2024 supply was 99.9% renewable, mainly via hydropower, biomass, and wind; Seattle, Washington was 95% renewables powered in 2024. In Kansas and South Dakota, wind alone comprises 60% of generation.

Energy storage is also rapidly expanding as a solution to intermittency, with the U.S. ranking second globally and achieving record growth in 2025. Such combinations of renewable resources, storage, and transmission continue to enable more reliable, renewable grids.

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Climate Council 11 countries leading the charge on renewable energy

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark Denmark #1 in share of renewables in net electricity generation for 2024 in the EU

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City of Burlington Electric Department Our Energy Portfolio

City of Seattle Power Supply and Delivery

Analysis of EIA data Share of electricity gen by wind, by state, 2025

U.S. Energy Information Administration Electricity Data Browser

U.S. Grid Energy Storage Factsheet University of Michigan

Princeton University Net-Zero America

NREL NREL Report Redefines Wind as a Grid Stabilizer, Not a Liability

Columbia Law School Sabin Center for Climate Change Law Rebutting 33 False Claims About Solar, Wind, and Electric Vehicles

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Rapid Warming in the Himalaya Exacerbates Geohazard Cascades Beyond Adaptation Limits

Mon, 21 Sep 2026 14:47:14 EST

This is a re-post from World Weather Attribution

A catastrophic rock-ice avalanche that transitioned into a debris flood in the Himalayas along the Nepal–China border on 26 August 2026 has caused widespread destruction across Nepal and neighbouring regions. In Nepal, at the time of writing (14 September 2026) the disaster has resulted in over 1,300 confirmed deaths, with only a small fraction of victims identified and returned to their families. Over 5,000 people remain missing, around 13,700 people have been rescued and more than 8,600 people have received medical treatment (NDRRMA, 2026e). About 3,400 people are currently sheltering in holding centres (NDRRMA, 2026a) and an estimated 84,270 people across 17 local levels in the six districts of Rasuwa, Nuwakot, Dhading, Gorkha, Chitwan and Tanahu are affected, with the government declaring 15 municipalities as disaster crisis-hit areas for three months (UNDP, 2026a; MOHA, 2026).

While initial reports suggested that the event may have been caused by an earthquake, later evidence indicates that the recorded seismic activity was actually linked to the rapid collapse of roughly 2 square kilometers of rock wall and glacier ice (US Geological Society Earthquake Hazards Program, August 26, 2026; Center for Hydrology and Water Resources Research, 2026). The collapsing material fell approximately 1,400 m, from around 5,150 m above sea level to the valley floor at about 3,750 m. This released a huge amount of energy and produced seismic waves that were initially detected as an earthquake-like signal.

The rock-ice avalanche then triggered a series of processes. As the ice, rock and debris moved rapidly down the mountain, friction and mechanical energy probably caused some of the glacier ice to melt, producing large amounts of meltwater (Le Page, 26 August 2026 [NewScientist]). When the avalanche reached the valley floor, it also hit buried ice, which probably melted and added more water to the debris flood.

Figure 1: Climate-sensitive processes potentially contributing to failure. Conceptual representation of the main mechanisms through which climate variability and climate change may have influenced the stability of the Rasuwa rock wall.

The resulting debris flood was therefore likely caused by several sources of water, including melting glacier ice, water stored beneath the glacier and in permafrost, ice and water carried within the debris (see fig. 1), and river water pushed ahead of the flow. A wall of water, ice, rock and sediment reached the Rasuwagadhi border, 22 km downstream, within seven minutes, moving at an average speed of 188 km per hour, and wiped out the border facilities, the town of Timure and the Syabrubesi market town within the next quarter of an hour, catching pilgrims, border staff and hydropower workers (CHWRR, 2026; Lord, 2026). Within a further half hour it was in the Trishuli valley at Betrawati, and still moving boulders and pulling multi-storey buildings into the river in Betrawati and Trishuli Bazaar far downstream (CHWRR, 2026; Lord, 2026). The flood travelled 200 km to Devghat in under seven hours, where river flow more than doubled to about 5,850 cubic metres per second, and an estimated 20 million cubic meters of excess water passed in under four hours before the flood continued into India (CHWRR, 2026; Lord, 2026). The water deposited 30.5 million cubic meters of sediment and debris along the corridor, burying agricultural fields, settlements and hydropower plants (NDRRMA, 2026d).

This mixture of water, ice, rock and sediment created a highly destructive debris flood that swept away families, homes, settlements, roads, bridges and other infrastructure along the corridor, leaving survivors stranded and cut off, many having also lost family members and everything they owned more than 35 km downstream while the water travelled much further, at Glachi, 88 km downstream the water level of the river Trishuli rose by 8.5m (Center for Land Surface Hazards, 2026). The extent of the humanitarian catastrophe is still being assessed.

Researchers from Nepal, Pakistan, the UK, Ireland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, the US, New Zealand and the Netherlands, including experts in glaciology, mountain hydrology, climate science, humanitarian aid, seismology and social science, have come together to examine the range of factors that may have contributed to this event. While the underlying geological structure controlled where and how the slope failed, longer-term warming and changing precipitation phase from snow to rain may have reduced its stability by weakening ice-filled fractures and rock–ice contacts and increasing water pressure. Climate change is thus best understood as a destabilising factor acting on a pre-existing geological predisposition, rather than the fundamental cause of the failure. Therefore, rather than conducting a conventional attribution study which is typically focused on a single, well-defined weather event, we are bringing together the available scientific knowledge on known and potential drivers, while also investigating how these drivers have changed in a warming climate.

Main Findings

Nepal has established early warning systems and adaptation measures that can help reduce impacts from more conventional and forecastable riverine floods, and have demonstrably helped save lives, including among communities downstream. However, the event was fundamentally different in its magnitude, speed and complexity. It was beyond the design and predictive limits of existing risk reduction measures, and no existing early warning system could have provided sufficient lead time or prevented the scale of impacts observed in the worst-affected areas, highlighting the limits of adaptation. In a rapidly warming Himalaya, increasingly extreme and complex hazards are exceeding adaptation capacity, resulting in loss and damage. This is occurring against a baseline of a high frequency of large earthquakes, which both destabilises slopes and hampers recovery from successive disasters.

The immediate impacts of this cascading hazard were almost entirely dependent on exposure to hazard, whereas longer-term impacts (e.g. related to recovery, long-term health effects) are likely to vary based on socioeconomic vulnerability characteristics of the populations affected. In a high mountain context where habitable land is constrained, population is increasing, and economic activity is dependent on rivers, it would be very socially, economically and politically difficult to eliminate or even substantially reduce exposure in riverine valleys, representing a soft limit to adaptation.

The 26 August 2026 Rasuwa disaster was triggered by a large rock wall collapse from the Langtang Lirung mountain at 5,150 m asl., which also caused part of the overlying glacier to collapse. The resulting rock–ice avalanche rapidly transformed into a debris flood and then a water-dominated flash flood that traveled downstream at average speeds of 188 km/hr, causing extensive erosion and sediment deposition. The failure involved an exceptionally large volume of rock and ice that on impact with the ground released energy equivalent to a M5.5 earthquake. There are several possible contributing causes, as outlined in the following points.

In 2015 an earthquake of magnitude 7.8 triggered a catastrophic rock–ice avalanche at Langtang Lirung and caused widespread damage across the region. Subsequent monitoring shows persistently elevated and, at high elevations, increased landslide activity, suggesting that earthquake shaking may have weakened the underlying rock mass over the long term. Although its specific contribution to the 2026 failure cannot yet be confirmed, the earthquake may have preconditioned the slope for failure, alongside geological and climatic factors.

Warming and permafrost degradation likely weakened the source rock wall by increasing bedrock temperatures and thawing ice within fractures. Loss of ice bonding reduces fracture strength, while meltwater can increase water pressure and further destabilise pre-existing geological weaknesses. Thus, permafrost degradation may have acted as an additional climate-related factor preconditioning the slope for failure.

Glaciers in the region have been losing mass for decades at a rate equivalent to more than half a metre of thinning per year. Since 2010 the rate of recession of the Langtang-Lirung glacier extent has accelerated, increasing from 0.5% per annum over the previous two centuries to 1-2.3% per annum in the past 16 years. Glacier thinning and retreat can reduce buttressing and alter stresses within adjacent rock walls, potentially weakening existing fractures and increasing slope instability. Combined with increased meltwater, these processes may have interacted to amplify the compound event.

Precipitation can provide an additional short-timescale forcing. As temperatures rise, the rain–snow transition moves upward, increasing the fraction of rain falling as snow at higher elevations. Rain produces an immediate liquid-water input to the slope, whereas snowfall temporarily stores water at the surface. Intense or prolonged rainfall can therefore rapidly increase water supply to fractures and potentially increase fracture-water pressure. At the rock-ice-avalanche location, stations recorded exceptionally high precipitation during October 2025, which combined with subsequent warmth may have been a source for meltwater during the following spring and monsoon seasons. There is also a tendency of the greater fraction of precipitation falling as rain than snow in recent years. This means there can be an increase in the amount of water stored in the land under the avalanche site, even in the absence of anomalously high total precipitation.

Observations show unusually warm conditions before the failure, supporting enhanced snow and ice melt and more precipitation falling as rain rather than snow. The slope failure on August 26th occurred against the backdrop of a warm 12 month period from September 2025-August 2026, with the warmest two months of the year (July and August) directly preceding the event also substantially warmer than the climatological average. These conditions were anomalous at the location of the slope failure itself and across the wider Himalayan region.

We also analysed the height of the 0°C isotherm, finding that it has shifted to higher elevations consistent with global warming, with particularly strong trends observed during the Monsoon and Postmonsoon seasons. This progressive upward retreat of the freezing threshold is on the order of 100m/decade in recent decades in the Monsoon and Postmonsoon season. This is highly relevant as it can contribute to the degradation of high-elevation permafrost, glacial thinning and retreat, the snowfall-rainfall transition, and associated slope instability.

When analysing how these conditions were different in a 1.4°C cooler preindustrial climate, using the standard WWA attribution framework that compares possible weather in today’s climate with possible weather in a 1.4°C cooler preindustrial climate using climate models and statistical models based on weather observations. We find in all datasets a significant increase in the likelihood and intensity of the very warm July-August temperatures at the gridcell nearest to the slope failure as well as in the wider region with an increase in temperature attributable to human-caused climate change during July and August of about 1.5°C, comparable to the level of global warming. Annually, the attributable increase is larger than global warming, at about 2°C. In individual winter months, the observed increase is as high as 3°C.

We have not assessed whether this specific rock-ice avalanche would have occurred in the absence of human-induced climate change. Such a direct attribution requires additional evidence linking atmospheric conditions to subsurface temperatures, fracture-water pressures and the mechanical evolution of the slope. However, rapidly rising temperatures at a rate beyond the global mean as a result of fossil fuel emissions increase the likelihood and severity of such hazards in the Himalayas.

Significant progress in adaptation is needed, particularly through strengthened high Himalaya earth observation, hazard monitoring, risk communication and transboundary data and knowledge sharing. But events of this magnitude ultimately exceed the limits of adaptation. Addressing unfolding and imminent loss and damage, through recovery and reconstruction support in impacted communities, has now become an unavoidable part of climate response.

Minimising future risk requires a rapid transition away from fossil fuel use and delivering on climate finance commitments for adaptation. This is particularly important in the Himalaya and other high mountains, where glacier decline and permafrost degradation are expected to continue even without further warming, meaning that some of the impacts of past warming have yet to fully emerge.

2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #38

Sun, 20 Sep 2026 10:45:08 EST

A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, September 13, 2026 thru Sat, September 19, 2026.

Stories we promoted this week, by category:

Climate Change Impacts (8 articles)

A Super El Niño Is Building. Florida`s Most Vulnerable Homes Aren`t Ready. A strong El Niño is raising the odds of an active winter storm season—and the Floridians most likely to die in a tornado live in aging manufactured homes the state can’t even count. Inside Climate News, Kate Waxman, Sep 13, 2026.
The Atmosphere Just Set a Water Vapor Record More water vapor means more rocket fuel for extreme rain — so this record is not good news The Climate Brink, Andrew Dessler, Sep 14, 2026.
Climate crisis likely behind devastating Nepal-Tibet floods that killed more than 1,300, first study finds Scientists say global heating was a destabilising factor in collapse of 200,000 sq metre glacier in August. The Guardian, Damien Gayle, Sep 16, 2026.
The open houses at the edge of disaster This story is part of Betting the House, a pop-up climate newsroom bringing together independent journalists to cover climate and housing. HEATED, Emily Atkin, Sep 17, 2026.
Climate change is making it easier for invasive species to succeed The Conversation, Nicola S. Smith & William W. L. Cheung , Sep 17, 2026.
MIT researchers are mapping extreme weather risks - and building tools to act on them The Climate Grand Challenges “New World of Weather” project shows how modeling, planning tools, and infrastructure analysis are translating research into real-world resilience. MIT News, David Chandler, Sep 18, 2026.
What Happens When Earth Passes 1.5 Degrees of Warming? Climate scientist Michael Mann digs into the story behind the latest numbers. Inside Climate News, Steve Curwood, Sep 19, 2026.
Burning forests, emptying rivers, €180bn in damage: Europe`s politicians face reckoning after `summer of truth` Amid record-shattering heatwaves and popular demand for climate action, why are politicians often timid or in denial? The Guardian, Fiona Harvey, Sep 19, 2026.

Climate Policy and Politics (7 articles)

This climate problem isn`t on the UN agenda - data centers The slow moving climate talks are struggling to address one of the world’s biggest drivers of rising energy demand. Politico, Sara Schonhardt, Sep 11, 2026.
EPA Will Remove Carbon Dioxide Limits on Power Plants The U.S. power sector—which accounts for roughly a quarter of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions—will no longer need to abide by Biden-era federal climate pollution regulations. Eos, Grace van Deelen, Sep 14, 2026.
Trump Administration Will Roll Back Climate Rules According to published reports, the Trump Administration will finalize rules to rollback carbon pollution standards for power plants, as soon as today. Common Dreams, Newswire Editor, Sep 14, 2026.
Trump Doubles Down on Climate Denial With Plan to Repeal Power Plant Rules The EPA revoked limits on greenhouse gas emissions from power plants, rejecting decades of settled science to argue that they do not contribute to dangerous air pollution. Inside Climate News, Liza Gross, Sep 15, 2026.
How does unthinkable policy become inevitable? The `Overton window` is one possible answer The Overton window seems convenient for explaining big shifts in public policy. But just how good is it? The Conversation, Joshua Black, Lecturer in Australian Political Studies, University of Canberra, Sep 15, 2026.
What the science really says about the health and climate risks of carbon pollution The repeal of this rule is the latest in the Trump Administration’s attempts to roll back federal climate regulation. TIME, Simmone Shah, Sep 15, 2026.
Why Germany is building an ark for U.S. climate data As researchers around the world begin work on the next U.N. climate assessment, fears are growing that the Trump administration could meddle with critical U.S. climate data. In response, scientists are preparing to transfer vast troves of that data to repositories in Germany. YaleEnvironment360, Christian Schwägerl, Sep 17, 2026.

Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (4 articles)

Why is Venus hotter than Mercury, when Mercury is closer to the sun? Despite being farther from the sun, Venus is the hottest planet in the solar system, and the reason has little to do with proximity to a star. Live Science, Olivia Maule, Sep 12, 2026.
Africa`s climate services need local detail and knowledge, say people who use the information The Conversation, Petra HoldenCherié Janine Forbes and Gerald Ngoma, Sep 13, 2026.
Australia must double down to meet our climate targets. Our new study shows how A new report from Climate Analytics and the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research asks and attempts to answer a seemingly simple question: what can Australia do to limit GHG emissions overshoot? The Conversation, Bill Hare, Murdoch University, Sep 13, 2026.
Scrap the term `net zero` - it`s too toxic, net zero committee urges Calling for a major rebranding of the effort to tackle climate change, the cross-party committee said the term had become a ‘lightning rod for opposition to climate action’ The Independent News, Millie Cooke, Sep 17, 2026.

Climate Science and Research (3 articles)

Wildfires, permafrost melt in Canada causing even more climate change, new study shows New research says current climate models don’t account for warming-induced emissions CBC, Inyat Singh, Sep 11, 2026.
Skeptical Science New Research for Week #38 2026 Skeptical Science's weekly survey of peer-reviewed climate research plus climate-related reports from think tanks and governments. Skeptical Science, Doug Bostrom & Marc Kodack, Sep 17, 2026.
How narwhal 'scientists' track Arctic warming Phys.org, Issam AHMED, Sep 19, 2026.

Climate Education and Communication (2 articles)

In Florida, textbook publishers are minimizing or removing climate change coverage The words "climate change" are slowly being removed from textbooks in Florida and from the state's education standards. NPR, Jessica Meszaros, Sep 15, 2026.
12 climate books for back-to-school season These titles showcase how disciplines across the curriculum can inform our response to climate change. Yale Climate Connections, Michael Svoboda, Sep 15, 2026.

Miscellaneous (2 articles)

2026 SkS Weekly Climate Change & Global Warming News Roundup #37 A listing of 28 news and opinion articles we found interesting and shared on social media during the past week: Sun, September 6, 2026 thru Sat, September 12, 2026. Skeptical Science, Bärbel Winkler & Doug Bostrom, Sep 13, 2026.
Kim Stanley Robinson won`t read aloud his climate disaster scene from `The Ministry for the Future` Kim Stanley Robinson, author of one of the most famous novels on climate change, says he has done more than 600 speaking events since “The Ministry for the Future” was published in 2020 — but he won’t read the first chapter out loud. AP News, Peter Prengaman, Sep 17, 2026.

Public Misunderstandings about Climate Science (1 article)

Many Trump `enemies` are being spoon-fed to him by one conservative think tank Climate denial successfully fed to the White House as policy framework. The Independent News, Andrew Feinberg, Sep 18, 2026.

Climate Law and Justice (1 article)

Congressional Republicans Aim to Shield Fossil Fuel Companies From Climate Lawsuits The House Judiciary Committee will consider the Stop Climate Shakedowns Act as the Trump administration moves to roll back federal limits on greenhouse gas emissions. Inside Climate News, Georgina Gustin, Sep 15, 2026.

Skeptical Science New Research for Week #38 2026

Thu, 17 Sep 2026 13:03:55 EST

Open access notables

Projected amplification of global warming by warming-induced greenhouse gas emissions, Abernethy et al., Environmental Research Letters

Warming-induced emissions (WIE) of greenhouse gases from natural sources are a large amplifying feedback that most climate models do not yet represent. This absence risks systematic underestimation of projected future warming and overestimation of remaining carbon budgets. To assess the potential magnitude of these feedbacks, we derived relationships between global temperature and WIE rates from process-based model estimates across three Shared Socioeconomic Pathways, SSP1-2.6, SSP2-4.5, and SSP4-6.0. The warming-induced methane emission rate from permafrost, wetlands, freshwaters, and wildfire combined increases with temperature at an estimated 97 ± 6 Tg CH4 yr−1 °C−1 across all three scenarios, while the warming-induced carbon dioxide emission rate from permafrost and wildfire combined increases at 7 ± 1 Pg CO2 yr−1 °C−1 in SSP2-4.5 and SSP4-6.0. Using the MAGICC climate model, we projected that WIE could add 0.2 °C–0.4 °C of warming by 2100 across scenarios, split roughly equally between carbon dioxide and methane, amplifying post-2020 anthropogenic warming by 20%–30%. Combined emission sensitivity and climate response 1σ uncertainties are ±0.2 °C on the added warming and ±10%–30% on the warming amplification.

Interpreting Ensembles of Climate Projections for Impact Studies, Chandler & Brierley, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change

To study the potential impacts of future changes in the earth's climate, projections of these changes are required. These are usually produced using complex computer models, and are subject to many uncertainties which are often sampled using collections (“ensembles”) of model simulations. However, the sampling in any individual ensemble is incomplete and often unrepresentative. This creates challenges for users of the projections, especially when it is important to understand the range of potential impacts that can reasonably be expected. Other challenges include the presence of systematic discrepancies between the model outputs and observations of the real climate system; and the fact that it is often infeasible to work with all members of an ensemble so that an appropriate subset must be chosen. Various approaches have been suggested for addressing each of these issues: a critical review is provided here, to allow an informed choice depending on the requirements of a given application.

The emergence of climate migration research as an academic field, Kohutova et al., Frontiers in Climat

This study examines how research on climate migration has developed from a dispersed topic of academic interest into a distinct academic field. Although the links between environment and human mobility have been studied for over a century, less attention has been paid to how knowledge has been structured and institutionalized around this topic. To address this gap, the article examines how climate migration scholarship has grown, organized its scholarly community, and gained recognition from external actors. Drawing on theories of field formation, we analyse four dimensions of academic fields: differentiation from other research areas, epistemic and social coherence among scholars, their social infrastructure and legitimacy-building. The study uses a mixed-methods approach combining bibliometric analysis, document and policy review, and expert interviews. The findings show that the formation of climate migration as a research field was a cumulative process. Policy attention brought resources for more research, while a shared understanding that climate migration is driven by multiple interacting factors, not climate alone, gave scholars common ground to organize around. Expanding citations and co-authorships networks then gave the field its structure over time. However, the field formation remains uneven. The networks are geographically uneven, research is being published across hundreds of journals, and theoretical frameworks are underdeveloped. Overall, the article shows how new research topics consolidate as academic fields and argues that the label of ‘research field' is not merely descriptive because it impacts visibility, resources, and epistemic authority.

Future warming enhances rates of population increase of arthropod crop pests globally, Molina et al., Ecography

We compiled a dataset on the thermal biology of arthropod crop pests and fitted TPCs to examine the projected shifts in performance under historic and future climates relative to their thermal niches, which were examined through modelling the latitudinal variation of their population-level thermal limits. Our findings highlight that most arthropod crop pests are projected to increase their thermal potential for population growth under warming by 2050, with temperate populations retaining room to grow but tropical populations increasingly exposed to heat stress. These findings can be explained by the asymmetric variation of thermal niche limits for these intrinsic rates of population increase, since we found that lower thermal limits declined with latitude, while upper thermal limits remained constant.

From this week's government/NGO section:

Communicating about Climate and Clean Energy in an Age of Affordability, Andrea Everett, Heatmap and Embold Research

Each phase of research built on the previous one, starting with a large national survey to uncover the core values, priorities, and beliefs of three broad segments of the electorate with different views of climate change. These groups were labelled as Skeptics, Persuadables, and Persuadeds. For climate and clean energy communicators, the electorate is best understood as three distinct audiences. Persuadeds already believe in the 11 urgency of climate action and clean energy. What they lack is the conviction that their own actions matter, so the core tasks are to give them concrete, achievable things to do and to help them see that their efforts matter. Persuadables are open but unconvinced, and on the central issue of clean energy affordability they demand proof they can see close to home, rather than broad statistics or slogans. Skeptics, meanwhile, may be reachable through appeals to their values of personal freedom and energy independence, supplemented by evidence on cost and reliability, but with so few trusted messengers to make the case, clean energy remains a tough sell.

What are the top social media platforms used by each of Global Warming’s Six Americas?, Ettinger et al., Yale University and George Mason University

In Fall 2025, as part of a biannual Climate Change in the American Mind survey, the authors asked a nationally representative sample of Americans (n = 1,146) how often they visit 14 different social media platforms. They were also asked how often they hear about global warming on social media. Across Global Warming’s Six Americas, the most commonly visited social media platforms are YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram. The Alarmed hear about global warming on social media more often than other segments of the Six Americas.

94 articles in 53 journals by 625 contributing authors

Physical science of climate change, effects

Contrasting SST modes explain decadal intensification of Pacific Walker Circulation, Li et al., Atmospheric Research 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109338

Projected amplification of global warming by warming-induced greenhouse gas emissions, Abernethy et al., Environmental Research Letters Open Access 10.1088/1748-9326/ae9e24

Substantial contribution of land-atmosphere interactions to the intensification of compound drought and heatwave events under rising CO₂, Xing et al., Global and Planetary Change 10.1016/j.gloplacha.2026.105722

Warming of the subpolar North Pacific accelerated by sea ice retreat and wind changes, Ge et al., npj Climate and Atmospheric Science Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41612-026-01541-2

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Transient overturning changes cause an upper-ocean nutrient decline in a warming climate, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52200-0 13 cites.

Observations of climate change, effects

Extreme Dry and Humid Heat Seasons Are Changing Asymmetrically, Ivanovich et al., AGU Advances Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026av002516

Global drought shows no detectable recent acceleration under climate warming, Xu et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03954-6

In situ observations reveal continental-scale warming, oxygen decline, and eutrophication in U.S. estuaries, Reinl et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03934-w

Rapid increase of climate extremes reveals new areas of concern in Amazonia, Barlow et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03975-1

State of Climate in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2025: A Review, Marengo et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70581

Warming accelerates drought–flood oscillations and stratifies socioeconomic exposure, Qi et al., PNAS Nexus Open Access pdf 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag283

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Cyclone Gabrielle as a Design Storm for Northeastern Aotearoa New Zealand Under Anthropogenic Warming, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2024ef004772 22 cites.

Instrumentation & observational methods of climate change, effects

A global hourly ISIMIP3 climate forcing dataset for impact modeling, Bechtold et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-18-6637-2026

Interpreting Ensembles of Climate Projections for Impact Studies, Chandler & Brierley, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1002/wcc.70088

Introduction to the Concept of Regional Frameworks for Climate Services (RFCS), Golding et al., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society Open Access pdf 10.1175/bams-d-25-0207.1

Regularized Fingerprinting with Linearly Optimal Weight Matrix in Detection and Attribution of Climate Change, Li & Li, Journal of Climate pdf 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0740.1

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
What is a heat wave: A survey and literature synthesis of heat wave definitions across the United States, PLOS Climate, 10.1371/journal.pclm.0000468 18 cites.

Modeling, simulation & projection of climate change, effects

Central Asian Future Dynamics of Coldwave and Cold Spell Under Changing Climate, Ledari et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70585

Evaluating Changes in Convective Environments Over Subtropical South America Under Forced and Natural Climate Variability, Chakraborty et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access 10.1029/2026gl125330

Global shifts in mountain wave turbulence within high resolution climate models, Smith et al., Weather and Climate Dynamics Open Access 10.5194/wcd-7-1733-2026

High-resolution projections of summer compound humid-heat extremes and GDP exposure in Eastern China, Yang et al., Atmospheric Research 10.1016/j.atmosres.2026.109341

Impacts of Different Anthropogenic Forcings on Tropical Cyclone Frequency in Large Ensemble Climate Model Simulations, Henry et al., Journal of Climate 10.1175/jcli-d-25-0442.1

Projected Changes in Wind Hazards From Extreme Extratropical Cyclones in the Northeastern U.S., Valle et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Atmospheres 10.1029/2026jd046823

Projecting Compound Wind-Rainfall Hazards From Tropical Cyclones in China Under Climate Change, Xu et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026ef008431

Projecting Spatial Synchrony and Socioeconomic Risk of Heatwaves and Extreme Precipitation in the future, Li et al., Weather and Climate Extremes Open Access 10.1016/j.wace.2026.100958

The Future of Atmospheric Heatwaves in Chile Projected by a Regional Climate Model, Petit-Laurent et al., International Journal of Climatology 10.1002/joc.70567

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Strong regional trends in extreme weather over the next two decades under high- and low-emissions pathways, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01511-4 53 cites.

Advancement of climate & climate effects modeling, simulation & projection

A global hourly ISIMIP3 climate forcing dataset for impact modeling, Bechtold et al., Earth system science data Open Access pdf 10.5194/essd-18-6637-2026

Current model capabilities and future predictive pathways of wildfires under a changing climate, Whaley et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-04013-w

Deciphering the Link Between Modeling Errors and the North Atlantic Surface Warming Pattern Projected by CMIP5 and CMIP6 Models, Douville et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl122158

Improving soil temperature simulation accuracy in Arctic permafrost regions by incorporation surface organic layer in CLM5.0, Liu et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111476

Interpreting Ensembles of Climate Projections for Impact Studies, Chandler & Brierley, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1002/wcc.70088

Km-scale regional coupled system in the Northwest European shelf for weather and climate applications: RCS-UKC4, Berthou et al., Geoscientific model development Open Access 10.5194/gmd-19-8535-2026

The added value of Med-CORDEX coupled high-resolution regional climate models in representing sea surface temperature and marine heatwaves in the Mediterranean Sea, Rovere et al., Ocean science Open Access pdf 10.5194/os-22-2725-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Artificial intelligence for climate prediction of extremes: State of the art, challenges, and future perspectives, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change, 10.1002/wcc.914 115 cites.

Cryosphere & climate change

Illusory early-warning signals of Greenland Ice Sheet destabilization, Robel et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2623190123

On thin glacial ice: New Austrian Glacier Inventory shows accelerating glacier shrinkage and 31 % area loss within two decades, Hartl et al., cryosphere Open Access 10.5194/tc-20-5157-2026

Projecting the evolution of the Northern Patagonian Icefield until the year 2200, Schaefer et al., cryosphere Open Access pdf 10.5194/tc-20-5115-2026

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Evolution of the Antarctic Ice Sheet Over the Next Three Centuries From an ISMIP6 Model Ensemble, Earth s Future, 10.1029/2024ef004561 73 cites.

Paleoclimate & paleogeochemistry

Recognition of two potential warming events in the Paleocene terrestrial record of North America and associated mammalian responses, Secord et al., PNAS Nexus Open Access pdf 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag289

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Opposing Changes in Indian Summer Monsoon Rainfall Variability Produced by Orbital and Anthropogenic Forcing, Geophysical Research Letters, 10.1029/2024gl109897 8 cites.

Biology & climate change, related geochemistry

Biome classification across global vegetation models reveals consistent biome shifts under future climate change, Scheiter et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-6409-2026

Broad-scale shift in dominance of arbuscular mycorrhizal trees along the Japanese archipelago associated with tree diseases and climate warming, Schaefer et al., Nature Communications Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41467-026-77711-w

Distribution and Habitat Suitability of Artemisia annua in China Under Climate Change Scenarios, Zhang et al., Ecology and Evolution Open Access 10.1002/ece3.74236

Evolution of flowering phenology over 44 years of climate change, Deurs et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2613665123

Experimental evidence of a biological soil crust degradation climate warming amplification feedback, Smith et al., Communications Earth & Environment Open Access pdf 10.1038/s43247-026-03874-5

Long-Term Warming Reduces Bacterial Diversity and Functional Potential in Temperate Forest Soil, Liu et al., Global Change Biology Open Access pdf 10.1111/gcb.71104

Seasonally asymmetric warming reshapes grassland stability across timescales, Lu et al., Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Open Access 10.1073/pnas.2608466123

The projected risk of plant invasions on the peri-Antarctic islands under climate change, Vorstenbosch et al., Ecography Open Access pdf 10.1002/ecog.08195

When warming stops lengthening the growing season: Insights from two decades of forest phenology in Central Europe, Nasiri et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111457

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Global change and premature hatching of aquatic embryos, Global Change Biology, 10.1111/gcb.17488 22 cites.

GHG sources & sinks, flux, related geochemistry

Assessment of Spatial Downscaling Used in Global Greenhouse Gas Emission Estimates, Sun et al., Earth s Future Open Access 10.1029/2026ef008225

Forest Floor Protection: The Critical Defense Against Post-Harvest Soil Carbon Loss, Wallace et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jg009694

From abandoned fishponds to mature mangroves: the integrated CO₂ balance of two contrasting coastal wetland landscapes, Wang et al., Agricultural and Forest Meteorology Open Access 10.1016/j.agrformet.2026.111469

High-Resolution Dynamical Downscaling Refines the Time of Emergence of Sea Level Rise in the Northwestern Pacific, Kang et al., Earth s Future Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026ef008543

Imaging deep carbon stocks with complex electrical conductivity, Orozco et al., Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.5194/bg-23-6287-2026

Inefficient consumption of natural gas drives methane emissions from a megacity, Zhao et al., Atmospheric chemistry and physics Open Access pdf 10.5194/acp-26-12911-2026

Methane emissions from municipal solid waste landfills in Tehran: Field measurements and modeling of a NASA-identified global super-emitter, Hassanabadi et al., Atmospheric Environment 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2026.122355

Projected amplification of global warming by warming-induced greenhouse gas emissions, Abernethy et al., Environmental Research Letters Open Access 10.1088/1748-9326/ae9e24

Spatial-Temporal Distribution Dynamics of Carbon Storage of Dominant Species in a Subtropical Evergreen Broad-Leaved Forest and Its Influencing Factors, Duan et al., Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2025jg008947

White Carbon: Bringing Managed Salterns Into Coastal Carbon Accounting, He, Journal of Geophysical Research Biogeosciences Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026jg010199

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Global riverine land-to-ocean carbon export constrained by observations and multi-model assessment, Nature Geoscience, 10.1038/s41561-024-01524-z 96 cites.

CO2 capture, sequestration science & engineering

CCS deployment policy choices under regional heterogeneity: Economy-wide impacts and spillovers in China, Xiao et al., Energy Policy Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115616

Deterministic Cost Estimation Approaches for Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage: A Review, Mohajeri & Azadbakht, Greenhouse Gases Science and Technology Open Access pdf 10.1002/ghg.70043

Marine carbon removal at a crossroads, Macreadie et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02740-8

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Enhancing electrochemical carbon dioxide capture with supercapacitors, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52219-3 61 cites.

Decarbonization

A 250-kilowatt system for co-production of hydrogen and fresh water from seawater, Jiang et al., Nature Energy 10.1038/s41560-026-02130-6

Accelerating renewable energy transitions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from Latin America, Moyo & Oree, Energy Sustainable Development/Energy for sustainable development Open Access 10.1016/j.esd.2026.102137

Critical gaps remain in carbon accounting at mine sites, Mervine et al., Carbon Management Open Access pdf 10.1080/17583004.2026.2730003

Photovoltaic deployment strategies for net-zero commercial buildings in India: A climate-zoned benchmarking approach, Azeem & Thomas, Energy Sustainable Development/Energy for sustainable development Open Access 10.1016/j.esd.2026.102135

Physical and Biogeochemical Ocean Response to Potential Offshore Wind Development Along the U.S. West Coast, Jacox et al., Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl123676

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Permeability partitioning through the brittle-to-ductile transition and its implications for supercritical geothermal reservoirs, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52092-0 29 cites.

Geoengineering climate

Impact of stratospheric aerosol injection on rangeland productivity and animal production in Africa, Ho et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1869700

Land Radiative Management Increases Heat Stress in Some Humid Regions, Cheng & McColl, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl125630

Pathway-dependent responses of temperature extremes under solar radiation modification over Northern Africa, Sian et al., Frontiers in Earth Science Open Access 10.3389/feart.2026.1884589

Aerosols

Impacts of Anthropogenic Aerosol-Forced North Atlantic SST Variability on the Simulated Historical Global Warming, Rashid, Geophysical Research Letters Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gl124086

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Surface albedo regulates aerosol direct climate effect, Nature Communications, 10.1038/s41467-024-52255-z 28 cites.

Climate change communications & cognition

Patient knowledge and views on the health impacts of climate change in primary care: a cross-sectional survey study, Stewart et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1930073

Shifting configurations of nationalism, populism, and conservatism: far-right environmental discourse on agriculture, climate, and energy, Lambrechts & Cleen, Environmental Politics 10.1080/09644016.2026.2728447

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Tackling the academic air travel dependency. An analysis of the (in)consistency between academics’ travel behaviour and their attitudes, Global Environmental Change, 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102908 27 cites.

Agronomy, animal husbundry, food production & climate change

Evaluating climate-driven agricultural suitability models for adaptation planning: stakeholder insights from British Columbia, Vakhshoori et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1928659

Exploring Behavioral and Social Dynamics in Crop Insurance Adoption amid Climate Change: Evidence from Paddy Farmers in Tamil Nadu, India, Thiyaharajan et al., Weather Climate and Society 10.1175/wcas-d-25-0063.1

Future warming enhances rates of population increase of arthropod crop pests globally, Molina et al., Ecography Open Access pdf 10.1002/ecog.08568

Impact of stratospheric aerosol injection on rangeland productivity and animal production in Africa, Ho et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1869700

Local climate variability indicators show differentiated socioecological impacts and opportunities for agroforestry-based adaptation in the Colombian Andean-Amazon, Ángel-Sánchez et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1881072

Minimizing climate change adaptation trade-offs in African rangelands, Clark et al., Nature Sustainability Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41893-026-01938-0

New labour and agricultural damages improve climate cost estimates, Moore et al., Nature Climate Change 10.1038/s41558-026-02749-z

Participatory assessment of agricultural value chain dynamics and market opportunities for smallholder farmers in climate-vulnerable coastal Bangladesh, Kabir et al., Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-71038-8

Rethinking climate vulnerability in livestock systems: evidence from exposure, adaptation, and within-system heterogeneity in West Africa, Adéchian et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1868024

Sustainable grazing management supports climate change mitigation in a mediterranean pasture, Ishaq et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1917508

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Climate change exacerbates the environmental impacts of agriculture, Science, 10.1126/science.adn3747 524 cites.

Hydrology, hydrometeorology & climate change

Extreme Dry and Humid Heat Seasons Are Changing Asymmetrically, Ivanovich et al., AGU Advances Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026av002516

Intensified Warm-Season Nighttime Precipitation over Large Tibetan Plateau Lakes: Evidence from Satellite Observations, Yang et al., Advances in Climate Change Research Open Access 10.1016/j.accre.2026.09.006

Water governance under pressure: neoliberal structures and collaborative freshwater management in Lincolnshire, United Kingdom, Tariq et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1840817

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Evaluation of precipitation extremes in ERA5 reanalysis driven regional climate simulations over the CORDEX-Australasia domain, Weather and Climate Extremes, 10.1016/j.wace.2024.100676 17 cites.

Climate change economics

Green energy and the shadow economy: implications for environmental sustainability in G7 countries, Uddin et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1871821

Guaranteed income as an anticipatory action for climate change and disaster preparedness in the US, Prandoni et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1838033

Rethinking overseas expansion: climate risk and Chinese corporations’ cross-border mergers and acquisitions, Guo & Wu, Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access pdf 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1896051

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The role of green financial sector initiatives in the low-carbon transition: A theory of change, Global Environmental Change, 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2024.102915 30 cites.

Climate change mitigation public policy research

Carbon mitigation governance strategies in Morocco, China, and Norway, Nefzi & Bouzidi, Discover Sustainability Open Access 10.1007/s43621-026-04602-x

Framing the transition: How consultants shape public energy governance in Sweden, Reindl et al., Energy Research & Social Science Open Access 10.1016/j.erss.2026.104959

Strategic pathways for decarbonization: a data-driven typology to strengthen climate policy, Bento et al., Figshare Open Access 10.6084/m9.figshare.33600992.v1

Tripartite evolutionary game analysis of emission reduction in EU road freight transport under ETD and ETS2 policies, Cai et al., Frontiers in Environmental Science Open Access 10.3389/fenvs.2026.1921416

Varieties of decarbonization: Comparing state narratives of Germany, India, and Mexico, Zambianchi et al., Energy Policy Open Access 10.1016/j.enpol.2026.115598

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The impact of electricity market reform on renewable energy production, Energy Policy, 10.1016/j.enpol.2024.114306 35 cites.

Climate change adaptation & adaptation public policy research

Assessing landslide probability changes under climate change scenarios as a basis for adaptation strategies, Chu et al., Bulletin of Engineering Geology and the Environment 10.1007/s10064-026-05309-z

Compound and heterogeneous relationships between climate extremes and global net migration, Petrova et al., Nature Climate Change Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41558-026-02752-4

Knowledge co-production and co-dissemination for climate change adaptation: insights based on Chokwe district, Mozambique, Jonas et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1935074

On race, racism and racialization: reflections on climate mobility, Baldwin, Climate and Development 10.1080/17565529.2026.2729553

The emergence of climate migration research as an academic field, Kohutova et al., Frontiers in Climate Open Access pdf 10.3389/fclim.2026.1825882

Weather extremes in migration dynamics: evidence from the Philippines, Innocenti & Randelli, Scientific Reports Open Access pdf 10.1038/s41598-026-67411-2

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
What is limiting how we imagine climate change adaptation?, Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 10.1016/j.cosust.2024.101476 45 cites.

Climate change impacts on human health

Balancing urban green space benefits and vector-borne disease risk under climate change: Critical decision-making for 21st century public health, Ferguson et al., PLOS Climate Open Access pdf 10.1371/journal.pclm.0001016

Impact of Climate Warming on All-Causes Mortality in China: The Role of Non-Optimal Temperature Exposure and Multi-Scenario Projections to 2050, He et al., GeoHealth Open Access pdf 10.1029/2026gh001897

Intimate partner violence in sub-Saharan Africa under climate change and socioeconomic scenarios, Peisker et al., Global Environmental Change Open Access pdf 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2026.103224

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Spatio-temporal characteristics of Heat stress over Nigeria using evaluated ERA5-HEAT reanalysis data, Weather and Climate Extremes, 10.1016/j.wace.2024.100704 24 cites.

Climate change impacts on human culture

Climate Change and Outdoor Sport in Chile: A Review of Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation, Carrasco, Weather Climate and Society 10.1175/wcas-d-25-0217.1

Other

A strengthening yet less extreme Atlantic–European jet during winter, Brönnimann et al., Nature Geoscience Open Access 10.1038/s41561-026-02069-z

Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
The 2023 Atlantic Hurricane Season: An Above-Normal Season despite Strong El Niño Conditions, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 10.1175/bams-d-23-0305.1 15 cites.

Informed opinion, nudges & major initiatives
Most cited from this section, published 2 years ago:
Disaster effects of climate change in High Mountain Asia: State of art and scientific challenges, Advances in Climate Change Research, 10.1016/j.accre.2024.06.003 75 cites.

Articles/Reports from Agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations Addressing Aspects of Climate Change

Indiana Renewables and the Residential Real Estate Market, Faulk et al., Purdue Extension Community Development and The Center for Business and Economic Research at Ball State University

This brief summarizes the findings of two larger reports examining how proximity to commercial wind turbines or large solar projects affect house values in Indiana. Using data from 2004 to 2024, the authors provide state-specific estimates to inform state and local officials and residents. They found no statistically significant negative effects on residential property values associated with proximity to large wind or utility-scale solar projects in Indiana.

Sustainability in Action 2026. The new rules of business resilience, Sweep and Cap Gemini

Climate disruption is costing companies now and the data cannot keep up. 94% of businesses report climate-related financial losses over the past two years, but 79% say their data is not sufficient to inform strategy. Fragmented data is the biggest thing standing between leaders and climate action Top barriers to sustainability data infrastructure, as reported by senior leaders: 34% limited system integration; 34% scaling across geographies; 31% incomplete Scope 3 or supplier data. These data may be behind, but the returns are already here. Share of leaders reporting measurable ROI today, by area: 43% from better procurement and supply chain efficiency; 52% from reduced regulatory and compliance costs; 41% from improved risk management.

Consumer Attitudes on Corporate Climate Action: Insights for Today’s Business Environment, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, Maslansky + Partners, and Potential Energy

The business landscape around climate action has shifted dramatically. But not in the ways heated policy debates might suggest. An in-depth analysis of consumer attitudes via a survey of 2,000 voters across the U.S. reflecting a representative range of political affiliations, ages, and incomes supports a different conclusion. It reveals something surprising for some: despite increased political polarization and a challenging regulatory environment, the business case for climate action has continued holding strong. What’s more, the authors suggest that corporate retreat from environmental commitments carries more reputational and financial risk than maintaining a clear, consistent stance. And perhaps most surprisingly, even those skeptical of climate policy remain open to the business case. Across party lines, strong majorities believe that climate action is smart business and would support companies that invest in clean energy and limit climate pollution.

What are the top social media platforms used by each of Global Warming’s Six Americas?, Ettinger et al., Yale University and George Mason University

In Fall 2025, as part of a biannual Climate Change in the American Mind survey, the authors asked a nationally representative sample of Americans (n = 1,146) how often they visit 14 different social media platforms. They were also asked how often they hear about global warming on social media. Across Global Warming’s Six Americas, the most commonly visited social media platforms are YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram. The Alarmed hear about global warming on social media more often than other segments of the Six Americas.

California IOU Grid Capacity to Fully Serve Local Load with Distributed Solar+Storage Systems during Summer Peak/Net Peak Hours https://www.kevala.com/resources/grid-capacity-to-serve-local-load, Kevala, The Coalition for Community Solar Access

The authors estimate the amount and geographic concentration of large investor-owned utility (IOU) distribution-connected load in California that could be served by fully exporting front-of-the-meter distributed solar+storage resources, such as community solar+storage, or storage-only resources during summer peak and net peak demand hours without back-feeding onto the sub-transmission or transmission system. Specifically, the authors estimate the total load and corresponding number of 5-MW systems, each discharging at full capacity for 4 hours, that could be interconnected to the distribution grid and operated from 4 p.m. to 9 p.m. from June through September, with the discharged electricity being fully absorbed by local load behind each substation.

The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: An Initiative of Eastern States of the United States, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Inc., Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Inc

The participating states of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) released a report tracking the investment of proceeds generated from RGGI’s regional CO2 allowance auctions. The report tracks investments of RGGI proceeds in 2024 and summarizes how these investments promote ratepayer affordability, drive pollution reduction, and deliver additional benefits across the region. The RGGI states have individual discretion over how to invest proceeds according to state specific goals. Accordingly, states direct funds to a wide variety of programs, touching all aspects of the energy sector. In 2024, $856 million in RGGI proceeds were invested in programs including energy efficiency, clean and renewable energy, beneficial electrification, greenhouse gas abatement, and direct bill assistance. Over their lifetime, these 2024 investments are projected to provide participating households and businesses with $2.6 billion in energy bill savings and avoid the emission of 4.4 million short tons of CO2. The largest share of the investments was directed to energy efficiency, with 46% of the 2024 total. Other categories receiving significant investments include direct bill assistance, clean and renewable energy programs, beneficial electrification, and greenhouse gas abatement and climate adaptation programs.

Communicating about Climate and Clean Energy in an Age of Affordability, Andrea Everett, Heatmap and Embold Research

Each phase of research built on the previous one, starting with a large national survey to uncover the core values, priorities, and beliefs of three broad segments of the electorate with different views of climate change. These groups were labelled as Skeptics, Persuadables, and Persuadeds. For climate and clean energy communicators, the electorate is best understood as three distinct audiences. Persuadeds already believe in the 11 urgency of climate action and clean energy. What they lack is the conviction that their own actions matter, so the core tasks are to give them concrete, achievable things to do and to help them see that their efforts matter. Persuadables are open but unconvinced, and on the central issue of clean energy affordability they demand proof they can see close to home, rather than broad statistics or slogans. Skeptics, meanwhile, may be reachable through appeals to their values of personal freedom and energy independence, supplemented by evidence on cost and reliability, but with so few trusted messengers to make the case, clean energy remains a tough sell.

Ahead of the Deal: How the United States Can Build an Energy Project Pipeline in Emerging Markets, Katie Auth, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The author argues that global U.S. electricity investment initiatives keep falling short for the same reason. Regardless of the divergent objectives and political rationales that drove each administration’s efforts, they all tried to mobilize private capital into energy projects using the same strategy: supporting individual deals at the very latest stages of project development. This works relatively well in mature economies, but not in the many emerging markets where few projects ever reach that point. The approach simply does not fit the reality of what is needed in the energy sectors of most emerging markets today. And it has left the primary implementer of U.S. development finance, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), with too few good projects in which to put its capital. To build a diversified pipeline of high-quality energy projects that feeds the DFC’s portfolio for years to come, achieves U.S. strategic goals, and expands commercial opportunities for American firms and technologies, U.S. development finance must pivot in three key ways including incentivize strategic, early-stage risk, delegate origination to external partners, and focus assistance on grid systems and procurement.

West-wide Transmission Study: 10-Year Horizon Report, Western Transmission Expansion Coalition

The 10-year Horizon Study offers a holistic, integrated evaluation of Western interregional transmission needs, with a focus on identifying transmission gaps and filling them with actionable projects. In performing the assessment, drivers of the growing need for transmission over the approaching 10 years became clear. Western Transmission Expansion Coalition's (WestTEC) forecasts show Western peak electric demand increasing by 30% in the next decade. This increase is more than three times greater than what the West experienced over the last decade. Nameplate generation capacity is anticipated to increase by 76% in the next decade, more than twice the historical rate. Plans to procure intermittent resources by several Western entities will increase reliance on transmission to manage supply variability. By 2035 the Western grid will increasingly depend on the geographic diversity of load and generation to maintain reliability, which drives high-volume power flows across and between regions. Extreme events requiring transfers between entities occur during summer and winter peaks, cold snaps, and periods of high generation output. This highlights how diversity strengthens the system but requires transmission capacity to do so.

The Cost of Heat: Managing Pennsylvania’s Thermal Transition, Kristin George Bagdanov and Kevin Carbonnier, Building Decarbonization Coalition

The authors call for a managed gas transition: a coordinated, regulator-led strategy to limit unnecessary gas investment, retire portions of the gas system where cost-effective alternatives exist, and protect customers and workers during the shift to cleaner heating and cooling. This managed gas transition is one part of a broader thermal transition: the long-term shift toward cleaner, more affordable, and better-coordinated systems for delivering heat. The analysis that follows traces how Act 11 accelerated gas system spending, how those costs affect customer bills, and why neighborhood.

The Impact of Climate and Environmental Change on Brain Health, Ikiz et al., International Neuro Climate Working Group

The authors synthesize the current scientific evidence on how climate related environmental exposures affect neurological health, mental health, cognition, neurodevelopment, and healthy brain aging. In addition to presenting the Neuro Climate Framework, the authors identify priority directions for future research through the Neuro Climate Research Agenda and outlines stakeholder-specific recommendations through the Neuro Climate Action Roadmap, providing practical guidance for researchers, policymakers, healthcare professionals, educators, communities, individuals, and international organizations.

2026 NYC Heat-Related Mortality Report, Bureau of Environmental Surveillance and Policy, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene

Heat contributes to the deaths of approximately 500 New Yorkers, on average, each year during the warm season of May through September. Inequities by race and income persist in the people and neighborhoods most impacted. Deaths across all races, however, were more common at home, underscoring the importance of access to and affordability of home cooling to prevent death. The authors report estimated trends in heat-exacerbated deaths for the current and past several decades (1974-2023) in 10-year rolling time windows to provide more stable estimates than previous 5-year aggregation and align with the 10-year period used to describe the temperature-risk relationship in the report. For heat-stress deaths, counts and the annual average for the past ten years (2016-2025) are reported.

Disaster Risk: Improvements Needed to Enhance FEMA’s National Risk Index, Currie et al., United States Government Accountability Office

The authors found that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) partially followed leading practices for risk assessment and information quality during the development, operation, and maintenance of the National Risk Index (NRI). The authors made three recommendations, including that FEMA provide information to users on how to apply NRI results effectively and systematically solicit, collect, and incorporate user feedback to inform NRI improvements.

Winter 2026 Arctic Events: A System Performance Review, Clark et al., Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and North American Electric Reliability Corporation

This system performance review focuses on understanding what occurred during the Winter 2026 Arctic Cold Period. The authors also highlight cold weather preparation improvements made prior to the Winter 2026 Arctic Cold Period that supported reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System during the period. The authors engaged with numerous electric and natural gas entities across the eastern half of the United States3 and Texas to gather the information necessary to provide an overview of the performance of the Bulk-Power System and natural gas system during the Winter 2026 Arctic Cold Period. The authors' analysis shows that the Winter 2026 Arctic Cold Period was fundamentally an endurance challenge (sustained reliable operation during extended periods of system stress) that stretched electric and natural gas systems for several days, revealing how extended cold snaps amplify risks across generator performance, fuel supply chains, load forecasting, interregional energy transfers, and system operators. Electric entities reported multi-day reliability challenges driven by equipment cold weather limitations, deferred maintenance, and constrained fuel availability, while natural gas systems faced infrastructure constraints, production obstacles, and logistical barriers that affected upstream deliveries and non-fuel consumables.

Wetlands for Climate Partnership Report (California), Pietri et al., The Nature Conservancy et al

California has lost more than 90% of its historic wetlands, prompting major state investments through initiatives such as AB 1757, CARB’s Scoping Plan, Pathways to 30x30, and Proposition 4. Drawing on workshops, agency discussions, and practitioner engagement conducted from 2024 to 2026, the authors present current progress, persistent barriers, and key opportunities to accelerate wetland restoration and management needed to achieve California’s climate, resilience, and biodiversity goals.

Spending and Safety Outcomes in U.S. Gas Distribution Systems: An Assessment of DIMP & PHMSA’s Call to Action, Seavey et al., The Future of Heat Initiative

Over the past 15 years, two federal initiatives — the Gas Distribution Integrity Management Program rule and Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's Call to Action — have fundamentally reshaped how U.S. gas utilities invest in safety, one by promoting integrity management and the other by encouraging accelerated replacement of certain pipelines. The authors presents the first comprehensive evaluation of these initiatives. They found that utility safety spending has been significantly misallocated: since 2011, capital spending is up 200% and customer delivery charges have nearly doubled, yet measured safety outcomes have not improved commensurately. The analysis traces this divergence to regulatory frameworks that often fail to ensure that capital investments are guided by rigorous risk assessment and systematic evaluation of alternative risk-mitigation strategies. The authors urge state and federal regulators, utilities, and other interested parties to take action to improve outcomes for the public.

A fossil-free Australia: An ambitious Paris-aligned phase-out of coal, gas and oil from the national energy system, Houlie et al., Climate Analytics

The authors show that Australia can meet its climate goals and reach net zero emissions by phasing out fossil fuels. The authors modelled a new Fossil Fuel Phase-out (FFPO) scenario, a Paris-aligned pathway for Australia informed by the latest global evidence. This scenarios' results are then compared to the Australian government's current policies - the Current Policy Projections (CPP) scenario. A fossil fuel phase-out for Australia to meet its climate commitments and to play its role in global efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C is urgent. The authors show this is possible in all sectors, present policies the government needs to adopt, and highlight what the government is not doing - or needs to be doing more of. The government needs to start this phase-out now.

Global Snapshot of Climate-related School Disruptions in 2025, Ji et al., United Nations Children's Fund

Globally, at least 171 million students – from pre-primary to upper secondary education – experienced school disruptions due to climate events in 2025. Climate-related school disruptions in 2025 could cost affected students at least US$200 billion in lifetime earnings through lost learning and widening education inequities. At least 1 in 10 students had their schooling disrupted due to climate-related hazards in 2025. 75 per cent of the 171 million affected students are in low- and lower middle-income countries. Schools in 106 countries or territories were affected by climate hazards, with 40 countries experiencing multiple instances of school disruptions.

Methane Made in America, University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law

The authors provide a user-friendly ranking of the Top 10 oil and gas sites in three basins, Appalachia, Permian, and Haynesville, as seen by one of the most sophisticated methane-detection satellites in the world. The authors define the Top 10 sites as those with the highest average methane emission rate observed from January 1,?2025, to June 1,?2026, by the Tanager-1 satellite, excluding sources with two or fewer detected plumes. Where possible, the authors also identify the “potentially responsible operator” of each site and give information on the site’s public health effects.

Ratepayer Impacts of Arizona Public Service’s Gas Resources, McGarvey et al., Sierra Club and Synapse Energy Economics

Natural gas purchases to fuel Arizona Public Service (APS) power plants currently account for 5% of residential bills. Gas prices can be affected by external factors including global geopolitical events and domestic extreme weather events. Therefore, APS’s reliance on gas resources exposes ratepayers to fuel price volatility risk. Gas price spikes could increase average residential customer bills by over $9 per month. Data centers are driving up electricity demand in Arizona. Since its 2023 Integrated Resource Plan, APS has increased its' planned additions for 2030 by 4.6 GW to meet increased demand. APS is responding by increasing its' reliance on gas. APS plans to increase nameplate capacity of natural gas from 5.1 GW in 2023 to 7.8 GW in 2030, a 48% increase. Gas could make up 32% of the company's generation mix, compared to 19% in 2023. This will lock customers into increased bills for many years and increase ratepayer exposure to gas price risks.

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The next water crisis is beneath our feet

Wed, 16 Sep 2026 16:48:35 EST

This is a re-post from Yale Climate Connections by Sanket Jain

Extreme heat and widespread drought related to climate change have been in the headlines this summer everywhere from Europe to the Colorado River Basin to Puerto Rico and Bangladesh. But drought is only the beginning of the problem for drinking water. Scientists say the depleted groundwater supplies that remain will warm by 2.1 degrees C globally by the end of this century – changing their chemistry and leading to contamination.

And heat is just one concern. Droughts and fluctuating rainfall patterns are also altering groundwater quality. The good news is that around the world, local and regional authorities are experimenting with ways to replenish groundwater, including methods for collecting excess rainfall or surface runoff and channeling it to replenish aquifers. The work is in early stages, but some methods already are showing promise.

Warming water, changing chemistry

As groundwater warms, dissolved gases become less soluble, while organisms underground can consume oxygen more rapidly. Because many aquifers already contain little oxygen, modest warming could make them even more oxygen-poor.

In some aquifers, this shift can mobilize naturally occurring contaminants such as arsenic, manganese, and phosphorus from surrounding rocks into groundwater, making it less safe to drink. The extra phosphorus can fuel harmful algal blooms when groundwater eventually flows into rivers and lakes. Warmer groundwater may also favor pathogens linked to waterborne diseases.

Under a stable climate, Earth gets warmer deeper underground because heat from the Earth’s core moves toward the cooler land surface, explained Barret Kurylyk, a professor of civil and resource engineering at Dalhousie University and Canada Research Chair in Coastal Water Resources.

“In the past few decades, the land surface has warmed due to climate change,” he said.

As the surface becomes warmer than shallow aquifers, the usual temperature difference reverses, causing heat to move downward toward groundwater. Movement of rain or snow downward can also transfer heat into groundwater, exacerbating the change in groundwater chemistry.

This heat transfer matters because groundwater accounts for 99% of the Earth’s liquid freshwater, provides about half the world’s drinking water, and supplies nearly 40% of the water used for irrigation. By 2100, an estimated 77-188 million people are expected to live in areas where groundwater exceeds the highest drinking-water temperature acceptable threshold adopted by any country.

What happens after a drought

In the remote Kasanal village in Southern India’s Karnataka state, Santosh Naik says the annual monsoon is no longer enough to fill his two wells. The 38-year-old farmer said that by August 2026, his 60-foot wells were 90% empty, even though they would normally fill within a month of the rains.

Naik has spent over a decade drilling deeper in search of water. Since 2011, he has dug 14 borewells – narrow, machine-drilled shafts – across his five-acre farm, each about 300 feet underground. Now only three are functioning. But he is not just worried about declining levels. The water quality is changing too, he says.

“Earlier, we used to drink water from borewells and wells, but if you drink that water now, you will definitely fall ill,” he said.

He added that the entire village has stopped drinking water from its wells.

Naik grows sugarcane, soybean, peanuts and sorghum, but his harvests have been falling as his water supply has gotten saltier. Since 2020, his annual sugarcane production has been about 80,000 kilograms lower, costing him about 280,000 Indian rupees ($2,935).

His experience illustrates a broader problem across India. An analysis of 20,994 groundwater observations estimated that about 29% of the study area, including 25% of cropland, had elevated groundwater salinity.

Changing contaminants

Scientists confirm that climate extremes can change how water moves through the soil and what it carries. One team monitored 13 groundwater wells across three aquifer systems in Germany for up to eight years. As groundwater levels declined, its molecular composition increasingly resembled that of water draining through the soil.

Senior study author Gerd Gleixner, a biogeochemist and professor at the Max Planck Institute for Biogeochemistry, said that during drought, larger pores open up in soils. When heavy rain follows, these pores can carry water rapidly toward groundwater instead of allowing it to move slowly through the upper soil.

“The problem is that this water that comes down is not supposed to go down directly. It is supposed to go more slowly, so that there is more time for progressive processing in the upper part,” Gleixner said.

The upper soil normally acts as a kind of “main bioreactor,” processing substances before they reach the groundwater. But rapid flow through these pores can bypass some of this processing, allowing substances from the surface to reach groundwater more directly.

Gleixner said this rapid downward movement can carry unwanted substances from the surface into groundwater, including antibiotics and, potentially, microplastics.

Scientists are also investigating what happens to groundwater when it is pumped more heavily during droughts. Researchers in California’s San Joaquin Valley analyzed water-quality records from over 3,000 public drinking-water wells over the 2012-2016 drought and the recovery that followed. During the drought, nitrate and total dissolved solids increased in many wells. As pumping intensified, wells drew a larger share of modern-aged groundwater, which was more likely to contain contaminants linked to human activities, such as nitrate. As wetter conditions returned and groundwater levels recovered, many of these changes reversed.

The water people once trusted

Farmer Shivaji Tasgave, 83, no longer trusts the water from a 200-year-old well that served his family for generations after it turned blackish and foul-smelling.

But when the rains failed to arrive as expected, he was forced to rely on this water to irrigate his crops. Half his peanut and sugarcane failed to grow.

In his remote Jambhali village in Western India, Tasgave said that almost 150 wells in his neighborhood have become unusable because of deteriorating groundwater quality.

Along coastlines, groundwater quality can change when the balance between freshwater flowing toward the sea and seawater moving inland is disturbed. Under natural conditions, groundwater flows from land toward the sea, creating a pressure that helps keep seawater from moving inland. When that freshwater pressure weakens, seawater can move farther inland into freshwater aquifers.

A team of scientists in Germany found many coastal groundwater systems are vulnerable to this shift. Between 1990 and 2024, they analyzed about 480,000 coastal groundwater monitoring locations worldwide. They found statistically significant groundwater-level changes in 28% of observations over nine-year windows, and 21% over 19-year windows. Declines became more frequent in the last nine years.

“These declines may reflect a combination of causes, including lower rainfall, drought and reduced groundwater recharge, but also potentially unsustainable groundwater abstraction that exceeds groundwater recharge,” said Annika Nolte, an environmental and data scientist at the University of Bremen, Germany, who led the study.

“Seawater intrusion can make groundwater less suitable or unsuitable for human consumption and may ultimately threaten reliable drinking-water supplies from wells,” she added.

When saline groundwater is used for irrigation, it can also reduce soil fertility and crop yields. A global meta-analysis found that irrigation with salty water reduced crop yields by 17.3% compared with freshwater irrigation.

Giving groundwater a chance to recover

In many parts of the world, researchers are experimenting with different ways to help aquifers recover. Monitoring groundwater levels and salinity, and improving estimates of present and future groundwater recharge, are essential to determine how much water can be withdrawn without weakening freshwater heads, Nolte said.

In the Netherlands, a solution named "Water Battery" has been operating near the village of Epe since 2015. Water from natural springs is collected in a human-made reservoir and then pumped to infiltration ponds, where it seeps into the groundwater. The water is stored underground, while natural biogeochemical processes improve its quality before the groundwater is extracted.

California has been adopting a similar strategy. Excess surface water can be diverted onto selected farm fields to replenish depleted aquifers, increasing groundwater storage and improving water availability during dry periods. Separate field studies in California almond orchards have also shown that flooding fields during the trees’ dormant winter period, in moderately drained to well-drained soils, has little effect on root production or crop yields.

Cities are also finding ways to use stormwater effectively. In the Argentine coastal city of Pinamar, researchers evaluated rain gardens, which are shallow, planted areas designed to collect stormwater and let it soak into the ground. Gardens improved groundwater recharge, particularly during low-intensity rains, where recharge efficiency increased more than sixfold.

Although the approaches differ, the idea remains the same: Instead of moving excess water away, let the ground hold on to it.

This article first appeared on Yale Climate Connections and is republished here under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

The Atmosphere Just Set a Water Vapor Record

Tue, 15 Sep 2026 15:08:51 EST

This is a re-post from The Climate Brink by Andrew Dessler

A few days ago, on an atmospheric sciences mailing list, Prof. Gary Lackmann pointed out that August 2026 set a record for the amount of water vapor in the atmosphere. I thought this was right in TCB’s wheelhouse, so I’ve dug further into the numbers in this post.

What does “precipitable water” mean?

Precipitable water (abbreviated PWAT) is the water in the atmosphere that’s available to condense and fall as rain or snow. We quantify it by calculating how deep a puddle it would make if you condensed all of the water vapor in the atmosphere and rained it to the surface. The value is typically reported in millimeters.

Here is the average PWAT over the 1991–2020 period. The global average is about 24 mm, enough to make a puddle about an inch deep.

The distribution of PWAT follows the distribution of temperature. The reason is thermodynamics: the amount of water vapor that air can hold increases by roughly 7% for every degree Celsius of warming, following the Clausius–Clapeyron relation. The result is high PWAT in warm tropics and low PWAT in cold polar regions.

It is increasing

The planet has been warming, so you might expect that the PWAT should also be rising. Indeed, this is what we see. Here is global-mean PWAT for every August since 1979.

Also plotted is the August global average temperature; it’s also going up. In fact, we see the expected correlation (r = 0.86) between PWAT and temperature.

August 2026’s PWAT was 1.5 mm above the average PWAT in August of the 1980s, a difference of 5.8%. This is in the ballpark of what we would expect given the ~1°C of global average warming over this period.

We’re #1

A few days ago, news came out that August 2026 was the hottest month in the last 170 years. Yup, climate change strikes again (with an assist from El Niño).

link

Therefore, it might not be too surprising that August 2026 also set a record for PWAT, 27.35 mm, beating the previous record (July 2024) by 0.04 mm1.

The data I analyzed only goes back to 1979, but given the very strong connection between PWAT and temperature, it is unimaginable that any month in the last few thousand years, maybe 100,000 years, has more PWAT in the atmosphere than August 2026. We are, as the proverb says, living in interesting times.

Why this matters: extreme rain

PWAT is one of the most important factors that controls the intensity of rainfall. In particular, we expect increases in PWAT to increase the frequency or intensity of extreme precipitation events. This has been confirmed in data. For example, Kunkel et al. (2020) concluded:

An analysis of 3,104 stations in the United States shows virtually every station exhibits a positive correlation between precipitable water (PW) and extreme daily precipitation (EP) with over one-third statistically significant.

In Trenberth et al. (2003), the authors state:

We have argued that because heavy rainfall rates greatly exceed evaporation rates and thus depend on low-level moisture convergence, then the rainfall intensity should also increase at about the same rate as the moisture increase, namely 7% per K with warming.

The IPCC AR6 report says:

In summary, precipitation extremes are controlled by both thermodynamic and dynamic processes. Warming-induced thermodynamic change results in an increase in extreme precipitation, at a rate that closely follows the C-C [Clausius–Clapeyron] relationship at the global scale (high confidence).

So the increase in PWAT is not just a weirdo statistic. It is a statement about the ceiling on the worst rain events we can face.

July 4 flooding

As an example of a real-life case, let’s consider the flooding in Texas on July 3-4, 2025. This tragic rain event caused flooding that claimed the lives of more than 130 people, including 27 campers and counselors at Camp Mystic.

The PWAT over Texas for that event was incredibly high. Here is a plot of the percentile rank of PWAT at 2 am CDT on July 4, 2025.

Percentile rank of precipitable water at 2 AM CDT on 4 July 2025, relative to all hours within ±10 days of July 4 in 1979–2025.

Most of the state has PWAT above the 95th percentile, with a large plume of moisture in the middle of the state exceeding the 99.9th percentile. Here is a histogram of PWAT for the grid point closest to Kerrville:

Distribution of precipitable water over Kerrville for all hours within ±10 days of July 4, 1979–2025. The red line marks 2 AM on 4 July 2025

PWAT over Kerrville was 55.6 mm, about 60% higher than a typical early-July value of 35 mm. Out of 23,688 late-June/early-July hours over 47 years of data, only 23 hours were moister.

It is inarguable that the high PWAT contributed to the extreme rain of this event. Given that we can connect increases in PWAT to global warming, we can confidently conclude that climate change made this rain event more intense than it otherwise would have been.

The bottom line

The atmosphere holds more water vapor than it used to because it is warmer than it used to be. August 2026 saw the highest water vapor levels in the modern record due to the extreme warmth from climate change and the El Niño. This trend is not going to stop as long as we’re dumping carbon into the atmosphere and it’s going to contribute to more and more intense rain events.

Code for the plots in this post can be found here.

1 That doesn’t sound like much, but it corresponds to about 5 trillion gallons of water.